[hist-analytic] Not Cricket
jlsperanza at aol.com
jlsperanza at aol.com
Mon Jan 18 23:38:43 EST 2010
In a message dated 1/18/2010 10:25:37 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
Baynesr at comcast.net writes:
The logic of all this will once clarified
have consequences for whether justice requires a standard, a standard
of justice. I don't believe it does, but I might change my mind. Also,
is not a privation of injustice; this figures in.
Excellent comments. I was reading them, and you do sound like Austin and
Grice at the best round of linguistic botanising. I will have to re-analyse
each of your utterances one by one.
For the record, I _think_ Grice opposes "flat" to "variable". I THINK I
borrowed the 'flat' versus 'rounded' from, rather E. M. Forster, Aspects of
This is a book that is familiar with students of literature where I come
from. Not that I am one. But I met some, and have socialised with some.
On one occasion, we were discussing a silly novel, "Sebastian's Pride" by
Susan Wilkinson -- I love Wilkinson. And this friend of mine, Graziella
Carrozzi, said, "The problem with the novel is that all characters are flat;
not a round one".
It was later I read Grice about 'flat' rationality.
But of course, the important point here is that you mention about the
'standard' of justice, and in what way injustice figures in. In another of my
post, where I comment on your 'calm water', I make a reference to 'equal',
and in fact,
it's very good to equate justice WITH equity.
But back to standards. Elsewhere I have considered at some length what
Altham calls, apres Geach, pleonetetic logic. The logic of plurarity.
Most, many, few, several (or 'severe' as I prefer).
This may relate if justice is a mass noun, as it were. I have no idea.
In any case, the analysis that Altham provides for these pleonetic terms (I
read an abstract in the well-known Formal semantics of natural language,
Cambridge University Press) -- Altham and Tennant, I think) is in terms of
On the other hand, there's the MESOTES.
For Aristotle, surely 'just' was the mesotes or golden-proportionally means
between the overjust and the injust.
I don't know. At present I'm obsessed with Grice.
He has Jack and Jill.
Jack wants to get some water from a hill, in a bucket. (It's been raining
cats and dogs here, and that would be very a dangerous thing to do).
Jack, brave as he was English, went up the hill. But he fell down and
broke his crown.
Jill commented, before she knew:
"Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave"
So 'brave' is like courage, a virtue. 'brave' would be not the mesotes but
the over-achieving agent. Imagine: going up the hill to fetch a pale of
water. You need English bravery at its best for that. And then see the
consequences: a failed wedding.
But 'just'? Why is it that over-achieving judge sounds silly? And also, the
fact that a judge is fair should be contingent (never tautological,
Consider Socrates discussing all these 'popular applications' of 'dikaios'.
With Plato saying "very fair", "extremely fair".
Then come the Judges of Athens and condemn Socrates to commit suicide,
i.e. drink the hemlock.
For Thrasymachus, if he was still alive, -- or if he read it in the news
-- must have said,
"So I WAN in the end. For this man, Socrates, was
preaching us about the absolute value of 'just'
but when it came to the grits he had to
go by what the judge said was 'just'"
And what the judge said was "just" is the 'popular application'. -- EVEN
if the judge is unpopular.
Or so said Kelsen.
-- but I'll revise your beautiful analysis of 'hot', 'warm', and 'just'.
While we're at it, I'll drop the ref. of a book,
HIRSCHBERG, Julia. A theory of scalar implicature. Routledge.
She discusses scales versus ranks.
So, the issue may well be implicatural.
I know that in my idiolect -- and in South America in general -- (except
Brazil, where you sweat what you sweat), you can say,
It's warm; indeed it's boiling hot.
For the scale is
Similarly, there must be a scale
but I'll have to analyse.
For Hirschberg, a rank is a different animal. I don't believe in ranks,
but she does.
If we say that Jack is a captain, we won't say -- she suggests -- that he
is a tar.
But I think that he is a tar if he is a captain.
If he is a general, we don't say he is captain. It's a lower rank. So the
'scale' here does not seem to hold. It does hold for me, for I define
'general' as 'what a general does' and surely what a 'captain does' is below and
included into what a general does.
Less clear about how this relate to 'just' -- and why Hart wrote so much
about all this in his Chair of Jurisprudence. We should find out what name
that Chair has. I hope one beginning with "W".
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