[hist-analytic] The Paradox of Analysis -- With a Vengeance

jlsperanza at aol.com jlsperanza at aol.com
Fri Jul 31 16:36:16 EDT 2009

B. Aune:

"If Steve wants to refute me, he has to provide a counter-instance to
my claims--specifically, he has to provide a clearly true (or false)
statement that is (a) distinctively philosophical and (b) is neither
analytically true (nor false) nor empirical--that is, not known by
observation, memory, and (broadly speaking) inductive inference.
Furthermore, if (c) he provides an example satisfying (a) and (b), he
should meet my challenge of telling us how we are supposed know that it
is true."

Neatly put! I think Grice would agree!

I for one, can tell I *am* a philosopher (of a Gricean type, granted)
because when in a serious mode I can but utter analyticities -- and
while they amuse me (cfr. Wilson, What we know we know) they leave
non-philosophers unamused.

Having done work in (ugly word this, but what can you do about it)
"interdisciplinary" pragmatics, I can testify to NEVER having been able
to hold one single conversation (let alone argument) of a philosophical
nature with a non-philosopher! Yet, while empirical facts leave me
cold, I would not like to say that all I (or Grice for that matter) has
been doing is engaged in 2 + 2 = 4. Thus, I wish S. Bayne *is* right
and there´s more than Carnapianism to philosophy!

Grice recalls how with Hampshire and Austin (during those infamous*
Saturday mornings -- *infamous to Russeell, meetings among middle-class
unimaginative folks held at=2
0cold mornings) they tried to reach a
verdict as to what makes a question (let alone proposition)
philosophical. Less dramatic than Popper giving that talk at
Braithwaite´s room -- for the Moral Science Society -- on "Are there
philosophjical problems?" but the offshoot of which transpired in an R.
M. Hare contribution for the Journal of Philosophy.


J. L. Speranza

More information about the hist-analytic mailing list