[hist-analytic] The Annals of Analysis
Jlsperanza at aol.com
Jlsperanza at aol.com
Wed Jan 28 09:03:16 EST 2009
Analytic Analysandum -- Analysans
Sorry for the mouthful of philosopher's worst jargonese, but it does sound
more 'pro' than "Davies and his ilk".
"Analysandum", is that a word? That would suggest a Latin verb, "analysare'!
Although not necessarily. We can assume that -andum and -ans are productive
conjugational expressions that apply directly to the English verb, 'analyse'.
The OED first cites Hodgson for 'analysans' in 1907. The first quote for
analysans includes also analysans and is dated 1944 (_Mind_ article). All
below. M. K. Davies, and his trend.
In a message dated 1/28/2009 7:14:16 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
danny.frederick at tiscali.co.uk writes:
>Third, I can suggest a text to consult about the issue of necessary truth
>and interpreted versus uninterpreted sentences, namely, Martin Davies,
>'Meaning, Quantification, Necessity.'
------ It is good of D. Frederick to recall M. K. Davies. I did some
research on him, too -- for my PhD on Grice! Anyway, found out this Davies, most
people think Australian; but from what I recall, he does his DPhil from Oxford
herself, from what I recall. I tended to place Davies, and others (notably
Loar, and Peacocke) within the same 'Gricean' category. Their readings shared
to me a feature -- which I don't know who was the first to introduce. To me,
this feature is best seen as a development out of Grice. If we recall, in 1948
('Meaning'), Grice does distinguish between what we may call
(i) _utterer_ meaning
and what, for lack of a better expression, we can call, namely,
(ii) _expression_ meaning.
This _expression_ meaning is double in that, in Grice's parlance, it may be:
"x meaning", i.e. meaning of a _token_ of an expression -- which for _me_
*is* an expression simpliciter, or "X meaning", i.e. meaning of a _type_ of an
expression. What I saw in these authors -- we know Loar's thesis advisor at
Oxford had been G. J. Warnock, colleague of Grice, and Peacocke had attended
Grice's seminars at Berkeley) is the idea of a
I am enough of a libertarian to avoid that word at all costs. For one, I
cannot fail to imagine Grice having an immersion foam bubble bath, and
'designing a High Way Code', to use his example (WOW, ch. 6) --. This melts for me any
idea of a 'population'. But Loar, Peacocke, and Davies, will speak of a
_population_ of speakers, from what I recall. In the case of Loar (both his book
and his contribution to the Truth and Meaning OUP ed. by Evans/McDowell) it
is understandable that he wants to reach to the stage of specifying the
meaning of a _special_ type of 'expression': the 'sentence'. Indeed, his D.Phil
Oxon bears that title, "Sentence meaning". It may be thought that it is at
_this_ level of 'sentence meaning' that the analytic/synthetic distinction
starts to make sense.
These authors then, would seem to follow some 'population-based', and thus
_very_ 'synthetic', or contigent, if you wish, account of 'analytic' -- which
looks very much like the line that R. B. Jones is essaying now (I failed to
read with detail his firsts posts on this thread). The formulae like the one
that D. Frederick seem to be pointing out may well have variables for "P" for
population. "In a population of speakers P, such that they share Language L, a
sentence of type Sigma will be analytic if and only if..."
------- My previous post on Grice's "Underdogma" contained what I may view
as some historical development in my thinking about the history of analytic
philosophy -- and I extend here my congratulations to both Bayne and Jones for
allowing this forum to _exist_ and _continue_ --. In my earlier paper I made
a reference to, I was commenting on J. F. Bennett's explanation. In his
"Linguistic Behaviour" -- and my paper bears the subtitle to the effect, "the
motivation of Grice", or something -- Bennett guesses what the motivation for
Grice's intention-based analysis of meaning may have been. He considers that it
is possibly no coincidence that Grice's Meaning appeared in print in 1957,
one year after Grice/Strawson's defense of the analytic/synthetic distinction
(1956) in reply to Quine's attack to the 'underdogma'. Bennett infers (but
fails to mention that 'Meaning' had been written 9 years before and was only
sent to the editors of "Philosophical Review" by Strawson, Grice not knowing)
that Grice's motivation (but it turs out this is more like _Strawson's_
motivation, then) was to escape the 'intensional' circle. If there is a way to
explain 'meaning' in non-semantic terms (belief, those were the days), then it's
in terms of "...means..." that we can explain away (in a legitimate way) what
"to be true in virtue of its meaning..." may mean. As it happens, I now see
Grice's "Meaning" as being more on the 'semiotic' line of Peirce, and his
"Defense of a dogma" as a mere exercise in paradigm-case-argument (alla
Urmson). In my paper I brought Grice's "Reply to Richards" and specific comments on
his 'valedictory' view, as it were, on the legitimacy of the
analytic-synthetic distinction. It showed a pragmatist-bent Grice not really concerned as to
whether a system has a necessary need to incorporate the distinction or not.
For good measure, in my paper I did mention that this was a "pragmatist"
(rather than 'pragmatic') view of analyticity and quoted D. E. Cooper on
"Pragmatics and Pragmatism" to back my rather obtuse views up!
Now for the history of analytic philosophy bit. The first cite for
'analysandum', the OED has it, is:
1907 S. H. HODGSON in Proc. Arist. Soc. VII. 117
"But in whichever way we define apperception..
we have by no means surmounted the difficulty of distinguishing,
in that universal panorama which is our analysandum,
what is due to conation from what is due to perception."
Later cites include
1932 Proc. Arist. Soc. XXXIII. 77
"The kind of analysis that is possible..depends upon the kind of
combination, or complex, which the analysandum is.
1944 Mind LIII. 73
"He suspects that the statement of an analysis must, in some sense, be about
the expressions used for the analysandum and the analysans, as well as about
1956 J. O. URMSON Philos. Analysis iv. 53
"To say ‘p is equivalent to q’ where p is the analysis and q the
analysandum is to utter a tautology if true." [This book above is interesting -- Grice
makes use of some of the examples one finds in Urmson, "He took of his
trousers and went to bed" as meaning the same as "He went to bed and took of his
trousers", Grice, 'Further notes on logic and conversation', and 'Presupposition
and Conversational Implicature', not in the WOW reprint)]
1960 in Concise Encycl. Western Philos. 18/1.
"An analysis..is a sort of definition, a kind of equation with the puzzling
expression, the analysandum, on the left-hand side and the new expression,
sometimes called the analysis, sometimes the analysans, on the right."
The cites for 'analysans' are two: the first the 1944 pasted above ("He
suspects that the statement of an analysis must, in some sense, be about the
expressions used for the analysandum and the analysans, as well as about these
concepts") and the second the 1960 from the Encycl.
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