[hist-analytic] Not Cricket
jlsperanza at aol.com
jlsperanza at aol.com
Fri Jan 15 18:34:56 EST 2010
Thanks for your comments, Steve.
Please note, and you may comment on this, that my "not cricket" is meant,
amusingly? to refer, apparently, to an idiom in English,
"That's not cricket!"
which is supposed to conversationally imply (if you excuse me the split
"It's not fair!"
If you feel you need to change the header, do!
(I call "not cricket" what Horn has called 'squatitive negation', for
surely it would be uncolloquial to say, of Rawls, or any other that he _is_
cricket, i.e. 'fair'. Similarly with 'she is my cup of tea'. Oddly Grice relied
a lot on this type of metaphor: "She is an old bag", WoW).
--- Now to the comments on what S. R. Bayne self-labels, 'trivial', meaning
that every schoolboy should study by heart in logic-grammar-and-rhetoric
In a message dated 1/14/2010 6:27:38 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
Baynesr at comcast.net writes:
"First a couple of trivial points."
"Honor among thieves is, among thieves, what the golden mountain
is to mountain climbers."
Aha. I don't know. But if there is one Americanistic spelling I love is
"honor" without the rather otiose 'u' of the British spelling, 'honour', so
there you are.
Was Robin Hood an honest thief? I don't think so. _I_ would possibly kill
him (but in self defence, only, and as I make my way from Sherwood to
My idea of honour I never understood. I recall in the film, with Margaret
Rutherford, "The happiest days" (of one's life are the school days), she
wonders about the school motto:
"Guard thy honour"
-- because in a female-only context, honour = virginity.
Bayne goes on to quote from Grice's brilliant eschatological (not
scatological, as Grice's biographer, S. R. Chapman, wants it! -- ain't that an
"Thrasymachus nowhere makes it clear whether he regards the POPULAR
APPLICATION of the term 'just', which Thrasymachus may not himself endorse, as a
positive or negative commendation."(p. 310)
Bayne comments, properly:
"Whatever the popular application may have been, I see no philological
reason for believing that it
might have been a term of derision or of simple fact: "There is a just
man, let's kill him." This doesn't
seem as though it would make sense in any language."
Right. Although I never go to philology for reasons! (recall, 'rhyme or
reason'. What do philologists know about things? Just joking).
Bayne gives the extraordinarily good contextual example. Cfr. Malcolm
Bradbury, apres Flanders/Swann, Eating people is wrong):
(1) There is an X man, let's kill him"
"(1) can, to use fashionable language, be "contextualized, but _not_ where
'X' is "just". This, of course, has been subject to considerable
discussion, "a priori evils.""
Good. I'm not so sure, of course.
Let's then provide the constant of predicate: X = "Be Just". Be fair, as I
prefer. I would use, frankly, the first predicate used in predicate
calculus, "F" for 'fair' in this case. And use 'a' as if it meant Robin Hood's
first name, "Adolph", let's assume. So (1) becomes
(2) Fa --> KILL(you, a)!
Or what is worse: Robin, among the thieves, sees this judge (from York,
where R. Hall hails from), who we all know as a "very fair" man. But Robin has
read Foucault, and thus thinks that if the judge is regarded as a fair man
in the community of York, that's because he is entrenched in the power
structures of the society, and that, to remedy that, and become cosmically
fair, _he_, the judge, a fair man if ever there was one, should be, first
robbed, and then _killed_, into the bargain.
(Sorry, I'm in my ultra-verbose style today, but will improve tomorrow, I
Bayne goes on:
"Now a quick reaction to the second point you make from Grice." He quotes
"Among [Socrates'] flaws in this argument one might point particularly to
the dubious analogy between the province of justice and the province of the
arts, and also to a blatant equivocation with the word 'compete', which
might mean either 'try to perform better than' or 'try to get the better of'"
(p. 313), and comments:
"I would have to look at the argument again very closely, which I can't
right now; but I have one reflection. Suppose we say that justice requires a
sovereign and he is the philosopher king."
Good point. For good ol' Socrates would certainly say, and in Greek too,
"For verily our sovereign is a foolosopher and a fair man, too!"
"Now what in the analogy corresponds to the philosopher king in the art."
Andy Warhol? Just joking! Well, if Michael Jackson was the king of pop, I
think _anything_ is possible.
"I would say it would be something very much like a master craftsman,
someone who can "play all the instruments" AND compose."
Yep, and pay the fiddler. (Here's a donkey for you:
(3) Hintikka paid himself so he was
able to call his tune.
Similarly, good ol' Gricean Larry Horn would usually praise hisself by
damnation when saying
(4) If I may blow my own horn, as it were.
"If this were the correct correspondence then I think Plato's argument, if
I am right about which one etc. you
are talking about can be saved."
Yes. Indeed, Grice HAS "Analogy" as the main topic, almost of what he
calls, indeed, 'philosophical eschatology'. Another one is "Metaphor".
Analogy featured indeed large in Parmenides, and analogical reasoning Plato
(if not Socrates -- I don't think he existed! -- cfr. Grice, "Vacuous
Names") thus features VERY large, -- too large, according, as you say, to
Aristotle -- if that's what you say.
There is a book on 'analogy' in Ancient Greek thought, which we should
"A further general remark. Socrates was deeply moved by Parmenides. He
took, I believe, the minimal step away from Parmenides that would preserve much
of his, otherwise shattered world - and here I'm talking about the logical
parts of the Sophist. Physical objects were no more real for either than
Russell. His, Socrates's ethical arguments are sometimes an exercise in
youthful nostalgia in relation to Parmenides. Hare, Grice, Austin moved away
from this conceptual forlornedness. Moore retained it, as did Mill. Rawls is
in all of this not at all close to people like Hare; there is no analysis."
Exactly. That's why I praise your efforts in bringing him here in the right
anal retentive perspective I hold on things! (Hist-Anal, I mean -- just
"Instead we have an incredibly complex set of relations between terms used
with new and not just "popular application.""
That _is_ sad, ain't it. Specially for us, native speakers. By native
speaker I mean exactly the opposite of what Chomsky means. Anglo-Argentines call
anyone whose mother tongue (they never speak of father tongue, alas) is
NOT English, a 'native'. For we read Rawls and wonder. And wonder. And
wonder. What do us, natives, know about 'popular applications'. I don't think
Grice knew anything about 'popular applications' of "dikaios" in Greek,
either! Here it may do to consult the online Greek dictionary edited by Alice
Hargreaves's father, Liddell, and Scott.
Liddell, incidentally, was said to have played the second fiddle. But his
surname is supposed to be pronounced /li'DEL/, rather.
"After a few hundred pages it becomes prose, no analysis."
Exactly. I especially skipped all those statistical tables that he drops in
for good measure. What I like most of his style is the analytic footnotes,
as this one in his "Public Affairs" journal, where he cares to quote Grice
in his "Personal Identity" paper, Mind 1941. I THINK Rawls quotes the
Perry reprint, in _Personal Identity_, University of California Press).
"There is something similar in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Grice, however,
is an unyielding analyst. I'd hate to have that blood hound after me,
that's for sure."
Right. And so did Hare!
J. L. Speranza
for the Grice Club
-- if you can't run with the Hares join'em
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