[hist-analytic] Previewing Part of the Anscombe Book

steve bayne baynesrb at yahoo.com
Tue Jun 30 16:44:06 EDT 2009


I'm finding that most of the work in writing a book 
comes in the final stages of production. This does not
make me happy. Somewhat asked how things were
going on the book. So I thought I'd send out a copy
of the table of contents, but only of those sections
completely "completed." There is a lengthy Part on
causation that doesn't show up in this table.

The Part on causation is based on the historical
observation that what animated discussion of mental
causation in Anscombe and others was animated by
Russell's views on causation. Anscombe departs from
his "regularity theory." But the relation is much deeper.
This has relevance to both her views on Chisholm's
"endeavoring" and Davidson's "anamolous"-ness.

I've also completed a paper on mental causation; much is
said about Davidson, D. Lewis, and, a little, on Igal Kvart. These 
issues as far as Anscombe is concerned wiill converge
at that point where we are able to describe "mental
causation" as a sort of "bridge" between wanting and
acting; viz. at that point where we, really, understand
the practical syllogism (where the conclusions, that is,
are not commands). Well here is the completed uncompleted
part of a larger whole etc.

Steve Bayne


TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 1: INTENTION AND KNOWLEDGE

  1:  ‘Prediction’, ‘Intention’, and ‘Intentional’ 
  2:  Prediction, Commands and the “Falsity” of Expressions of Intention. 
  3:  Expressions of Intention, Prediction and Talking Leaves.
  4:  The Agent as Sole Authority in Knowledge of Intentions

PART 2: REASONS, INTENTIONS, AND KNOWLEDGE

  5:  “…A Certain Sense of the Question ‘Why?”
  6:  Intentional ‘Under a Description’
       a. Anscombe’s Later Discussion of ‘Under a Description’
       b. Davidson’s Use of ‘Under a Description’
       c. The Intentionality of Sensation
       d. Anscombe’s Criticism of Davidson on Agency
       e. Davidson on Tying One’s Shoes ‘Under a Description’
  7:  The Involuntary
  8:  Non-Observational Knowledge
       a. Donnellan on ‘Knowing What I Am Doing’
  9:  A Difficult Distinction Based on Causation
10: Introducing Mental Causes 
11: Mental Causes are neither Intentions nor Desires
13: Backward Looking Motives and Motives-In-General
14: Mental Causes and Backward-Looking Motives
15: Mental Causes or Reasons?

PART 2: ACTING WITHOUT REASON

16: “I Don’t Know Why I Did It”
17: “I Don’t Know Why I Did It” (Continued)
18: When the Answer to the Question ‘Why?’ Makes No Sense
19: What Makes an Action Intentional?
20: Non-Forward Looking Intentional Actions
21: Chains Consisting of Actions

PART 3: SERIES OF INTENTIONAL ACTIONS

22: ‘Acting with the Intention That’
23: Whether an Intentional Action has a Unique Description as Such 
24: Individuating Actions
25: Identifying Intentional Actions
26: How Many Actions are There?
27: Acts of Intending and the Presumption of Their Efficacy
         a. Intentional Acts of Creation
28: Observational Knowledge of Intentions, Again
29: I Do What Happens
30: Against the Idea of Intentions as Initiating Causes of Action
31: Knowledge of Intention is not Like Our Knowledge of Commands
32: Lists and Two Kinds of Error: Introducing Practical Wisdom

PART 4: PRACTICAL WISDOM

33: Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism
34: Wants and Practical Reasoning
35: Wanting as the Starting Point of a Practical Syllogism
      a. Actions as processes
      b. Wants not Included in a Practical Syllogism
      c. Incontinence and the Division of Responsibility 
      d. The Difference between Theoretical and Practical Syllogisms
36: Wanting and Its Place in Reasoning

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