The Grice Companion

Notes for the Carnap/Grice Conversation

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Chapter 1

Introduction

J. L. Speranza is an Italian born in the pampas who has dedicated his life so far to Gricing this and that. He holds (in the wall of his room) a doctorate [Spe95] from the University of Buenos Aires on Grice – “Pragmatica Griceana”. (This, he regrets, while recognised by Western Educational Services alright – has been translated as “Grecian Pragmatics” – but he don’t (sic) mind. He has written extensively, but more recently, spoken extensively on matters Gricean at the Grice Club which he created just to annoy Dan Sperber.
Chapter 2

Grice Biography

2.1 A Chronology


Thirties


Forties

1941 Personal identity. Mind.

1948 Meaning. repr. in WoW.

Fifties

Sixties

1961 Causal theory of perception. Repr. in WoW

CHAPTER 2. GRICE BIOGRAPHY


1969 Utterer’s meaning and intentions. Philosophical Review. From original 1967 manuscript. Repr in WoW as Essay 5.

1969b Vacuous names. in Davidson/Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. O. Quine.

Seventies


1975 Logic and Conversation. Originally second William James lecture


Eighties

2.2. **GRICELAND**

Herbert Paul Grice was born in Harborne, Staffs in 1913 and died in 1988. He wrote thus far three books:

- Studies in the Ways of Words [Gri89]
- The Conception of Value [Gri91]
• Aspects of Reason [Gri01]

He was educated at Clifton and Corpus Christi, and was Tutor in Philosophy for more than forty years at St. John’s to end as full professor of philosophy at Berkeley.

2.3 Religion and Morality

During this period (as a student) Carnap gradually came to disbelieve in God, without being aware of any change in his beliefs on moral questions.

Grice’s religious inclinations are harder to pin down. Chapman in fact sounds rather authoritative when she states that ”Grice lost all faith by the age of 19” or something. You can never be so sure. Chapman redeems herself by noting the very many religious references, eschatological and Biblical, in Grice’s various writings.

While a disbeliever in God, Grice liked to play God. Borrowing on this idea by Carnap of pirots which karulize elatically, Grice founds a full programme in the vein of the ideal-observer. What we would do, as God, to secure the survival of pirots. While not religious in nature, it has a religious tone that is absent in the writings of Carnap in any respect.

2.4 Influences

While Carnap would write, ”The men who had the strongest influence on my philosophical thinking were Frege and Russell” in that order\(^1\), Grice could be more irreverent.

A 1913-born man finds the strongest influence in a linguist born in the 1930s: Noam Chomsky and the Vienna Circle refugee: Quine. —”I have to admit” Grice writes (or words), that what ”I admired in them is their method – never their ideas, which I never respected, really”. Grice’s choice is particularly agonistic: in the

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\(^1\)But was the order significant? Carnap is very specific about the ways in which he was influenced by these men, and Russell’s influence seems to have been more significant in shaping Carnap’s philosophical programme.
sense that it provokes sheer agony in us: ”for I never ... over the
fact that these two genii never agreed ON ANYTHING”. And they
lived so close!

2.5 Carnap in London

Carnap gave three renowned lectures in London in 1934 [Car35].
This Grice must have been aware of. He was in his early 20s, then,
but I'd think Ayer would have made the thing known in Oxford.

Grice was VERY concerned with what Austin was doing – be-
fore the Phoney war.

2.6 Aristotle

It really all starts with Aristotle. Hume is Where the Heart Is, but
Kant is the big influence when we are speaking of the Carnap/Grice
interface. Grice refers to Kantotle and Ariskant as apt abbrevia-
tions of what he has in mind when he thinks of the greatest of
them all. If the early Carnap is best seen as a neo-Kantian, Grices
pedigree can be traced back as early as Oxford Hegelianism. Ryle,
who had been an adherent of Heidegger (and had reviewed Heid-
deggers Sein und Zeit for Mind in 1929, had sent Ayer to Vienna
(Ayers Weiner Kreis crisis, as it were). On his return, the enfant-
terrible as he then was and Grice depicts him as, he soon splits
from Austin’s playgroup. Everything Grice notes, was brought to
a halt with The Phoney War.

2.7 The Wars

Carnap fought in the Great War. Grice in the ‘phoney’ one. Grice’s
father was operative during the Great War when Carnap fought.
Grice’s father was a businessman – a rather poor one. He invented
a contraception that was good during the Great War but found
useless in the aftermath. In 1939 Grice joined the Royal Navy and
fought the Germans in mid-Atlantic theatre of operation. He was
transferred to Admiralty in London in 1942.
Carnap possibly acquired some pessimism after the Great War. After all, the Germans lost. This contrasts with the strange optimism felt by the Brits in the post-war period. Grice included. They were grown up, they had been forced to grow up too soon. Yet they had not been able to develop their philosophical talents. Now in their thirties, a whole generation had been devastated. They had no time to lose. Grice’s efforts were directed at the formation of a new generation of philosophers at Oxford – along with his current fare of unappointed tuttees. Strawson was Grice’s favourite student, and the one which gave some sense to his rambling life. At the senior level, the influence of Austin was paramount.

2.8 After the War

After the war, Grice becomes more and more influential in Austin’s ‘kindergarten’, and eventually gets the greatest credit of them all: he travels to the USA to deliver the William James Lectures, where he manages to pun on Heidegger alla Carnap (“Heidegger is the greatest living philosopher, if you can take me seriously” ([Gri89] Essay 1)). Its sadly after Carnap’s demise that Grice introduces his “pirotological programme” in the APA presidential address (Pacific Division) for 1975. He becomes more metaphysical as gives the Carus Lectures (published as [Gri91]). His postmortem influence grows as his “Aspects of Reason” lectures get published in 2001 [Gri01].

Grice regards metaphysics as comprising both a general and a special branch. The general branch comprises two subbranches, metaphysics proper, qua theory of the category, and eschatology, qua theory of transcategorial epithets. The special branch includes cosmology and rational psychology.

2.9 The Oxford Circle

The Oxford Circle. The Berkeley Circle. If Carnap was ultimately Vienna Circle, there’s more of a larger geographical spectrum in Grice. “The Carnap Circle” – by this we mean the Carnap con-
2.10 SYSTEM $G_{HP}$

Grice lists 13 items ([Gri89] ii) which Grice thinks are constitutive of a good formal language. They reproduce almost verbatim Carnap’s own ideas of axiomatic languages which he had drawn independently from Euclid and the modern formal logicians like Frege and Gödel. System $G_{HP}$ is best illustrated with simple utterances like the one Carnap used in “Introduction to Semantics”. Grice agrees that lack of sense here is actually a good thing. For what is the logical form of, “Pirots karulize elatically”? We need a meaning postulate. An x is a pirot P iff it karulize K, where K is extensionally defined as a class such that its members are the denotata of all the names of pirots. The elatically qua adverb should not deviate us from the gist of the logical form. More important is the need to quantify. Are all pirots meant? Or is there some scalar implicature at work (“Some pirots karulise elatically”; “some not”. Is karulising the pirots raison detre. Is, in the words of Carnap’s meaning-and-necessity something that holds for all possible worlds.
where pirots exist? In other words, indeed Aristotles, is karulisng an essential property for pirots? Are we to read Carnp’s sentence as pirots having ("MUST") to karulis elatically? These are the goals. The means are simple enough in Morrisian terms. We need first a Syntactics where ’proof’ is defined, with Gentzen-type rules added for good measure (if we are going to formalize this as \((x)Px \rightarrow Kx\), we need introduction and elimination rules for both (x) and . Then we need a proper formal Semantics. This should allow for scope indicator devices. While pragmatics in Carnapcopia is the realm of pragmatism, the landscape of Griceland is more formal. The third element in System G, Pragmatics, is the realm of implicature

\section{2.11 Metaphysics}

Grice, as a Brit, would be more familiar with the views of Waismann, the member of the Vienna Circle who had made it to England. Grice lectured on metaphysics for the BBC. The result is in D. F. Pears, “The nature of metaphysics”, [PSP57]. This is vintage Grice. i.e. Grice self-presenting as a metaphysician as ’ambitious’ as Kantotle was. Metaphysics was starting to cease being the term of abuse he felt Ayer had turned it into. Metaphysics as a discipline in need of professional defence.

Grice, unlike Carnap, was professionally involved in DEFENDING metaphysics. He delivered annually two courses on Metaphysics. Usually with G. Myro. Naturally, he felt the defence of the discipline was what was professionally and institutionally required from him, especially after becoming a full professor at Berkeley in 1975. Grice’s student, Sir Peter Strawson had become by 1968 the standard for metaphysical theory as understood in England and Oxford. As Waynflete professor he became more and more interested in neo-Kantian foundations for the discipline.

\textbf{How formal can we get} Myro was a special influence in Grice’s metaphysical thought. Educated at Oxford in Balliol, he had a strict logical background and inspired in Grice much of what transpired as Grice’s System Q, which Myro later re-baptised System
2.12. **SEMANTICS FOR SYSTEM G**

G – “in gratitude to Paul Grice for the original idea”. The syntax of System G makes use of scope devices to allow for pragmatic implicature.

These undertake two forms:

(i) the use of square brackets to indicate common-ground status. Grice provides formal rules for the introduction and elimination of square brackets in ([Gri89] xviii)

(ii) the use of numerical subscripts (in Vacuous Names). This allows for the scope maximal readings of formulae but allowing as well for a minimal reading upon a simple numerical transformation.

**Dogmatism** Grice and Strawson had defended the analytic-synthetic distinction in ”In defense of a dogma” but Grice grew sceptical as to the success of that defense (of an underdogma, as he later had it). He grew more and more pragmatist towards the viability of the need to postulate the distinction.

2.12  **Semantics for System G**

Carnap’s ”meaning postulates” have affinities with Grice’s notion of ’entailment’ which he drew from Moore. Moore, while not a formal logician, is responsible for this coinage, which appealed to Grice, as he would contrast, in his System G, only entailment with ’implicature’. There would be no place for ’presupposition’ or truth-value gaps in this scheme, as there is in Strawson. The metaphysical implications of Grice’s choice of a bivalent standard interpretation of System G are obvious. The Man is the Style. Grice spoke excellent English. As Clifton and Corpus Christi educated, he found easily crowds of followers, especially in America, in younger philosophers who had grown tired of their dogmatic empiricist teachers. Grice brought a breath of fresh air. This is ironical as seen from the other side of the ’pond’, in that the breath of fresh air can be looked, in a sort of inverted snobbery, as an irreverent reactionary dogmatism! On the other hand, Carnap was perhaps less influential among the younger philosophers.
CHAPTER 2. GRICE BIOGRAPHY

2.13  Griceland and Carnapcopia Galore

It’s pretty easy to trace genealogical trees from Grice to the major figures in the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of a decade ago or so. It is perhaps less easy to do same with Carnap. Important metaphysicians with Gricean influences include G. Bealer, G. Myro in the USA. Strawson and Peacocke in the US. A search for ‘metaphysics’ and Grice retrieves more hits in Google than it retrieves for ‘metaphysics’ and Carnap. The growth, continuing, of Gricean bibliography is overwhelming. Books published in his memory, although not necessarily from cutting-edge philosophers. He was after all, a philosopher’s philosopher. The secondary bibliography on Carnap is perhaps not so vast.

2.13.1 Dialogue

Dialogue Much of the stimulus came from discussions with other philosophers. you write on your thing.

—

Note.

The diagogic. Further to the gladiatorial and the conversational, it is worth pointing out that the later Grice grew less and less tolerant of ‘epagoge’ and more and more embracing of diagoge. The distinction is Aristotelian, but Grice’s twist reminds one of Carnap’s pro-attitude for dialogue as stimulating.

Grice’s father had been a musician and so was his younger brother Derek. The trios they engaged in in Harborne gave Grice a rich ... (thing) about the value of cooperation: ”Getting together to do philosophy should be like getting to play music”.

— The epagoge/diagoge distinction is a basic one for Grice’s metaphysical methodology. If evidence is, as the neo-Kantian he was, all too clearly necessary, one would hope however that the BASIS for this or that metaphysical claim (or rejection) should rest on its own virtues rather than on the success or failure of having confronted its antithesis.

re the Vienna Circle as forum for open discussion.

”The Carnap Circle” – by this we mean the Carnap convivial approach to philosophy. This is echoed in the Grice Circle. Grice
could only work philosophically in convivial conditions. Although he never belonged to the early Austin club, he was a regular, indeed, Austin’s favourite member of Austin’s playgroup. On Austin’s death, Grice indeed led the playgroup until his departure for the States. What’s more important, while in the States he would gather at his ”at-homes” up the Berkeley Hills.

— It’s less clear what sort of convivial meeetings Carnap held while at Santa Monica, etc.

(my impression is that he was more isolated [RBJ])
Chapter 3

Notes on Grice and Others

3.1 Frege

The connection between Grice and Frege is only recently being developed, mainly due to efforts by Beaney and L. Horn. Much of the subtler writings by Frege on ‘tone’, ‘colour’ and ‘force’ can be given proper Gricean interpretations.

Frege was of course one of the inspiring models for Carnap. For Grice the Frege influence came much later. There is one single ref. to Frege by Grice in his ”Prejudices and Predilections” and this only in connection with the idea of the Fregean ’sense’ – he writes, ”in something like a Fregean sense”. Grice is considering, however, one of his ’metaphysical’ routines. His Humean projection is supposed to deliver concepts alla Fregean senses. E.g. the concept of negation, the concept of value, the concept of – you name it.

Grice on Frege. Frege was of course one of the inspiring models for Carnap. For Grice the Frege influence came much later. There is one single ref. to Frege by Grice in his ”Prejudices and Predilections” and this only in connection with the idea of the Fregean ’sense’ – he writes, ”in something like a Fregean sense”. Grice is considering, however, one of his ’metaphysical’ routines. His
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### 3.2 Hardie

Hardie was the philosophy don at Corpus Christi, Grice’s alma mater. Corpus had a reputation for the classics, and it was indeed as a classics scholar that Grice had come straight from Clifton. He would develop a friendship with Hardie – who taught him not just to argue but to play golf as well.

Corpus had its minus, though. It was NOT regarded as ‘in’ – and the fact that it catered for ‘boys from the provinces’ was enough to have Grice never ‘hearing’ of the Thursday evening group that met at the more prestigious All Souls. So we can say that Grice between the wars was a lonesome Grice. He managed to balance it with captaining the football team at Corpus and edit the college philosophy journal, “The Pelican”. And of course he obtained a first cum laude in Lit. Hum. BA which he later turned onto a MA – which was, as it should be, his maximal degree.

### 3.3 Hempel and Reichenbach

Grice cites Hempel and Reichenbach re: atomistic metaphysics in his ”actions and events” PPQ, 1986. Grice on Quine, Grice on Chomsky. While Carnap would write, ”The men who had the strongest influence on my philosophical thinking were Frege and Russell” in that order, Grice could be more irreverent. A 1913-born man finds the strongest influence in a linguist born in the 1930s: Noam Chomsky and the Vienna Circle refugee: Quine. –”I have to admit” Grice writes (or words), that what ”I admired in them is their method – never their ideas, which I never respected, really”.

Grice’s choice is particularly agonistic: in the sense that it provokes sheer agony in us: ”for I never ... over the fact that these two genii never agreed ON ANYTHING”. And they lived so close!
3.4 Kant

The double influence. The influence of Kant on Grice was a later one. As an Oxonian, Kant was not really taken too seriously. In this respect, Carnap’s education was more traditionally philosophical (His PhD which Grice never attained, was published in Kant Studien). Grice first came to the proximities of Kant via Abbott’s translation, and thus he was more of a minor Kantian than Carnap was, who could savour Kant in the vernacular! – In 1966, Sir Peter Strawson, Grice’s former student, published his ”Bounds of Sense” which brought Kant to the Oxonian map. Grice will later be invited to deliver the Kant Lectures at Stanford. But importantly for the present conversation: while it was Kant’s ‘theoretical’ reason that only influenced Carnap, Kant’s influence on Grice was just as strong on the theoretical if not MORE in the practical realm. Grice, unlike Carnap, looked for the UNITY of reason and justification in all our attitudes: not just doxastic, but notably boulomaic. This is a strong contrast with Carnap. His neo-Kantianism was theoretical in nature: aimed at epistemological problems concerning space/time coordinates as Carnap found had to be ‘vamped out’ to deal with discoveries by Einstein, etc. – But Carnap remained an irrationalist in matters of value and ethics. Grice on the other hand possibly had with Kant the insight of the categorial imperative: the dark starry night sky above us.

3.5 Quine and Morris

The connection here is pretty interesting. While every schoolboy knows that Quine was THE logical positivist in the USA, Morris also visited both Vienna and Prague.

The connection with Grice here is more indirect. But typically Gricean rather than triggered, as poor Grice often was, by Strawsonians whims. Grice had read Stevenson’s Ethics and language (1944), which was an offshot of Morris’s teaching.

In 1948, Grice lectured publicly for the Oxford Philosophical Society on ”Meaning”: he is opposing some simplified accounts of things he found in Stevenson – but which he in private lectures at
CHAPTER 3. NOTES ON GRICE AND OTHERS

Oxford – had extended to cover Morris, and still earlier, Peirce.

The project of the unified science which was so Morrisian and Carnapian is less easy to detect in Grice. His treatment of the ethical views of Stevenson, however, shows his sympathy with a philosophy that is at least ready and willing to be able to discourse on both matters alethic and practic.

1935 Philosophy and Logical Syntax - the text of three lectures given in London in 1934
— where, etc.
— This Grice must have been aware of. He was in his early 20s, then, but I would think Ayer would have made the thing known in Oxford. Grice was VERY concerned with what Austin was doing – before the Phoney war.

1929 Abriss der Logistik - An Introduction to Logic giving special attention to the theory of relations and its applications.
— Grice expands on the pirots that karulise elatically.
This can potch and cotch and fed.
Fed is a variable for a relation ship. in Carnap’s sense.
Grice made this public in the Lectures on Language and REality in a memorable summer symposium in Irvine in 1971. etc.

3.6 Russell

Russell has to be the lingua franca Carnap/Grice. Russell’s influence on Carnap, which was actually two-way, was invaluable. Carnap was the Russelian par excellence.

The influence of Russell on Grice is much more roundabout. Grice got an interest in Russell’s modernism, as he calls it, after Strawson had challenged it in Intro to logical theory (1952), which was as influential in Oxford as Carnap’s Intro to Semantics had been in the USA.

1939 Russell @ Chicago lecturing on meaning and truth
Grice’s attitude towards Russell is ambivalent. The most provocative Grice could get was in his ”Definite descriptions in Russell and the vernacular”, – 1970. Grice was ambivalent because Russell himself was. He had attacked Grice’s student publicly (”Mr. Strawson on referring”, 19–??. Mind. While Grice disagreed with Strawson
over details, he was of course going to align with Strawson against Russell who was giving the Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy some good press that actually worked very well for Grice’s professional life. So he had to be careful. His sympathies were for a formalistic approach to languages alla Russell and as evidenced in his System G. But his ‘pro-attitude’ was institutional and he felt he NEEDED to self-present as an ordinary-language philosopher, even if with very big caveats.

1940-41 takes visiting professorship at Harvard where Russell was giving the William James lectures.

Take the FL vs NL. Grice is clear in the ideology behind this. There’s what he calls Modernism and Neo-Modernism. This is Russell and the heirs of PM. This INCLUDES, almost by antonomasia, CARNAP. But then there’s neo-Traditionalism, and earlier, Traditionalism. By this Grice means Aristotelian logic (made respectable by Lukasiewicz) and Strawson’s and indeed Oxonian ordinary-language philosophical logic.

– the idea that ’&’, ’v’, –> – the connectives in the syntax of FL – do not correspond to the vernaculars of NL ’and’, ’or’, ’if’. Vide Carnap on this for a formalist (vs informalist) view. Grice came to prefer the modernism-traditionalism distinction to his earlier formalism-informalism. The important thing here is not so much the labels for these sorts of betes noires, but Grice’s own brand: the way he saw or presented himself ”in society”

– and what he called the longitudinal history of philosophy: ”a foot in each camp”, he jokes. But in essence, that’s the aptest description of his position. For his System G– complete with a pragmatics, allows to maintain that the alleged divergences between NL and FL are a matter of ’implicature’ rather than logical form. At the end of the Gricean day, Grice’s attitude towards Russell is ambivalent. The most provocative Grice could get was in his ”Definite descriptions in Russell and the vernacular”, – 1970. Grice was ambivalent because Russell himself was. He had attacked Grice’s student publicly (”Mr. Strawson on referring”, Mind. While Grice disagreed with Strawson over details, he was of course going to align with Strawson against Russell who was giving the Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy some good press that ac-
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3.7 Tarski

”Tarski was invited to Vienna in February 1930 and lectured on metamathematics, which introduced Carnap to the use of formal metalanguages. Discussions with Tarski and with Gdel helped Carnap towards his theory of logical syntax. He disagreed with Tarski on the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, which Tarski thought a matter of degree. Carnap visited Warsaw in November 1930, giving lectures to the Warsaw Philosophical Society, talking privately to Tarski” you wrote.

Tarski. The influence of Tarski on Grice is much more roundabout. Again, the trigger was his rebel student, Strawson. In a famous talk at Bristol, much much later revisited by Warnock (”Bristol Revisited”, in refs.) Strawson opposed Austin’s correspondence theory of truth. Strawson argued that ’is true’ was illocutionary in nature. This puzzles historians of philosophy as it would have been natural to to think AUSTIN would have embraced such a view. Yet, Austin, like Grice, were traditionalists in these. Grice dedicates a whole section of his third William James lecture to a discussion of Tarski. Grice ends up endorsing a neo-Tarskian view. The sentence of Tarski becomes an utterance in Grice, but the basic Tarskian idea of ’satisfactoriness’ is retained by Grice –. He even goes on to propose some implicatural solutions to formal problems having to do with blind uses of the metalogical predicate ’true’ in NL: ”What the policeman said was true”. Much later, when generalising what he now called ”alethic satisfactoriness”, he introduces special apparatus to his System G to deal with satisfactoriness in realms other than the alethic, notably the practical.
3.8 White

In 1961 Grice participated in a symposium with A. R. White – as second symposiast – organised by the Aristotelian Society in Cambridge (Braithwaite was the Chair) and which got published in the Proceedings.

3.9 Wittgenstein

Not my man. Wittgenstein, or Witters as the more irreverent Grice would have it. Again, Carnap’s contact was literally first hand. Grice was a closet Wittgensteinian. One reads his ”Method in philosohical psychology” and finds whose passages verbatim from Witters without a recognition (well, once). Grice would often quote from Witters. He is listed as an A-philosopher against which Grice reacts in the William James lectures.

First Wittgenstein, Last Wittgenstein, Middle Wittgenstein. The refinements of Witters’ philosophy are important for our reconstruction of the Griceland of Carnapcopia. — The first Wittgenstein falls squarely in the FL project of Modernism\(^1\). The middle Wittgenstein is the critical ie. crisis – Witters. The later Wittgenstein possibly had a stronger influence on Grice than on Carnap.

\(^1\)Though the Tractatus has only one foot in that camp.
Chapter 4

Topics

4.1 Formal v. Natural Languages

Grice is clear in the ideology behind this.
There’s what he calls *Modernism* and *Neo-Modernism*.
This is Russell and the heirs of PM
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Then there’s
neo-Traditionalism
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pragmatics, allows to maintain that the alleged divergences between NL and FL are a matter of ‘implicature’ rather than logical form.

4.1.1 USA Good for Logic

Carnap observes that the state of Logic teaching in the USA was much better than in Europe,
— this is echoed by Grice.

He confesses publicly that part of his professional reason – one wonders: couldn’t he just write? – for moving to the States was ”closer contact with logicians”.

Grice is already in 1969 quoting from Boolos, Parsons, Myro, Mates, etc. This is the beginning of his System G. Putnam would actually repress Grice’s formalistic fancies short: ”You are too formal” he’d complain. Grice did not fit the brit stereotype of the good humanistic Oxford don of the Austinian ilk. Of course they were wrong. Grice fit NO stereotype.

4.2 Metaphysics

how many angels could dance on the point of a needle.”
—
Grice cites the same example. In ”Prejudices and Predilections”.

To consider:
– Note
– Longitudinal unity/latitudinal unity. Metaphysics is important for Grice as a manifestation of philosophy’s latitudinal unity: everything connects and metaphysics is the ground-floor discipline: the theory-theory or first philosophy. But unlike Carnap, Grice was an inveterate historicist\(^1\). He rejoiced in what he called the longitudinal unity of philosophy which Carnap repudiated. Grice found inspiration in time-honoured philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, (Grice to the) Mill, etc. These he

\(^1\)Believer in the importance of the history of philosophy?
called ’the great’. He was less tolerant with the minors – among which he provocatively lists Witters!

— etc.

wiki ref. by you mentions Hempel

Grice cites Hempel and Reichenbach re: atomistic metaphysics in his “actions and events” [Gri86]. To provide quotes by me.

4.3 Betes Noires

4.3.1 phenomenalism

It is surprising Grice lists Phenomenalism as a bete noire. Carnap’s tolerance for phenomenalism was well known. His first hand encounters with Goodman couldn’t have been but positive. Grice’s brand of phenomenalism was of an earlier vintage. None of the sophistification of Goodman. Grice’s ideas of phenomenalism were either the rather rough notes by Ayer and I. Berlin in a rather influential paper in Mind in the 1930s. In the postwar period, Grice would rely on work by G. A. Paul, ”Is there a problem about sense data?” and Austin’s refutation of Ayer. Etc.


also:

4.3.2 inductivism

Strange Grice does not list this as bete noire. And confirmationism (Carnap’s reply to Popper’s falsificationism). The most technical Grice gets on this is his scattered refs. to Kneale (Ind. and Prob) in Reply to Richards, and his treatment of Davidsonian’s probability operators in various publications vis a vis generalisations to desirability operators:


this above vis a vis your ref. to Carnap/Kemeny

Bar-Hillel is cited by Chapman in connection with a possible influence of Carnap on Grice. Bar-Hillel had worked with Car-
nap and comes out with this idea that the divergence between FL and NL is in the ‘implicature’. He uses ‘implication’ and it’s the idea of pragmatics as the wastebasket of philosophers. Grice on metaphysical excrescences. etc.

### 4.3.3 Diagogism

The diagotic. Further to the gladiatorial and the conversational, it is worth pointing out that the later Grice grew less and less tolerant of ‘epagoge’ and more and more embracing of diagoge. The distinction is Aristotelian, but Grice’s twist reminds one of Carnap’s pro-attitude for dialogue as stimulating. Grice’s father had been a musician and so was his younger brother Derek. The trios they engaged in in Harborne gave Grice a rich ... (thing) about the value of cooperation: ”Getting together to do philosophy should be like getting to play music”. The epagoge/diagoge distinction is a basic one for Grice’s metaphysical methodology. If evidence is, as the neo-Kantian he was, all too clearly necessary, one would hope however that the BASIS for this or that metaphysical claim (or rejection) should rest on its own virtues rather than on the success or failure of having confronted its antithesis. Grice on Kant. The double influence. The influence of Kant on Grice was a later one. As an Oxonian, Kant was not really taken too seriously. In this respect, Carnap’s education was more traditionally philosophical (His PhD which Grice never attained, was published in Kant Studien). Grice first came to the proximities of Kant via Abbott’s translation, and thus he was more of a minor Kantian than Carnap was, who could savour Kant in the vernacular! – In 1966, Sir Peter Strawson, Grice’s former student, published his ”Bounds of Sense” which brought Kant to the Oxonian map. Grice will later be invited to deliver the Kant Lectures at Stanford. But importantly for the present conversation: while it was Kant’s ’theoretical’ reason that only influenced Carnap, Kant’s influence on Grice was just as strong on the theoretical if not MORE in the practical realm. Grice, unlike Carnap, looked for the UNITY of reason and justification in all our attitudes: not just doxastic, but notably boulomaic. THis is a strong contrast with Carnap. His neo-Kantianism was
theoretical in nature: aimed at epistemological problems concerning space/time coordinates as Carnap found had to be ‘vamped out’ to deal with discoveries by Einstein, etc. – But Carnap remained an irrationalist in matters of value and ethics. Grice on the other hand possibly had with Kant the insight of the categorial imperative: the dark starry night sky above us. Grice on Frege. Frege was of course one of the inspiring models for

4.3.4  Carnap

For Grice the Frege influence came much later. There is one single ref. to Frege by Grice in his ”Prejudices and Predilections” and this only in connection with the idea of the Fregean ‘sense’ – he writes, ”in something like a Fregean sense”. Grice is considering, however, one of his ’metaphysical’ routines. His Humean projection is supposed to deliver concepts alla Fregean senses. E.g. the concept of negation, the concept of value, the concept of – you name it.

4.3.5  Secularism

Grice’s religious inclinations are harder to pin down than Carnaps. Chapman in fact sounds rather authoritative when she states that ”Grice lost all faith by the age of 19” or something. You can never be so sure. Chapman redeems herself by noting the very many religious references, eschatological and Biblical, in Grice’s various writings. While a disbeliever in God, Grice liked to play God. Borrowing on this idea by Carnap of pirots which karulize elatically, Grice founds a full programme in the vein of the ideal-observer. What we would do, as God, to secure the survival of pirots. While not religious in nature, it has a religious tone that is absent in the writings of Carnap in any respect. Scholasticism rears its pretty face. how many angels could dance on the point of a needle. Grice cites the same example. In ”Prejudices and Predilections”. To consider: Longitudinal unity/latitudinal unity. Metaphysics is important for Grice as a manifestation of philosophy’s latitudinal unity: everything connects and metaphysics is the ground-floor discipline: the theory-theory or first philosophy. But
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4.3.9 Inductivism

Grice and Carnap on physics. Carnap on Einstein. Grice on Eddington’s two tables. Also: inductivism. Strange Grice does not list this as bete noire. And confirmationism (Carnap’s reply to Popper’s falsificationism). The most technical Grice gets on this is his scattered refs. to Kneale (Ind. and Prob) in Reply to Richards, and his treatment of Davidsonian’s probability operators in various publications vis a vis generalisations to desirability operators: Grice, Probability, Desirability and Mood Operators, 1973. Grice Aspects of Reason. On Probably, as a sentence modifier.

4.3.10 Empiricism

This is the first bete noire. But Grice fails to mention his twin: Rationalism. There is some mystifying about empeira, as the Greeks used the word. Peira is ultimately a tribunal. There is nothing to scary about having a doctrine based upon the idea of a tribunal.
CHAPTER 4. TOPICS

4.3.11 Extensionalism

While Grice lists this, he fails again to mention the twin: Intensionalism. Grice was not necessarily attracted to Intensionalism. So his rejection of Extensionalism is indeed a case of his epagoge, trying to refute a thesis rather than provide positive evidence for its contrary. The root tensio, that is common to both btes noires is an interesting one, and related to the deeper questions about meaning.

Since we are currently examining this vis a vis Carnap, we speak of ’Grice morphed onto an intensional isomorphist’. The early Grice was not. He would say that the utterer who utters,

\[ p \rightarrow i \ q \]

is the same utterer who utters

\[-p \lor q \]

These are intensionally nonisomorphic (perhaps – but this label is best applied to predicate calculus). What U means, however, is the same. As a defender of truth-functionalism, the early Grice is an extensional isomorphist.

The later Grice finds this a protectionist measure for the commodity of an explanation that does use ’intensional isomorphism’:

Grice then says he’ll select ”Extensionalism”, which he defines as

”a position imbued with the spirit of Nominalism [another bete noire] and dear both to those who feel that (b) is no more informative an answer to the question (a) than would be (d) as an answer to (c).”

Scenario I:

a: Why is a pillar box called ’red’? b: Because it is red.

Scenario II:

c: And why is that person called ’Paul Grice’?
d: Because he is Paul Grice.

Cfr. Geary’s daughter:

Geary: Why are pigs dirty? Daughter: Because they are pigs.

The picture of Extensionalism Grice presents is clear enough. It is
"a world of PARTICULARS as a domain stocked with tiny pellets ... distinguish[ed] by the clubs to which they belong”.

He had a thing for clubs. He would define Austin’s club as “the club for those whose members have no class” (or rather ‘for those whose classes have no members’)


Grice goes on:

"The potential consequences of the possession of in fact UN-EXEMPLIFIED features [or properties] would be ... the same.”

Grice then turns to a pet topic of his, ”Vacuity”. He had dedicated his contribution to the anti-dogmatist of them all, Quine, with an essay on ”Vacuous Names and Descriptions” published 1969 in Hintikka/Davidson (we need a reprint of that, urgently!). And he knew what he was talking about. We have discussed this with Roger Bishop Jones elsewhere (’Vacuity’ in Hist-Anal)

Vis a vis his critique of Extensionalism (and where is Grice’s diagogism when one wants it?) one may want to

"relieve a certain VACUOUS predicate ... by exploiting the NON-VACUOUSNESS of other predicates which are constituents in the definition of the original vacuous predicate.”

This is good, because his ”Vacuous Names” focuses on, well, names, rather than predicates or descriptors. Here his approach is more, shall we say, substantial: connotative, rather than denotative.

Grice exemplifies this with two allegedly vacuous (i.e. non-extensional) predicates:

1
   – ” ... is married to a daughter of an English queen and a pope”
2
   – ” ... is a climber on hands and knees of a 29,000 foot mountain.”

The second has echoes in ”Vacuous Names”

That’s Marmaduke Bloggs.

Marmaduke Bloggs is indeed a climber on hands and knees of a 29,000 ft. mountain. The Merseyside Geographical Society was so impressed that they had this cocktail in his honour. But he failed
to turn up.

"He is not at the party"

"Who isn’t?"

"Marmaduke Bloggs"

"He doesn’t exist. He was invented by the journalists”.

— etc. Cfr. Horn on a similar passage by Lewis Carroll on this – in his Symbolic Logic.

Grice is interested in what makes Marmaduke Bloggs an ’elusive chap, if ever there was one’:

"By appealing to different
”relations” [now, alla Carnap, Abriss]
to the ’primitive’ predicates, one can claim is
such distinct relation,
rather than the empty set beloved of extensionalists which each vacuous predicate is made equivalent to.”

But his objection to this move has to do with what he feels
an adhocness in defining the relations as involving again, NON-VACUOUS predicates.

– the relevant passage is available as google books –. (p. 70).

A SECOND TACK. (He is looking for harder and harder tacks)

A second way out to the alleged problem involves ’trivial’ versus
’non-trivial’ explanations.

Recall that for Grice all betes noires trade on the untradeability of explanations. They want to restrict the realm of explananda. They regiment our hopes for explanation. (Hume’s fork or his is-ought problem would be similar blockages).

Grice has it in clear enough terms:

”the explanatory opportunities for vacuous predicates depend
on their embodiment in a system”.

His caveat here is purely ontological, or shall we say eschatological:

”I conjecture, but cannot demonstrate,
that the only way to secure such a system would be to confer
SPECIAL ONTOLOGICAL privilege
upon the ENTITIES of PHYSICAL SCIENCE...”
But that’s Eddington ”non-visible” ’table’. And he had a foot on both camps here, or rather, he knew that, historically, he was and will forever be seen as a proponent of Austinian Code: the idea that there is wisdom in folk: the cathedral of learning is Science but it’s also Common Sense, as expressed in our ordinary ways of talking (ta legomena).

And he seems to be allowing that sometimes we do engage in talk where the entities of things OTHER than physical science are relevant too. Notably stone-age physics. This is possibly a thing of the past now, but most of the English ways of talking (if grammar is going to be ’a pretty good guide to logical form’) are imbued with it, and they would be just rejected en bloc if only CONTEMPORARY physical science, true physical science, is deemed articulatory only.

Grice notes at this point:

”It looks AS IF states of affairs in the ... scientific world need, for credibility, support from the vulgar world of ORDINARY OBSERVATION...” –

Eddington’s visible ’table’ to which he explicitly refers in his little quoted, ”Actions and Events” (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1986).

And this, he feels would be an ’embellishment’ in need of some justification. In other words, if the real table (of Eddington) is not made of matter, but of wavicles, why is it that a wavicle be deemed as a more fundamental entity than, say, ’table as we knew it’?

### 4.3.12 Functionalism

Again it’s difficult to see what twin bte Grice is having in mind. Not Formalism, but indeed, the standard antonymy is form versus function. As per Aristotle. Thus, think of cabbage. What is the function of a cabbage? To cabbagise, Grice suggests (2001 of cabbages and kings). Oddly, while Grice sees functionalism as a bte noire, the Original Christian found Formalist. We read from Bunyan: And as [Christian] was troubled thereabout, he espied two men come tumbling over the wall, on the left hand of the narrow way; and they made up apace to him. The name of the one was
Formalist. But what Bunyan is having in mind of course is mere Dogmatism. Something to consider here is that Grice may have thought that Functionalism is Not Enough. Thus, when B.F. Loar, for example defines simple things like Grices conversational maxims as empirical generalisations over functional states (Mind and Meaning, Cambridge University Press) we know that that will leave Grice cold. He is going to look for a deeper explanation than that.

4.3.13 Materialism

When it comes to this ism, again its interesting not just to consider the twin, but the root. After all, Grice was an Aristotelian, and matter is all there is for Aristotle: the hule. So Hylism would be a better term. At least less hybrid. By rejecting Hylism, Grice may be again saying that it is insufficient rather than wrong. After all for Aristotle, who played with hule, we need the basic compound: matter and form: hyle and morph. But doesnt hylomorphism sounds as a scarier bete than Hylism?

4.3.14 Mechanism

Indeed one bete noire destroyed by another. Antonym here: Telism. I.e. the idea that final causes are all we need. The root of mechanism in the Greek idea of mekhane is not as bad after all. Naturalism. Twin bete noire: non-naturalism, as per Moores non-naturalistic fallacy which Grice rejects in Conception of Value: value cannot be non-natural, as Moore would think about this. Grices sympathies were for constructed entities and constructivist approaches to value in particular along the lines made familiar in Oxford by J. L. Mackie and Philippa Foot (both authors he mainly focuses on in (1991)). Nominalism. Is he thinking of Realims as the twin bete noire? One thinks so. But Grice came only at a very late stage to become a realist, and with caveats. He never was the closet realist that Davidson was (Speranza here recalls his conversations with Davidson on this on occasion of Speranza delivering his very first Gricean paper in, of all places, Buenos Aires!)(vide Speranza 1989). Grice was no realist in that he thought that realism needed some transcendental justification: our beliefs have to
be true because they would be useless if they weren’t. Similarly he never abandoned the idea that only via sense-data do material objects enter our cognitive schemes: objects threaten and nourish us: sense data don’t. If the opposition is with realia over universalia, I would think Grice was enough of an occamist (would you modify Occam’s razor if you were not?) to throw the baby with the water. Phenomenalism. The funny bit about this that here we do have a case where both a bete noire and her twin (Physicalism) both scare the Christian in Grice! Strictly, the perfect antonym, at least for Kant, for this would be Noumenalism, as per Philosophy 4. A caveat however is in order: noumenon does not really oppose phainomenon, at least for the Grecians. Noumenon is the realm of thought. So its Mentalism which the proper bete noire would be. Incidentally, Mentalism can claim however, the status of the twin for the bete noire of Physicalism, too. Positivism. However, it may do here to consider betes noires that one usually associates with Positivism, too. Inductivism, Confirmationism, etc. What about Poppers falsificationism? Is this a twin bete noire here? It seems so. Strictly, the anonym for falsificationism would be confirmationalism.

4.3.15 Physicalism

The source for this all Prejudices and predilections, now safely deposited at BANC 90/35c, was triggered by a request by Grandy and Warner, so Grice may have been in a hurry. For indeed, a hasty etymological ramble leads you to conclude that Naturalism and Physicalism are two ugly rearing heads of the SAME bete. phusis of the Grecians was the Nature of the Romans. Reductionism. His twin, irreductionism, is just as scary. It would seem that indeed, analysis is what bridges C and G. So that an irreducible feature is a non-sequitur. Perhaps the clearest Grice gets on this is his reply to Davidson on intending. Davidson, who was perhaps Grices soul mate more than anyone else while at Berkeley, Grice found reductionist. And this in the sense, that Davidson went for the bigger picture, failing to see the leaves for the tree. His account of volition, for example, Grice finds obscenely reductionist.
Grice has manifestos to the effect: (words). Not that Davidsones picture is wrong; its just too simple: surely when I inspect my mind and see all the volitional things that I associate it with, theres no big core picture in terms of the desirability operator that Davidson is claiming is basic. So the anti-reductionist Grice is wanting to say that the richness of the phenomenon (or better, phenomena) in question has to be given proper due before going for the easy way out of a reductive (even) explanation. Scepticism. Twin bete noire? Dogmatism, just as bad. Alla Grandy (cited by Grice, [Gri89]:xix) we can say that its Underdog-matism, with Grice, but yet. The idea behind scepsis was not that bad: it was a thorough (but not perhaps that thorough, for Grice) examination. His caveats for anti-sceptical views however were clear in those essays Grice cared to reprint in [Gri89] that bear titles like, Common sense and scepticism. As a autobiographical reminder, Speranza should here disclose that indeed he felt very close to Grice when he realised that the topic of scepticism had fascinated Grice, as it had fascinated Speranza, from a tender age. Common sense and scepticism Grice dates as 1946. I.e. the third or fourth piece he produced. His first being Negation 1938. Grices arguments therein are directed towards Norman Malcoms assuming the Moorean position of the Ordinary Languager versus Phyrro.

I enjoyed your three points re: Carnap’s thing. Will see what I can say about it from G’s perspective. (Oddly Grice uses initials a lot: he has M, A, R, U, G., in his Retrospective Epilogue. So surely he would not object to C. He distinguishes between G and G* but I forget what the distinction amounts to.

4.4 Pirot Talk

More on the pirot talk. Vis a vis Carnaps focus on relations in his 1929 Abriss der Logistik, Grice expands on the pirots that karulise elastically. These can potch and cotch and fed where Fed is a variable for a relation ship. in Carnap’s sense. Grice made this public in the Lectures on Language and Reality in a memorable summer symposium in Irvine in 1971. etc. Can pirots implicate?

Bar-Hillel is cited by Chapman in connection with a possible
influence of Carnap on Grice. Bar-Hillel had worked with Carnap and comes out with this idea that the divergence between FL and NL is in the 'implicature'. He uses 'implication' and it's the idea of pragmatics as the wastebasket of philosophers. Grice on metaphysical excrescences. etc.

4.5 Carnucopia

Conceptual Map to
CARNUCOPIA and GRICELAND
(also one page only)
. . Aristotle
Hume is Where the Heart Is
Kant
(Kantotle, Ariskant)
.
Cornucopia
neo-Kantianism
Oxford Hegelianism
Ryle sends Ayer to Vienna
Wiener Kries
Ayer returns from Vienna Splits from Austin’s playgroup
The War
Grice influential in Austin’s ’kindergarten’
Grice travels to the USA to deliver the William James and puns on Heidegger alla Carnap. ”Heidegger is the greatest living philosopher, if you can take me seriously” ([Gri89]:i)

Carnap Grice introduces his pirotological programme in the APA presidential address (Pacific Division) for 1975.

Carnap dies
Grice gives the Carus Lectures (published as Grice 1991)

Then one page about
The Place of Metaphysics in
CARNUCOPIA GRICELAND
ontologia
generalis specialis
Theory of Categories
(a) cosmologia vs.
(b) psychologia rationalis
Eschatology

Then
one page for
Lingua Franca
(Carnap and Grice find they can hold a conversation in a lingua franca)
System G-HP
here I will provide the 13 items, I think they are which Grice thinks are constitutive of a good formal language ([Gri89]:ii – first two pages)
We are going to use a simplified semantics for
"Pirots karulize elatically"
— pirot P x is a pirot iff karulize K K as a class. = names of pirots the logical form of adverbs, the elatically of Carnap. quantifiers: all pirots karulize elatically understood. scalar implicature of ”Some” (Some pirots karulise elatically; some not) etc. essential properties. pirots MUST karulise elatically
FL NL
syntactics
definition of ‘proof’
Grentzen-type rules

Semantics
Carnacopian Griceland Pragmatics Pragmatics
the realm of pragmatism – the realm of implicature

The Actual Conversation.
For this Jones and Speranza met online and recorded their online dialogue. The result is as follows
CARNAP/JONES. Hello.
GRICE/SPERANZA. Hello.

GRICE-Speranza. Whatever
CARNAP-Jones. Whatever
– they part.

For the NOTES
— Waismann. Grice, as a Brit, would be more familiar with the views of Waismann, the member of the Vienna Circle who had made it to England.

— Grice lectured on metaphysics for the BBC. The result is in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics, 1957. This is vintage Grice. I.e. Grice self-presenting as a metaphysician as ’ambitious’ as Kantotle was. Metaphysics was starting to cease being the term of abuse he felt Ayer had turned onto.

— Grice, unlike Carnap, was professionally involved in DEFENDING metaphysics. He delivered annually two courses on Metaphysics. Usually with G. Myro. Naturally, he felt the professional defence of the discipline was what was professionally and institutionally required from him, especially after becoming Full prof. at Berkeley in 1975.

— Grice’s student, Sir Peter Strawson had become by 1968 the standard for metaphysical theory as understood in England and Oxford. As Waynflete professor he became more and more interested in neo-Kantian foundations for the discipline.

— Myro was a special influence in Grice’s metaphysical thought. Originated educated at Oxford in Balliol, he had a strict logical background and inspired Grice in much of what transpired as Grice’s System Q, which Myro later re-baptised System G – ”in gratitude to Paul Grice for the original idea”

— The syntax of System G makes use of scope devices to allow for pragmatic implicature. These undertake two forms: (i) the use of square brackets to indicate common-ground status. Grice provides formal rules for the introduction and elimination of square brackets in [Gri89]:xviii) (ii) the use of numerical subscripts (in Vacuous Names). This allows for the scope maximal readings of formulae but allowing as well for a minimal reading upon a simple numerical transformation.
Grice and Strawson had defended the analytic-syntetic distinction in "In defense of a dogma" but Grice grew sceptical as to the success of that defense (of an underdogma, as he later had it). He grew more and more pragmatist towards the viability of the need to postulate the distinction.

Carnap’s "meaning postulates" have affinities with Grice’s notion of ‘entailment’ which he drew from Moore. Moore, while not a formal logician, is responsible for this coinage, which appealed Grice, as he would contrast, in his System G, only entailment with ‘implicature’. There would be no place for ‘presupposition’ or truth-value gaps in this scheme, as there is in Strawson. The metaphysical implications of Grice’s choice of a bivalent standard interpretation of System G are obvious.

Grice spoke excellent English. As Clifton and Corpus Christi educated, he found easily crowds of followers, especially in America, in younger philosophers who had grown tired of their dogmatic empiricist teachers. Grice brought a breath of fresh air. This is ironical as seen from the other side of the ‘pond’, in that the breath of fresh air can be looked, in a sort of inverted snobbery, as an irreverent reactionary dogmatism! On the other hand, Carnap was perhaps less influential among the younger philosophers.

It’s pretty easy to trace genealogical trees from Grice to the major figures in the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of a decade ago or so. It is perhaps less easy to do same with Carnap.

Important metaphysicians with Gricean influences include G. Bealer, G. Myro in the USA. Strawson and Peacocke in the US.

The growth, continuing, of Gricean bibliography is overwhelming. Books published in his memory, although not necessarily from cutting-edge philosophers. He was after all, a philosopher’s philosopher. The secondary bibliography on Carnap is perhaps not so vast.
4.6 Dialogue

I.e. your gladiatorial thing as thesis. With a reference to Aristotle ‘epagoge’ which I think will look cute in Greek letters.

Then the second paragraph is your conversation thing – with Aristotle’s ”diagoge” in Greek letters. which will look cute.

The synthesis is: sort of what you say about this being an ”imaginary” conversation along these lines. To sound good literary, we can drop the Landor reference in the references:

Landor, Imaginary Conversations.

The epagoge/diagoge distinction used by Grice bears on this. It may be best provided some formalisation. Let ‘c1’ be claim c as put forward by philosopher C (Carnap). Let c2 be claim as put forward by philosopher G (Grice)

\[
\begin{array}{c c c}
C & G \\
c1 & c2
\end{array}
\]

In the epagoge model, c2 only attains sense vis a vis c1. G’s claim to fame is seen as C’s claim to infame, and vice versa. The epagoge works indeed gladiatorially: the success of c2 is in the defeat of c1 and vice versa. It is a zero-sum game, where game is loosely understood as such. More like a mediaeval joust, if you ask us.

In the diagoge model, we need to add pieces of evidence, e1 and e2. So we get

\[
\begin{array}{c c c c c}
C & G \\
e1 & c1 & c2 & e2
\end{array}
\]

The success of each claim does depend on the strength and virtue of their own corresponding backings. But we feel we need a synthesis to the epagoge-diagoge dialectic then. For there are issues regarding the incommensurability of the respective pieces of evidence and the topicalisation issue (are c1 and c2 about the same thing – or is Grice changing the subject). Last but not least, there is the question as to to what extent this is just ”imaginary”. After all, we are building a bridge: looking for some sort of ‘actual’ conversation, and it seems that we still have C with his c1 and e1 on one hand and G with his c2 and e2 on the other. So what gives? We propose then a sort of criss-crossing. Where we add e1’ : i.e.
evidence derived from c1 as it supports or fails to support c2. And we add e2’, i.e. evidence as derived from c2 which supports or fails to support c1. Only when we reach this level of bridging can we say that G is conversing with C and vice versa:

\[ C ~ G \]
\[ e_1 ~ e_2 ~ . . . . . . ~ c_1 ~ c_2 ~ . . . . . ~ e_1' ~ e_2' \]

Bunyan, John. (1678). The pilgrim’s progress from this world, to that which is to come, delivered under the similitude of a dream, wherein is discovered, the manner of his setting out, his dangerous journey; and safe arrival at the desired countrey. London: Nash.

[As early as] 1946, Bar-Hillel [was discussing] the sense of ‘imply’ identified by Moore, proposing to describe it as ‘pragmatical’ (p. 334). He identifies himself as a supporter of ‘logical empiricism’ (he quotes approvingly a comment from Carnap to the effect that natural languages are TOO COMPLEX and MESSY to be the focus of rigorous scientific enquiry) and his article [’Analysis of “correct” language’. Mind 55 328-30] is aimed explicitly at REJECTING philosophy of the ‘analytic method’ ... However, he suggests that by using sentences that are ‘MEANINGLESS’ to logical empiricists, such as the sentences of METAPHYSICS or [worse, JLS] aesthetics [never mind ‘ethics’. JLS], ‘one may nevertheless imply [emphasis Bar-Hillel. JLS] sentences which are PERFECTLY MEANINGFUL, according to the same criteria, and are perhaps even true and highly important’ (p.338). – cited by Chapman in her book on Grice.

4.7 technical

While Carnap has these as applying to ‘rejection’, in a more charitable light we can see the labels as applying to approaches. It seems plausible to entertain the idea that it takes a metaphysical stand to reject another. So what’s the technical side to this. G would surely oppose a characterisation of metaphysics as the realm of ‘synthetic’ truths. If anything of value, metaphysics has to transcend that realm. In the way that Nietzsche said (we think) that morality was beyond evil and good. The analytic-synthetic distinction must be one of the first offshoots of our metaphysical
thinking, so it cannot be presupposed by it! Now C’s way out here, the distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘analytic’ would be one that may perhaps appeal G. We mean, he was one for splitting anyday (never lump). Assuming a retreat to ‘analytic’ would be vicious here (or vascuous, if you want), we are left with ‘necessary’. Now, this operator Grice found increasingly complex. C’s idea that it deals with the denotatum rather than the denotans is one which would have appealed G. Echoes of ratio essendi come to mind. Grice was hoping (recall Hopeful is Christian’s soul mate in his pilgrimage to the Celestial City) that philosophy (or metaphysics, specifically) could provide a backing for ratio as apply to esse not just *cognoscere*. While C’s would have had the knee jerk reaction, ”Scholastic!” this need not be so. The idea is that while ‘must’ (the token of ‘necessity’ as it were) applies to various realms but it’s not for that reason ‘aequivocal’. It is rather *aequi-*vocal: i.e. the same vox for various items. There is ontological necessity, there is cognitive necessity, there is logical necessity (‘analyticity’ in C’s jargon). So what gives. Grice would go on to define metaphysics as that part of the discipline of the philosopher, perhaps qua eschatologist, which defines the axioms for our understanding of ‘must’. When and how are we ready to postulate an item as *deontic*. Deontic is the adjective that would have appealed Grice at this point. It’s the deon of the

### 4.7.1 Greeks

The idea that some things are, some others must be. The internal-external distinction C draws at this point would have sounded to G ”a mere Hartism”. Hart had distinguished between internal and external readings of things (notably ascriptions of right: ”Carnap is right” ”Carnap is wrong”. On an internal reading, we assume he is wrong. On an external reading we assume that someone assumes he is wrong. Grice discusses this feature of ‘deontic’ in connection with Nixon being appointed the Professor of Moral philosophy at Oxford! (Grice 2001). The levels of internal, external, and middle-of-the-way readings are formidably complex as Grice was wont to say. But in any case, the offshot is that the ‘deontic’ operator need
not be self-referential: i.e. it’s not like our grasp of the meaning of ‘deontic’ involves our acceptance of ‘deontic’ as deontic at a higher level. Ultimately Grice would have appealed to a mere reiteration of symbols. Some operators are not deontic. Notably the boulomai operators, the volitional operators. What we decide or deem that we’ll do. This is mere volitional. But volitional predicates have the ability to go recursive. We decide to decide. And we decide to decide to decide. When this iteration is given free reign, we find that we have cashed the deontic operator out of the boulomai operator. This type of transcategorial epithets would thus define the ‘necessity’ which we associate with this or that metaphysical scheme. In G’s case, his hidden agenda is not so hidden: he wants to license the metaphysics (or physics as he would sometime say) underlying English! (The sun rises from the East – will we still be using ‘rise’ knowing that that is NOT what it does? Isn’t this getting involved in stone-age physics? Whatever. But that is not a serious issue. More serious is the inability of ordinary English speakers to go beyond the solid ‘table’. The solid ‘table’ is what we mean by table. If it turns out that Eddington is right (as he most likely is) and the real table is a bunch of wavicles, we may still want to keep using the metaphysical scheme that we inherited from our ancestors – cavemen no doubt – out of respect for them, and because if we are not that dumb we know how to translate one metaphysical scheme onto another!

4.7.2 intuitive approach

There is something to be said for Carnap’s gut rejection for metaphysics. His claim to fame is actually his laughing at Heidegger’s Nothing Noths. So we could consider this in more detail. German: Nicht nichtet. This was thought serious enough by Ryle when he cared to review Heidegger for Mind. But what does “Nicht nichtet” amount to? At this point, Bar-Hillel’s throwing onto the same wastebasket ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ethics’ or aesthetics, won’t do. Carnap is a much more serious philosopher than early Ayer’s caricature of the statements of ethics as “ouch” and “pooh!” . But there is more to consider here. In this work we cannot hope to cover all
4.7. TECHNICAL

realms of statements, so we better focus on allegedly metaphysical statement or pseudostatements (schein- is the lovely suffix for Carnap here) of metaphysics. So what’s wrong with “Nothing noths”. Carnap thinks this breaks a rule of grammar. And it does! Heidegger MEANT it as a breach of a rule of grammar. Heidegger kept saying these things, to the point that, no C, but G, could laugh at him when he said, “Heidegger is the greatest living philosopher” (in [Gri89]:i). So what was Heidegger up to. We believe he was PLAYING with the rules of grammar. He is into “not”. “Not” is a trick of a word. He had an intuitive, or gutty feel for language as play. So out of “not” he coins the noun, “nought”, “Nicht”. (Nought is a complex word in English, involving ne- and aught. I.e. Not Something – No-Thing. Noths. But what about the verb, ‘noths’. Well, it does seem like a thing Nothingness would do. To do nothing. To who? G was fascinated by the grammar of verbal constructions. He played with things like ‘tigers tigerise’ (1991:x). So he wouldn’t have objected, upon proper understanding of what rules we are ‘flouting’ here – with a sprinkling of Strawson’s “Subject and predicate in logic and grammar” for good measure – to utter, “Nichts nichtet”. It’s like, if you can’t beat them, join them.

4.7.3 radical approach

G would have enjoyed that. Indeed Bradley for G, and Heidegger for C are what we may call arch- or ur-metaphysicians. Recall G’s WoW: “nobody since the demise of the influence of Bradley was even remotely inclined to believe that”, where we don’t even need to care what the claim Was. Some absurd extravaganza. This is amusing, because we do know that both C and G did care for their ancestors. C for Kant’s and Neo-Kant’s extravaganzas, G for Bradley (eg. on ‘negation’ or ‘deixis’). So it was more of a pose, that, we can say, get the headlines. The various readings of C’s specifics in his ”Ontological” essay would have amused G. Indeed Quine could get over the top about what ’there is’ – a seminal work that both C and Q were very aware of. But C’s radicalism was perhaps more ‘intuitive’ – if we can lump these two labels here – than G’s. G would have examined what we mean by ‘real’ or
‘really’ when C’s claim, on the serious reading of his “Ontology” paper, that this or that ‘does not really exist’. As opposed to th’other ‘does really exist’. After all, why, G would have it, should we give such a hoot to a mere ‘trouser-word’ such as ‘real’ is? Surely our radical opposition to a campaign as serious as metaphysics is presented to be (by metaphysicians, no doubt) should rest on something more substantial than that. The topic of the evidence gets us closer to the nail we need to hit. This is back to some of Grice’s betes noires (Phenomenalism, indeed) – but again, a close examination at how language works does suggest a neat way out. For we claim the denotata of our terms to go beyond the evidence we may have (or lack) to ‘assert’ the ‘warrantibility’ of our claims. “The cat is on the mat”. No intension here makes a strict reference as to how we get to KNOW that. It’s here where an examination of the ‘simpler ways’ in which ‘pirots karulise elatically’ will, we hope, eventually land us on the Celestial City. And then, wouldn’t we find it boring enough that we are going to scream alla Heidegger! (“Out! Get me Out of Here!”).

This quote from WoW:then

”(Mrs. Jack),” Grice says,

“also reproves me for ”reductionism,” in terms which suggest that whatever account or ANALYSIS of meaning is to be offered, it should not be one which is ‘reductionist,’ which might or might not be equivalent to a demand that a PROPER analysis should not be a PROPER REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS. But what KIND of analysis is to be provided? What I think we cannot agree to allow her to do is to pursue the goal of giving a LAX REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS of meaning , that is, a reductive analysis which is UNHAMPERED by the contraints which characteristically at- tach to reductive analysis, like the avoidance of circularity; a goal, to which, to my mind several of my opponents have in fact ad- dressed themsleves ((In this connection, I should perhaps observe that though MY EARLY ENDEAVOURS in the theory of mean- ing were attempts to provide a REDUCTIVE analysis, I HAVE NEVER (I THINK) espoused reductionism, which to my mind in- volves the idea that semantic concepts are unsatisfactory or even UNINTELLIGIBLE, unless they can be provided with interpre-
tations in terms of some predetermined, privileged, and favoured array of concepts; in this sense of ”reductionism” a felt ad hoc need for reductive analysis does NOT have to rest on a REDUCTION-IST foundation. Reductive analysis might be called for to get away from unclarity not to get to some predesignated clarifiers)). I shall for the moment assume that the demand that I face is for a form of REDUCTIVE analysis which is less grievously flawed than the one which I in fact offered; and I shall reserve until later considerations of the idea that what is needed is NOT any kind of reductive analysis but rather some other mode of explication of the concept of meaning” (WoW:351).

4.7.4 Clarification

In this respect, it is clarificatory that, for Grice, as for Carnap, psychological concepts should be introduced as theoretical terms, rather than as ones based on observation. The locus classicus here is Grice’s use of Ramsification to introduce T terms in terms of O terms (in Grice 1991).

We like the idea that indeed Grice is perhaps slightly hasty in dealing with all the betes noires at one fell swoop as it were, or at the one blading of the sword.

The fact that all of the betes noires end in -ism is perhaps telling. This is a Greek suffix, -ismos which of course Grice would NOT reject in other collocations: his beloved Aristotelian ’syllogismos’ for example. So we have to be careful.

Grice seems to consider that besides this common mark – they all end in -ism, they may also all be seen as the offsprings of ”Minimalism” – his rejection of deserted, or made-dessert landscapes (the rosebushes and cherry-trees in the springtime). We shall have to get back there.

4.8 Beyond the Pirot talk

CHAPTER FOUR: BEYOND THE PIROT TALK. As we have seen (3.2.2.1 i.e. our reactions to extensionalism) there are broader
issues here. To what extent will an intensionalist NOT feel betrayed by an intensionalist. Some of the most formidable passages in WoW:RE deal with this. He is here concerned with what we may see as an intensional, i.e. non-truth-functional context. But well need to elaborate on that. On p. 374 of WoW:RE he writes:

A truth-functional conception of COMPLEX propositions offers prospects, perhaps, for the rational construction of at least part of the realm of propositions, even though the fact that many complex propositions SEEM PLAINLY to be NON-truth-functional ensures that many problems remain — the naivete of Grice is formidable here. For he is saying that something is plainly or SEEMS plainly thus and thus. By what evidence. It seems that whatever evidence he has to SAY that is of a different kind from the evidence he is supporting as providing a rational construction. Etc. I would think that whatever Carnap had as an intensional context would fit the bill here in not being truth-functional. One is less sure that G would have been happy with a mere extensional treatment of modal propositions. Etc.

4.8.1 Un-Carnapian Grice

"The un-Carnapian character of my constructivism would perhaps be evidenced by my idea that to insist with respect to each [pirotic] stage in metaphysical development upon the need for THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION might carry with it the thought that to omit such a stage would be to fail to do justice to some legitimate metaphysical demand" (Gr91:76)

¿ "The un-Carnapian character of my constructivism"

he is thinking that Carnap was such a pragmatist that he was into ’theoretical justifications’ being practical?

would perhaps be:

evidenced by my idea that to insist with respect to each [pirotic] stage in metaphysical development

this in the context of what you were asking before about the objectivity of value judgements. Grice is introducing ’pirots’ or creatures the last stage of which will endow them with a capacity
4.8. BEYOND THE PIROT TALK

to project values onto the world (and thus turn them objective via construction).

“upon the need for THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION might carry with it the thought that to omit such a stage would be to fail to do justice to some legitimate metaphysical demand”

— yes here it is where he gets complex. For he uses too many neg. constructions, omit, fail to do... etc. omit and fail are so negative that one wonders... he is saying that not to omit is not to fail to include is to succeed So he is saying that by including value-thus construed he IS fulfilling a demand.

— I think the carnapian would say that if there is no theoretical justification one would not be succeeding.

Anyway, we will provide such a detailed exegesis that the reader will omit to fail to understand it, for she will!
Chapter 5

The City of Eternal Truth

5.1

And there it lay: the City of Eternal Truth. Carnap and Grice were in awe, as they approached it with veneration. As fellow pilgrims we can now report:

The early history of the City of Eternal Truth lies hidden in the mists of time. The City reached her present form under the patronage of Kantotle. In an aerial view we can see the total surface area of the temple covers 13 hectares or 35 acres, each dedicated to a philosophical speciality – and placing it among the largest Cities in the whole of Philosophy.

The City is the result of some urban planning. It is designed with 5 concentric ’monads’, or circumambulatory temple courtyards. Each of these is associated with one of the Five Elements – which are ultimately one, of course.

The innermost ’monad’ is not visible. It lies within the sanctum with the golden roof, and can only be entered by the Universal Maxim.

The architecture and the rituals of this City reflect its history and doctrine. Where we now find this beautiful and ancient City
CHAPTER 5. THE CITY OF ETERNAL TRUTH

was once an impenetrable Forest of Dogmatic Trees, which is a kind of mangrove.

This Forest gave The City her first and most ancient name, "Woody". Within this sprawling forest was a lotus pond, and at the southern bank of this pond existed a Cunning of Reason. A Cunning of Reason is a representation of Kantotle – which unites both the concepts of Form as well as of Formless in itself. In modern terms this formless-form might be called an abstraction. What Carnap calls an “Intension”. Intension means self existent [only different], signifying that the Fregean Sense [like the Natural Number] was not made by human beings, but came into existence by itself, from what Grice calls “Nature”.

To this lotus pond in the "Woody" forest came two saints, named Carnap and Grice. They came from very different backgrounds and from very different directions. But they came for the same reason: to witness Kantotles Cosmic Dance.

It had been foretold to them that if they would ‘elucidate’ the “Cunning of Reason” on the bank of the lotus pond in the forest, Kantotle would come to perform His Dance for them. Eventually this great event took place. Kantotle (in his guise as Plathegel) came to perform His Dance on a Saturday morning, when the moon was in the asterism Ryle, during Hilary, long before the Devil of Scientism era. Kantotle’s dance is called the Dance of Bliss. The two saints achieved liberation, and on their special request Kantotle (in his guise as Plathegel) promised to perform His Dance for all time at that place. For the full narration of the myth the reader is referred to chapter IV of the present Conversation (again – and again). The story of the origin of the worship of Kantotle in the City of Eternal Truth is told in the Logische Aufbau der Welt.

The Sacred History of the City of Eternal Truth, which is part of the “Principia Mathematica”, one of the 18 great vademecums or collections of mythology. From one of the saints, Carnap, which means “Slept in a Vehicle”, The City of Eternal Truth received her second name, Pirotgrad, meaning City of the Pirot. Its third name, Griceland, refers to the philosophy and doctrine of the temple, as narrated by Grice’s arch-enemy: Carnap, in his third reincarnation. “Gri-” means consciousness or wisdom. “-ce” signifies
“ether” in Pirotese but in Russell it means ‘hall’. Carnap-Corner-in-Griceland unifies the two aspects of the one and only Kantotelian doctrine. Meaning thus both “Hall of Wisdom”, as well as the place of the Ether of Consciousness.

\subsection*{5.1.1 Inside The City}

The edifice which now includes within its sanctum this Cunning of Reason form of Kantotle, situated on the southern bank of the sacred pound, is called “Bosanquet”. This term means place of origin or root place – an exaggeration, seeing that old Grice saw him as a 'minor figure’. “Bosanquet” can be found in the third courtyard, within the temple proper.

Facing east, it is a conventional temple with a sanctum containing the cunning of reason, and aa hall in front of the sanctum. In this hall we find the images of our two saints, Carnap and Grice. How the images got there BEFORE THEM is a great mystery. They stand with their hands folded, worshipping. A sanctum placed at an angle to the Cunning-of-Reason shrine, facing south, houses the consort of Kantotle, the goddess Aletheia. On the western wall of the shrine we find a relief sculptured of the Wishing Tree of Paradise (Eschatology). This shrine achieved its present form probably under the middle and later stages of the Vienna Circle. The main edifices of the temple are the five Halls. At the centre of the temple is situated the sanctum sanctorum or Holy Of Holiest. This means the Hall of Wisdom. It is the main shrine where Kantotle accompanied by his consort Aletheia (the Unveiled One) performs His Cosmic Dance, the Dance of Bliss. The World – or "Nature" – is the embodiment of the colossal human form. The City of Eternal Truth is the centre of this form, the place of the heart, where Kantotle performs the Cosmic Dance. The City is laid out as a labyrinth. For this reason the devotees may approach the central shrine from two sides. One is called Extension. A narrower path is called Intension. As blood flows to and from the heart. The 16 stupas topping the golden roof represent the sixteen strands of The Fabric. They also asymbolize the sixteen Strands – or goddesses. The roof of this hall is made of 21,600 tiles, representing
inhalations and exhalations of Pirots. The links and side joints symbolize the connecting veins – of the pirots, of course. The five main steps at the entrance to the shrine stand between the devotees and the image of Kantotle, covered in silver. They are the five seed words or syllables. By chanting these syllables:

\[
\text{KAN – TO — TLE}
\]

the devotee can cross the ocean of bondage and attain to the Lord. The granite plinth of the shrine is called Oxonianism – because it does duty for Vienna in providing a support for Kantotle (in his Russell re-incarnation). On all special occasions worship is performed to this plinth. The name, Hall of Consciousness or Hall of Wisdom, refers to the quality of wisdom which pervades the atmosphere, bestowed upon the worshippers by the Dance of the Lord. His boon is the experience of the Cosmic Dance. A unique feature is that the structure of the actual stage is made of wood, which has so far not been botanically classified but is nevertheless real. It is rectangular in form and here Kantotle is worshipped in his three aspects: as Form or Image, as Formless-Form – the crystal Cunning of Reason – and as formless. From the platform opposite one can see the image of the Dancing Kantotle, situated in the middle of the stage. Kantotle is facing south, unlike most other simpler Philosophers. This signifies he is the Conqueror of Dogma, dispelling the fear of death for Humanity. The Crystal Cunning of Reason is Kantotle as Formless-Form. It was formed from the essence of the crescent moon in Kantotle’s matted hair, for the purpose of peripatetic worship.

This is taken from its keeping place at the feet of the thing six times a day, and holy ablution is performed to him in the hall. Immediately to the proper right of this is the mystery of Analyticity. Here, behind a silk curtain which is black on the outside and red on the inside, is the Treasure of Meaning Postulates, in the form of Predicate Calculus. An abstract geometrical design, on which the deity is invoked. Behind the curtain, before it, hang a few strands of golden fig leaves. This signifies the act of creation – or Pirotology. One moment nothing exists, the next instant the All has been brought into existence.
At regular timings the curtain is removed to allow the devotees to worship the Ether which is the vehicle of the Absolute and Consciousness. The hall houses one more unique form of Kantotle. This is the Organon, the Ruby Lord: a replica of Kantotle in ruby form. This appeared out of the fire of the sacrifice in response to the devotion of the Modernists. Every Saturday, as part of the 10.00 oclock morning ritual, after the Recitation of the Crystal Cunning of Reason is also performed to the Ruby Kantotle. As conclusion of this ceremony the Ruby Thing is placed on the edge of the Swimming Pool and an Implicature is offered. This is the burning of camphor on a special plate which is shown both in front and behind the Ruby Thing. This brings out the special quality of translucence of this, creating a mystical spectacle for the onlookers. Nobody knows when the worship of Kantotle was established here, or when the City of Eternal Truth was build. The original wooden structure is doubtless, and ironically, the oldest structure in the temple complex, as the shrine of Plathegel is a later construction under the Neo-Kantians. The City has no features, really, that could help to date it and it might just as well be eternal, after all.

It is unique and no other structure is known like it anywhere else in Philosophy. Analysis by the Leibnizian infinitesimal method would be unreliable because it is known to have been regularly renovated during the centuries. But the origins of the City of Eternal Truth lie back in prehistoric times. According to the mythology the City was first constructed by a Philosopher King nicknamed ”Thales”. This Philosopher King was healed of leprosy by bathing in the sacred pond in the ”Woody” forest and witnessed the Cosmic Dance. The first gilding of the roof of the temple and the instituting of the formal worship are all attributed to this King Philosopher.

The first historical references can be found in Jowett’s translation of the Plato Dialogues, especially in the Timaeus. Here Aletheia, the six-faced Daughter of Yocasta and Socrates, is described as worshipping his parents in Athens, before going to do battle with a demon called Physicalism. This text can be dated to the fourth century BCE. The City of Eternal Truth is also prominently mentioned in ”De Consolatione Philosophiae”, an important
CHAPTER 5. THE CITY OF ETERNAL TRUTH

religious and philosophical text in ancient Latin, dating from the beginning of the Christian era. A few centuries later the temple and its Lord are often mentioned by members of the Vienna Circle, but only derogatorily and, especially by Schlick. The first historical persons to claim having gilded the roof of the temple are Baumgarten and his ‘cousin’, Kant. By this time the temple had already become important. The place where Students were crowned, and where they came to worship and receive counsel. How the gilding of the roof was done is a knowledge that was sadly lost with time. But it is without doubt one of the great technical achievements of ancient times. Immediately in front of the temple is the golden hall.

Its roof is made of copper, although Kanaka means gold. This is the gold of spiritual treasure: to experience Kantotle’s dance from so near. In this hall are most of the Saturday morning rituals of worship performed. The Early Morning rituals. The rituals with lamps and ritual objects. And the Ruby Thing. The pilgrims can enter certain areas of the hall for worship at specified hours. It is a controversy whether this was originally constructed together with the older hall, or some time later. This is the shrine in the form of a chariot, pulled by two stone horses. One represents Practical Reason, the other Theoretical Reason. It is situated opposite the old hall, in the third courtyard. It is the place of the dance contest between Kantotle and Plathegel.

Kantotle conquered Alethei, who would not calm down after she destroyed a powerful demon – Reductionism – by lifting his right leg straight up towards the sky. This dance is called “Gentzen”. Then and there Aletheia suddenly remembered who she really was, the peaceful consort of Kantotle, and she was able to leave her furious mood and returned to her peaceful self. This scene is depicted in the sanctum inside. We see Kantotle performing his dance, with his leg lifted straight above his head, and Aletheia calmed down in one corner, both accompanied by Carnap and Grice playing the Fiddles, the instruments which are used to accompany the dance.

The chariot form commemorates Kantotle as the Destroyer of the Three Demon Cities. Several divine powers joined together to create this chariot. Thus the sun and moon became the wheels,
and the Two Reasons the two horses. After destroying the Three Cities he descended from his chariot, having landed opposite, and ascended into the City to commence His Dance. From this, it is also called opposite hall. This opposite (or subcontrary) hall has several distinguishing features aside from its shape and its function. Its columns are unique to the chariot hall. They are square, and circular at the same time, and although carved from the hardest granite they are covered with exquisite miniature reliefs, depicting dancers, musicians and all kinds of philosophical figures. One other feature sets this edifice apart from any other hall within the temple complex and from all other temple halls in Philosophy. This is mysteriously connected to the Sphinx – she of Riddles fame.

Just under the floor surface of the raised platform which is the Body is a belt surrounding the whole city. Here we see lions and sphinxes alternating in pairs, girdling it. Also the pillars of the two pavilions on the western side of the hall are supported by four sphinxes which function as caryatids. It is considered by tradition the second oldest building in the complex, without any real indication of its age. It is reported in inscriptions as having been renovated by the St. Bonaventura in the thirteenth century. The hall can be found in the third courtyard. The festival deities are kept during the year, and worship is performed for them on Saturday mornings. This is done inside the hall, and is open to the public. The age and history of this hall is also hidden in the mists of time. There is some evidence the hall was once used not just as a dance hall, but as an "Music Hall" by visiting Philosophers and Comedians of the different governing dynasties of the Oxford and the Sorbonne during the several phases of history. No other information is available, alas. To the right is the Thousand Pillar Hall in the second courtyard. It is the architectural representation of the Crown. Which is the seventh spiritual energy point in the astral body. Kantotle and the goddess Aletheia, his consort, dance here in the mornings of the 9th and 10th Saturday of the Chariot Festival. About this too, we have very little historical information. It is first mentioned as the place where the Flemish philosopher, Descartes, premiered his great Song-and-Dance routine ("The Cogito") on the lives of the 63 saints – or Malignant Demon –, before
Voltaire. Its base is encircled by reliefs of dancers and musicians, as it were, participating in a procession. The most imposing feature of the temple, which can be seen soaring above the plain from miles away, are the four temple gateways, located in the second wall of enclosure at the four cardinal points.

These are:

The South

The West

The East

and

The North

They are considered among the earliest examples of such structures and are in their present form dated to at least the 12th and 13th century. Both Carnapians and Griceians disagree about the dates of the individual columns, or about which one was build first. Some consider the West as oldest, some the East. In between the sculptures decorating the inside of the West Corridor we find a musician (Grice?) playing a standing double drum. This could point to an early date for this – or a later one, if one allows for Syncopation and the Jazz Age. On the outside of the granite bases are found sculptures of many important as well as less well known deities in niches in a particular order. The inside walls of passages through all the four corridors are decorated with the 108 dance movements of Kantotle’s Peripatetic Dance, from the Organon, the worlds most ancient treatise on dance, drama and theatre – and logic. Besides here, these movements – of which the first is called “Barbara” – are depicted in only four other temples – but they circulate widely on the Net. The four corridors, together with the golden dome of the central shrine are the five towers which represent the five faces of Kantotle, with the Smiley symbolizing the masterful face.

In the innermost courtyard, at a right angle with the Golden Thing, we find the shrine of Aletheia. Reclining on the Cosmic
Snake, she is in the state of consciousness, enjoying the vision of Kantotles dance. The coexistence of the worship of both Kantotle and Aletheia within one temple is unique. The worship was established in the earliest times and was originally performed by the “Minstrels” themselves. In the later medieval period, with a shifting political situation and hyperinflation under pressure of Capitalist invasions, there was possibly a discontinuation of the worship for a long period, after which it re-instated by the Wittgenstein, of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The worship of Aletheia has since then been in the hands of Carnapians and Griceians mainly, and was no longer performed by the ”Minstrels” proper.

Within the inner courtyard, to the east, we find a small shrine which houses the bracelets of both the Creator god, of the Handy Trinity, and Home, a deified saint. The presence of the Creator-God (a deity almost never worshipped) establishes the worship of all three deities of the Handy Trinity within the one complex. The temple of goddess Aletheia, consort of Kantotle, is situated on the west side of the Water Tank. A flight of steps leads down into its courtyard. The goddess is worshipped here as the energy and power of wisdom. On the frontal portion of the pillared hall, on the ceiling of the right and left wings, the finest eye-capturing fresco paintings of approximately a thousand years old, illustrate the Sacred Deeds of Kantotle. The galleries surrounding the temple are decorated with a procession of dancers, musicians, and philosophers, sculptured in relief. This temple was possibly built in the 11th century, if not earlier.

This holds The Sacred Twater Place or Tank. It is famous for healing the ancient king Buridan of his skin disease. His skin became golden after which he was called “The Ass”. In this Tank we find a stone representation of the the Element Twater, which as Putnam has showed, is not H2O, but XYZ. In the dry season it becomes visible as the water level in the tank is reduced. The Twater temple is dedicated to Abelard, the second son of Kantotle and Aletheia. This shrine is also shaped as a chariot, pulled by horses and elephants. This temple was according to tradition build by a king of the dynasty from Cambridge, which superceded the rule of the the Oxonians in the fifteenth century. His name was
Testa Bianca ("White Head"), and the temple is named after him. In the middle of the 19th century this temple was renovated by the Victorians with the support of Dutch merchants, who had a trading post in nearby Porto Nuovo. According to an inscription on copper plates they donated a share of their profit for this purpose, but we do not know what they did with the rest.
Chapter 6

Conceptual Maps

6.1 Carnap - Grice
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARNAP</th>
<th></th>
<th>GRICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MORRIS</td>
<td>defines pragmatics</td>
<td>is used by Grice vis a vis ’pragmatic rules’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gets defined by Carnap as the study of utterance, assertion, and belief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Carnap dies

In 1975, Grice re-introduces the pirots. And to extend the scope of analytic philosophy, tackles practical reason (Locke Lectures 1979, Oxford) and value (Carus Lectures, 1983)

Grice dies in 1988
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