[hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori

Steven Bayne srbayne at earthlink.net
Sat Mar 21 20:12:53 EDT 2009



"That is: I defined a priori knowledge as what can be known 
independently of the truth or falsity of inter-subjectively testable 
singular existential statements."

Now we have "inter-subjectively testable singular existential" to 
worry about; this will require a lot of unpacking.

"Obviously, knowing THAT I am thinking involves awareness, but it 
does not involve sensory awareness, just as knowing THAT I am willing 
something involves awareness but not sensory awareness. Kant confuses 
the whole issue,..."

Well, awareness entails intuition and intuition puts it in the 
Sensibility not the Understanding. So it doesn't matter. In addition, 
since your rejected as absurd the idea of sense impressions, I must 
query you on what "sensory awareness" is; such as what are its 
objects; what is 'sensory' in relation to experience; whether 
sensation figures in your idea of perception etc. So we have a way to 
go before abandoning the "pleasant poetry" of Kant. Also, introducing 
"theory" and all that brings in does not clarify as well as one would 
like, precisely what you mean in respect to a priori. So, maybe, a 
little more explanation is in the offing.

Best wishes

Steve



At 10:34 AM 3/21/2009, Danny Frederick wrote:
>Hi Steve,
>
>Thanks for putting the word 'radical' in quotation marks.
>
>I think I have already answered some of your objections in my last 
>reply to Bruce, here:
>
><http://rbjones.com/pipermail/hist-analytic_rbjones.com/2009q1/000213.html>http://rbjones.com/pipermail/hist-analytic_rbjones.com/2009q1/000213.html
>
>That is: I defined a priori knowledge as what can be known 
>independently of the truth or falsity of inter-subjectively testable 
>singular existential statements.
>
>But I offered no procedure for deciding whether or not a proposition 
>was knowable a priori. There is not even a decision procedure for 
>all the analytic truths of first-order predicate logic, so we should 
>not expect decisions procedures elsewhere. The fact that there is no 
>general decision procedure for truth or falsity does not make that 
>distinction 'a mere formality.'
>
>Yes, I recall Hintikka's paper on the cogito. I read it as an 
>undergraduate. In fact, I think it was that which led me to identify 
>'I think' as a contingent a priori truth (whether or not Hintikka 
>does the same I cannot remember).
>
>Obviously, knowing THAT I am thinking involves awareness, but it 
>does not involve sensory awareness, just as knowing THAT I am 
>willing something involves awareness but not sensory awareness. Kant 
>confuses the whole issue, it seems to me, because of his doctrine 
>that time is the form of inner sense, which seems to make all 
>temporal awareness sensory. I can't remember what Geach said, but I 
>probably read it (in fact, I might even have it on my shelf somewhere).
>
>I agree that we have sensory experience. But I deny that the basic 
>statements against which empirical theories are tested are reports 
>of sensory experiences. Rather they are the reports of 
>inter-subjectively observable events; reports which are accepted or 
>rejected on the basis of sensory experiences, but which are in no 
>way justified or entailed by sensory experiences.
>
>Cheers.
>
>Danny




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