[hist-analytic] The Logic of Reciprocity: David Lewis etc.
Baynesr at comcast.net
Baynesr at comcast.net
Sun Jan 10 10:30:36 EST 2010
"Reciprocity" should be easy enough to formulate."
It's like the weather: we should be able to do something about
it (but what?).
Reciprocity is fraught with difficulties at all levels. To take one
example: Bill loves Mary and Mary loves Bill. At first it is easy
to believe that they love each other. That seems clear enough,
so reciprocity may be reduced to a form of conjunction. This is
not so obvious.
In my idiolect Mary can love Bill and Bill Mary but this is insufficient
to make the claim that they are "in love" precisely because there
is a missing sense of reciprocity, even in the binary case.
It is what is superadded to the conjunctive analysis that conceals the
sense of ''reciprocity'; relevant to the political discussion.
The notion, also, eludes David Lewis. For example, he says that
2) A indicates to both of us that you and I have reason to believe that
A holds
applied to
4). A indicates to both of us that each of us has reason to believe that you will return
implies
5) A indicates to both of us that each of us has reaobs to believe that the
other has reason to berlieve that you will return.
Not only do I not see this, I think it's wrong. Later, he gives one example
where he may have the connection right (op cit p. 55); but in this instance
I see no warrant for believing that this is equivalent to
A gives reason to believe of each other that he believes A will return.
or
Each has reason to believe of the other that he believes that A will return.
These last two are authentic reciprocals, not (5).
This is just a logical or grammatical observation; it is debatable but
recirocity is tied essentiall to "each other" and this eludes Lewis. He
picks up on this without realizing it is a problem.
By the way, in ol' style government and binding theory reciprocals
have an instructive lesson for political theorist interested in
distinguishing convention and a contracts. In 'They love each other"
you have reciprocity that yields obligation. I don' think this is the
case with the merely conjunctive interpretation of binary reciprocity.
1. Each of them loves the other
2. They love each other
3. Each of them loves the others
The think to notice is that in a world of two individuals (1) and
(2) are synonomous. But notice that in a world of ten individuals
(2) and (3) are not equivalent: (2) doesn't imply all possible
pairwise hittings. In (3) all possible pariwise hittings are
fulfilled. Compare here H.. Lasnik's terrific but a little dated
paper "The Logical Structure of Reciprocal Sentences in
English" in Essays on Anaphora, Klewer, 1989, p. 38.
Now don't this all too seriously in the political context BUT
note that insofar as reciprocity is obligation creating we cannot
derive reciprocity like (3) from (1); we would expect this
on a simple conjunctive analysis. I don't care to expand much
more at this point, except to say reciprocity is a very deep
notion and the grammatical features suffuse our understanding
of the case where obligation is at issue.
Regards
Steve Bayne
----- Original Message -----
From: jlsperanza at aol.com
To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk
Sent: Sunday, January 10, 2010 8:37:46 AM GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern
Subject: The Immanuel
Reciprocal
-----Original Message-----
From: Baynesr at comcast.net
To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk
Sent: Sat, Jan 9, 2010 9:31 pm
Subject: Re: Grice´s Highway Code
right now I'm taking a closer look at reciprocity;
oddly (?) it seems rooted in Biblical texts, at least insofar as it has
influenced the west. The nature of reciprocity is, of course, clear in
Kant.
Alan Donagan supplies a basis I think for making a connection.
----
That would be the Golden Rule, right? I think I´ve read things about
that in, of all journals, Philosophy. This journal was edited or still
is by the Royal Society of Philosophy, or Royal Association, I forget.
The old-fashioned shaped volumes always appealed me: and found that
most of the articles published therein were particularly _English_,
rather than aimed at a international audience like those in _Mind_ were.
I _think_ what Ayers calls the Lesbian Rule is a bit like the Golden
rule, but I would have to revise that. If the Golden Rule, yes, indeed,
I would think it has a base in the Old Testament (Don´t say ¨Biblical¨
unless you mean the whole thing! Just kidding). But on second thoughts,
I think this thing is _New_ Testament stuff. St Matthew on do not do to
others what you do not want to be done on you, or King James words to
that perlocutionary effect.
I recall I was once exposing Grice´s "conversational maxims" regarding
honesty or trustworthiness on this at a seminar with O. N. Guariglia --
he had my ¨German Grice¨ published in his journal, and cited by
Habermas in his MIT collection --. And Guariglia would minimise my
exposition by saying: That´s St. Matthew. Surely we need a stronger
foundation than that.
Recall Grice (WoW) on not abiding by ´be trustful´. The one you are not
letting down is yourself, not your reciprocal partner!
On the other hand, ´generality´ of application of a procedure, as Grice
dubs it in "Method", _seems_ important. Recall that his pirots are
really a Carnapian expression for
persons
and that his ¨karulize elatically¨ may be translated as
act rationally
-- So Grice is looking for a code, as it were, or "immanuel" as he
charmingly calls it -- in a reference that is both Biblical and
Kantian, as Chapman notes -- her _Grice_) where reciprocity somehow
holds.
Now why would it?
This may relate to his second out of three concerns: generality of
psychological predicates involved in these procedures. We do not want a
moral or political (?) ´code´ to involve predicates which are specific
to an office. So, for any pirot, we are discussing things that any
pirot should expect any other pirot (including itself) would abide by.
Thus, "be trustful", once justifiable by these constraints can become a
maxim or commandment (as I would prefer) of this immanuel. My Palacios
paper I entitled, "The Conversational Immanuel", since I was interested
in a moral -- or political -- grounding of the ten conversational
maxims. I would also use the expression "decalogue", to mark the
Biblical reference.
Oddly, when reading Chapman´s bio of Grice I was amused by this
reference to Chapman to a note that Grice wrote on his bank statement
of account. It read: "We may imagine that Moses brought something more
than the 10 comms (sic) as he descended from Mt. Sinai", or words to
that perlocutionary effect.
"Reciprocity" should be easy enough to formulate. It should involve
"transitive" actions as it were with at least two arguments for at
least two pirots. "X: Do not betray your friendship with Y". In Oxford,
the polemic always was -- particularly I read about it in the online
obit of S. N. Hampshire -- that one should rather not betray one´s
friend than the Kantian, ´say the truth´. Grice pokes fun on this
aspect of Kantian rigidity that he found difficult to digest, and as
having itself attracted some criticism from Oxford quarters other than
his own.
So it would be interesting how post-Kantian takes on reciprocity
relate. You say it´s "clear in Kant". One thing that is not clear with
me and Kant is his "apperceptual subject". In the case of the
theoretical or alethic or pure as he prefers, reason, it´s always the
"I think" of apperception. This is the Kantian "Subjekt" par
excellence. In the case of his practical reason, I would think
something ditto can be claimed for. In this case, the first step for a
reciprocity constraint would be to extend the "I" of the Subjekt of
apperception to something like a second person, the Thou. This is
possibly done by Buber, but I´m not sure a Kantian would swallow such
phenomenological load!
Etc.
Cheers,
J. L. Speranza
for the Grice Circle
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