[hist-analytic] Defiending Kant Against Kripke
Baynesr at comcast.net
Baynesr at comcast.net
Mon Nov 9 14:27:17 EST 2009
In a couple of posts I argued that Kripke has not
refuted Kant on the matter of the, alleged, impossibility
of the contingent a priori. Essentially, my argument at
one point was this: from the truth of an identity statement,
even if necessity follows, you can't know that the
statement is necessary in virtue of experience, alone, and,
so the truth or judgment cannot be necessary a posteriori;
and this is because you need more than knowledge that the
proposition is true in order to know it is necessary.
Since you don't know it is necessary a posteriori, the truth
is not a posteriori. Kripke in his closing remarks in NN
p. 159 provides further reasons for thinking I'm right on
this. Take a look.
Kripke addresses my very concern, which I think (of course!)
is much to his credit. He says,
"Nor can Kant argue that experience can tell us that a
mathematical proposition is *true*, but not that it is
At this point the crucial question is: "Why can't Kant
argue this way. Here is Kripke's answer:
"...for the peculiar character of mathematical propositions
...is that one knows (a priori) that they cannot be
contingently true; a mathematical statement, if true, is
But this is hardly reason to deny to Kant the option of
arguing that whereas it may be the "peculiar" character of
mathematical propositions" that they be known a priori,
that we do know them a priori is precisely why (!) we cannot
be said to know them a posteriori! In the very next
line Kripke says that this is not a feature peculiar to
mathematics; it holds for "all the cases of necessary a
posteriori advocated in the text." If this true, then there
is a problem, it seems.
Suppose, then, that I know that the theory of types is
consistent because my teacher told me so - this is Kripke's
argument not mine, although I supply the example. Now I
have some difficulty accepting this, but let's let it pass.
Now the quesion is this: if I have empirical knowledge of
the truth of some identity statement, 'p', how do I know
that 'Nec(p)' is true? Kant will say I cannot know this
by way of experience. Kripke quotes Kant, and he selects,
thanks to Stroud, the perfect quotation. It goes: "Experience
teaches us that a thing is so, but not that it cannot be
otherwise." So DOES experience teach me that 'Nec(p)', which
is just another way of saying p could not be otherwise?
If Kripke is right, then since it is necessary a posteriori,
it should be knowable a posteriori. However, by his own
admission there is reason to doubt this.
According to Kripke, and he actually says this (p. 159),
such necessary identities are known to be necessary
because "Philosophical analysis tells us that they cannot
be contingently true..." But how can we equate this with
knowing a posteriori?! Something has gone wrong, or so
it seems. But wait! There's more. Kripke says that IF we
accept this reliance on "philosophical analysis" then
empirical knowledge of the truth of these propositions
is "automatically empirical knowledge that they are necessary."
But this is simply incorrect. The use of "automatic" is the
What we have here is an inference to knowledge of the necessity
of these truth from "philosophical analysis," NOT experience.
Again, the identity may be necessary, and THAT it is necessary
may follow from analysis or logic etc. But it does NOT follow
from *experience* as an a posteriori truth. Ergo, Kripke is
wrong. That is my argument. It should be noted that Kripke,
unlike many of his epigones, is most definitely not doctrinaire.
He has advanced these issue to new heights, particularly in the
semantics of counterfactuals and the model theoretic treatment
of the modalities; but he has not refuted Kant! One other point
We can't expect most folks, philosophers or otherwise, to be
Kant scholars. The table of contents of the First Critique
is an education of sorts in its own rights, but if anyone
maintains that Kant has been refuted then a few well memorized
misunderstood facts about Kant will not suffice. Here's the
point. Kant view of the a priori differs from Leibniz's, but
he isn't always clear where he moves from earlier to latter
views (his) on the matter. Kant realized that his synthetic
a priori judgments concerned knowledge of this, our human
species. He knew or believed that other minded entities may not
share the same set of Categories of the Pure Understanding etc.
So in a very real sense, Kant knew all along that there is a
contingent a priori, where "a priori" is laden with the notion
of the "transcendental," something that supplies a good laugh
particularly among those who haven't read Kant very closely, as
a rule. So claiming a contingent a priori is no refutation of
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the hist-analytic