[hist-analytic] Quine's "two dogmas"

Jlsperanza at aol.com Jlsperanza at aol.com
Sun Feb 1 18:52:08 EST 2009

In a message dated 2/1/2009 5:54:56 P.M. Eastern  Standard Time, 
rpsevero at gmail.com writes:
Quine was rejecting not the  possibility of drawing the distinction,
but the claim that there is an  epistemically significant
analytic/synthetic distinction. We can still draw  the distinction, but
it will not do the job that Carnap and others assigned  to it. Quine is
not rejecting the distinction, but the idea that there is  a
distinction which can do the job Carnap assigned to it  (namely:
explaining the justification of a priori sentences by saying they  are
true in virtue of meaning).

----- This would, I hope, coincide  with Grice's latter thoughts on 
'analyticity' in his "Life and Opinions" (pp.  54ff). Grice suggests that the 
distinction has to be made within a _theory_ and  that, as methodological decisions go, 
comes along with a pragmatist ring to it.  Will it _do_. I like this idea of 
connecting Carnap's distinction with Carnap's  _aim_ and Quine's observation 
that the distinction will not fulfill Carnap's  aim.

I'll try to look for the more specific reference.  


J. L. Speranza  

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