[hist-analytic] Clarity Is Not Enough

Roger Bishop Jones rbj at rbjones.com
Fri Feb 20 16:16:13 EST 2009


On Friday 20 February 2009 19:04:00 Danny Frederick wrote:

> First, I count philosophy as a part of knowledge; and knowledge needs no
> justification beyond itself.

I'm curious to know how you square this attitude with your earlier
statement that "there can be no such thing as the justification of
mathematical propositions".

How can we regard philosophy as part of "knowledge" (and in need of
no justification) when there is no consensus (except occasional
transient points of consensus) about which propositions of philosophy
are true (excluding history of philosophy)?
On the other hand, there is a very high degree of consensus among
professional mathematicians about which propositions of mathematics
are not merely true but proven (i.e. justified by the standards
of professional mathematics), scepticism about mathematics being
almost exclusively confined to philosophers.

There is arguably something not very far off consensus, even among
philosophers, that mathematics and philosophy are poles apart
in matters of rigour (mathematics being of course, highly
rigorous and philosophy quite the opposite).

Have I misunderstood your position?

Roger Jones

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