[hist-analytic] Frrom AUNE: Analytic and A Priori (2-7)

Roger Bishop Jones rbj at rbjones.com
Tue Apr 21 12:10:27 EDT 2009


This is the second of what will probably be three installments
in my response to Bruce Aune's objections to "my" proposed
definition of analyticity.

In his paragraphs 2-7 Aune is preparing the way for a criticism
along the lines that Kant's definition provides but
mine does not a "truth certifying property" for analytic
sentences.

A response on the question of truth certifying properties
will be in my next installment.  This one will respond
to some of Aune's preparatory remarks.

On Monday 23 March 2009 20:32:52 Bruce Aune wrote:

>2.    The standard philosophical use of the expression comes from
>Kant, who used it in raising a philosophical problem that has no
>connection that I can see with Roger’s concerns.  This philosophical
>problem persists, at least in a qualified way, and that is my
>principal reason for thinking that Roger’s use is less than useful.

I have never previously seen used the phrase
"standard philosophical use", and if this is intended to suggest
that only one definition of analyticity is acceptable then
the literature on analyticity unequivocally refutes it.

However, that Kant's usage is not connected with mine is also
quite incorrect.
Kant aknowledged that he was responding to Hume and his
objection to Hume I believe was principally to Hume's
rejection of metaphysics, in which Hume's "fork" played
a central role.
My own conception of analyticity owes more to Hume than
to Kant, and follows the logical positivists in deliberately
supporting Hume's position against Kant.
Thus the motivations of Hume, Kant, Carnap and myself
are intimately interrelated.

>4.    UAJs that are not analytic are, Kant stipulated, synthetic:
>this is just what a synthetic UAJ is suppose to be.  Although we can
>see a priori that analytic UAJs are true, the universal and necessary
>truth of synthetic judgments is highly problematic.  There is no
>discernible connection between subject and predicate that guarantees
>their truth; this must be accomplished by some “third thing,”
>something additional to semantic inclusion. The question “How could
>judgments of this second kind possibly be known to be true a priori?"
>is the fundamental topic of Kant’s famous Critique of Pure Reason.

The answer of Hume, Carnap and myself to this question is that
they can't, there are no necessary synthetic truths.
The difference might possibly be due to a difference in the
conceptions of analyticity involved, this is a matter of
controversy, the outcome of which is not important to my
own philosophical position.

In my next message I will discuss "truth certifying properties".

Roger Jones




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