[hist-analytic] Not Cricket
Baynesr at comcast.net
Baynesr at comcast.net
Thu Jan 14 18:26:33 EST 2010
First a couple of trivial points.
Honor among thieves is, among thieves, what the golden mountain
is to mountain climbers.
"Thrasymachus nowhere makes it clear whether
he regards the POPULAR APPLICATION of the
term 'just', which Thrasymachus may not himself
endorse, as a positive or negative commendation."
(p. 310)
Whatever the popular application may have been,
I see no philological reason for believing that it
might have been a term of derision or of simple
fact: "There is a just man, let's kill him." This doesn't
seem as though it would make sensein any language.
"There is an X man, let's kill him" can, to use fashionable
language, "contextualized, but now whare 'X' is just.
This, of course, has been subject to considerable
discussion, "a priori evils."
Now a quick reaction to the second point you make
from Grice.
"Among [Socrates'] flaws in this argument one
might point particulArly to the dubious analogy
between the province of justice and the province
of the arts, and also to a blatant equivocation
with the word 'compete', which might mean
either 'try to perform better than' or 'try to get
the better of'" (p. 313)
I would have to look at the argument again very
closely, which I can't right now; but I have one
reflection. Suppose we say that justice requires
a sovereign and he is the philosopher king. Now
what in the analogy corresponds to the philosopher
king in the art. I would say it would be something
very much like a master craftsman, someone who
can "play all the instruments" AND compose. If this
were the correct correspondence then I think Plato's
argument, if I am right about which one etc. you
are talking about can be saved. A further general
remark.
Socrates was deeply moved by Parmenides. He
took, I believe, the minimal step away from Parmenides
that would preserve much of his, otherwise shattered
world - and here I'm talking about the logical parts of the
Sophist. Physical objects were no more real for either
than Russell. His, Socrates's ethical arguments are
sometimes an exercise in youthful nostalgia in relation
to Parmenides. Hare, Grice, Austin moved away from
this conceptual forlornedness. Moore retained it, as did
Mill. Rawls is in all of this not at all close to people like
Hare;there is no analysis. Instead we have an incredibly
complex set of relations between terms used with new
and not just "popular application." After a few hundred
pages it becomes prose, no analysis. There is somethng
similar in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Grice, however,
is an unyielding analyst. I'd hate to have that blood hound
after me, that's for sure.
By the way, we should both (and others) save space on
the archives by only quoting the message to which we
respond. I'm trying to adjust to this.
Regards
STeve
--- On Thu, 1/14/10, jlsperanza at aol.com <jlsperanza at aol.com> wrote:
From: jlsperanza at aol.com <jlsperanza at aol.com>
Subject: Re: Not Cricket
To: hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk
Date: Thursday, January 14, 2010, 1:55 PM
Yes, toleration and tolerant are great concepts. I cannot but think of
Locke when I hear those words.
The Grice ref. in fact is to Plato, Republic. It should be online
googlebooks for Studies in the Way of Words, and the rather pretentious title goes:
"Metaphysics, Eschatology, and Plato's Republic"
and it's possibly Grice's last, since he wrote it in 1987 especially for
the book.
The "Republic" section concerns the dialogue between Socrates and
Thrasymachus on
'fair' -- say
as being
'moral'
or
'legal' or 'political' as Rawls would have it.
Grice feels Socratic but finds it hard to 'go the rounds' with
Thrasymachus, hence the need to apply what he calls philosophically eschatological
concepts.
E.g.
Grice writes:
"Thrasymachus nowhere makes it clear whether
he regards the POPULAR APPLICATION of the
term 'just', which Thrasymachus may not himself
endorse, as a positive or negative commendation."
(p. 310).
"Among [Socrates'] flaws in this argument one
might point particulArly to the dubious analogy
between the province of justice and the province
of the arts, and also to a blatant equivocation
with the word 'compete', which might mean
either 'try to perform better than' or 'try to get
the better of'" (p. 313)
which look like anti-reciprocals, if you axes (sic) me.
Grice goes on to discuss,
"honor among thieves"
as important.
Grice's classicist prose sometimes take the best of him.
"If the possession of Gyges's ring would enable
our inroads upon others to remain undiscovered,
no reasonable person would deny himself this
advantage.
Adeimantus reinfornces the demands expressed
by Glaucon by drawing attention to the support lent
by the prevailing education and culture to the
RECEIVED opinion
about
justice
as distinct from the view of it taken by Socrates"
(p. 314)
"In the case of Plato's Thrasymachus it seems that he,
perhaps like Plato himself, is njot disposed to engage
in the kind of
conceptual sophistication
practiced by Aristotle and by some philosophers since
Aristotle; for Thrasymachus, the friends of MORAL JUSTICE
(on the assumption that the representation of Thrasymachus
as a kind of moral sceptic is legitmate) will be philosophers
who treat the term
'moral justice'
as one which refers to morality, or to moral virtue
in general, a usage which Aristotle also recognises as
legitimate , alongside the usage in which 'justice'
is the name of one or more specific virtues"
(p. 316)
"The possibly more Kantian conception of the
relation between moral and political justice will
perhaps carry the consequence that the view
of Socrates and his friends that moral
justice is desirable independently of the consequences
of acting justly is no accident."
(p. 319)
"My account also resembles the original account
by Socrates in that it deploys the notion of
ANALOGY
which was a prominent ingredient in Socrates's story."
(p. 320).
On analogy:
"Consider 'in in good shape', which seemingly
applies to objects belonging to different stages,
namely to animal bodies and to states. In addition
to such 'holistic' epithets, which apply to subject
which inhabit different stages, there will also be
'meristic' epithets, like 'part' itself, which apply to
parts of such aforementioned subjects"
(p. 323)
"Gaps which appear in the ranks of
first-mode specifications might be expected
to favor neo-Socrates rather than
neo-Thrasymachus, unless neo-Thrasymachus"
--- Grice must be thinking Nozick.
"can make out a good case in favour of the
view that where first-mode specifications
are lacking, second-mode specifications
will also be lacking." (p. 323)
"It might be possibly, by a move which would
be akin to that of "Ramsification", to redescribe
the things which inhabit a certain stage"
(p. 324).
Re: analogy.
"It further suggests that neo-Socrates need
both of these conceptions [of analogous terms],
but, of course, cannot have both of them"
(p. 332).
"If we go beyond Plato, we might to add
such forms of motivational appeal as that which
arises from subscriptions to some
principle governing the realization of the
initial property"
(p. 335).
"Nothing has so far been said to rule out
the possibility that while Socrates and other
such persons may each be concerned that
people IN GENERAL should value the
realization of justice in themselves because
of its intrinsic appeal, that is to say, for
moral reasons, neverhteless, their concern
that people in general should value
for moral reasons the realization in themselves
of justice is based at least in part on
CONSEQUENTIAL
or political grounds rather than on any
intrinsic or moral appeal"
(p. 335).
"At this point it seems to me we
move away from the territory of Socrates
and Plato and nearer to the territory
of Kant"
(p. 336).
etc.
Cheers,
J. L. Speranza
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