[hist-analytic] PPE, Quinton
John W. Heintz
heintz at ucalgary.ca
Mon Jan 11 05:00:10 EST 2010
Anthony Quinton was President of Trinity College Oxford in 1980.
PPE is Politics, Philosophy, and Economics
On 10-Jan-10, at 6:19 AM, jlsperanza at aol.com wrote:
> Political Philosophy: The Oxford Tradition
> In a message dated 1/9/2010 7:32:40 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
> Baynesr at comcast.net writes:
> That would be Sir Anthony Quinton. Isn't he librarian, or was, at
> In any case, this is a perticularly good anthology. I read a number
> a long while ago, but I'm going to be returning to this. Carritt's
> and Equality" will be among the first on my list, since it's
> for Rawls (the second principle qualifies the first as equality may
> qualify liberty) is crucial. Also, the essays by Benn on
> That's very good. Indeed, Anthony, Viscount Quinton -- I am told his
> was a New Year's celebration from the Queen after Quinton's work on
> educational policies. I first saw Quinton on a photo. And that's B.
> Magee, "Men of
> Ideas", the BBC book based on the BBC lectures. You see Quinton
> sitting I
> think at Trinity, his college, and talking about, I think, the
> spell of
> linguistic philosophy.
> Hampshire, who I corresponded on the matter of what Hampshire and I
> the 'old play group' -- the Tuesday evening meetings at All Souls --
> me that Quinton possibly got influenced by Grice on matters of the
> theory of perception. I would have to revise the correspondence. I
> tend to
> remember that Hampshire told me that he (Hampshire) and Quinton
> Grice's seminars on perception. Those were the days when colleagues
> of such
> statute would just 'sit' like that for hours!
> ---- I think Carritt too has Oxonian associations, and so does Benn,
> and so
> does Donagan, so your reading list looks amazingly amazing!
> Now, for a time PPEs were looked down at Oxford. You had to be a
> to count. Strawson, for example, was a PPE -- I forget what it
> stands for,
> but one P is for Politics. I am unaware how the teaching of political
> philosophy is organised. Hart taught Jurisprudence (the [...] Chair
> Jurisprudence]. I don't think there is a chair of political
> philosophy, which is just
> as well -- do not multiply chairs beyond necessity, my Oxonian
> motto. And
> I'm very pleased that the three chairs that matter start with a W:
> Waynflete and Wykeham. It simplifies things so.
> Incidentally, I think you should distinguish between:
> -- Meinongian contracts
> -- other.
> Meinongian contracts are no contracts. They are irreal things. E.g.
> and the veil of ignorance. Surely such a thing is a myth of not the
> Platonic kind. (Grice uses 'myth' but with other goals in mind -- vide
> Wharton, last chapter in his "Pragmatics" books). Meinongian
> contracts are
> metaphorically so, but on the other hand they attain non-
> metaphorical validity
> status. You are supposed to be bound by a contract that their
> appealers accept
> was never signed or anything!
> We should also distinguish between: levels of pacting or compacting or
> contracting. Lawyers and accountants use the word 'contract' so
> freely that
> they give 'contractualism' a bad name. The scholastics took the word
> seriously. First there was the Jewish, as you say, or Biblical,
> alliance with God,
> which we need not go over.
> But when it comes to authors of contractualism proper, we need to
> distinguish between the 'social' contract per se (that which
> contracts 'pirots' who
> can abide by this sort of contract -- e.g. non-rational pirots cannot
> really engage in contracts), and the 'political' contract.
> When Moreno used the 'contract' theory to justify the Argentine
> against Spain, he was criticised for lumping when you can split.
> Surely the
> Argentines were still _human_ when they rebelled against the King of
> (the holder of the other side of the contract as it were). So the
> contract was never broken or breached. It was the political
> contract, rather.
> Whatever the complexities that follow from this are!
> I title this Grice's Myth, because the word is so used by Wharton in
> book for this policy by Grice of appealing to myths of this or that
> type (his
> example is one for the origin of language) as having explanatory
> power. I
> would like thus to compare Grice's use of myth with other uses of
> say, in political philosophy, as they involve contracts per se.
> J. L. Speranza
> for the Grice Circle
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