[hist-analytic] Shuga-Free

[Jlsperanza at aol.com]

Further to neo-Carnap calling neo-Grice, lovingly, 'a muddle all over the  
place' with bits of shuga on it, too -- but burnt.
 
 
Since I have WoW to hand, I will quote the passage where Grice   
originally had this footnote to the effect that he owes this to "Hans 
Shuga"  
(in  
P. Cole, Radical Pragmatics, 1981, but WoW has this essay as  being indeed  
1970).

Grice writes:

"Before we go further  [in our attempt to rob Peter to pay Paul, as it 
were. 
JLS -- since Grice is  into the campaign to re-visit Russell/Whitehead's  
modernism vs.  Strawson truth-value gappy neo-traditionalism -- these are 
Grice's   terms]..."

"...it would be EXPEDIENT to define the task
somewhat more  precisely" [it is at this point
that he credits 'Shuga']

"If we are  looking for a possible FORMAL COUNTERPART
of such a sentence  as

[the author of 'Sein und Zeit' wears a  moustache]

we have TWO candidates to consider."

[the first  candidate being]

(ix.Zx)Mx

"in which the  iota-operator is treated as being
SYNTACTICALLY analogous to a  QUANTIFIER"

-- the second candidate being

M(ix.Zx)

"in which the iota operator is treated as a
DEVICE for  forming a TERM"

-- and not as a 'term' itself, as I wrote in my previous  post, which would 
 
be stupid.

Grice continues with a very  important point -- which he then owes to  
'Shuga':

"If we select  [the first candidate], then, when we introduce  negation,
we have two  SEMANTICALLY distinguishable ways of doing so"

a.1.   - ((ix.Zx)Mx)

a.2     (ix.Zx)-Mx

"The second [a.2] will, and the  first [a.1] will not, ENTAIL
the existence of an x [e.g. Heidegger] that is  UNIQUELY
[the author of Sein und Zeit]"

"But if we select [a.2] there  is only ONE place -- prefixing --
for the introduction of  negation."

"And, in consequence,  

(ix.Zx)-M


-- ["The  author of Sein und Zeit did not ALWAYS wear a moustache"]

"will be a  [scope-] ambiguous structure"

"unless we introduce a disambiguating scope  convention"

-- as Grice does: two of them: the square-bracket device,  which turns  
certain expressions immune to negation, and, in "Vacuous  Names", the 
numeral  
subscripts.

Grice continues:

"One  ONE REDUCTION to primitive notation
the existence of a unique [author of Sein  und Zeit]
will be ENTAILED"

-- the term is Moore's.

[and thus  we do not need Strawson's notion of 'presupposition']

"On the other will  will not", but will be 'implicated' conversationally;  
and thus we  don't need the Strawsonian notion of truth-value gappy  
presupposition  either -- but cfr. Noel Burton-Roberts and his 
neo-Strawsonian   
fanfares.

Grice continues:

"Call these respectively the STRONG  and the WEAK readings."

How to decide? Grice is clear: his ear for  English:

"Now, if there  WERE a clear distinction in SENSE [Fregean  sense] 
(in English) between, say"


S   [the author of  Sein und Zeit did not wear a moustache   then]

and

W   [it is not the case that the author of  Sein und Zeit  wore a moustache 
then]

"(if the former demanded  the STRONG reading
and the latter the WEAK one), then it would  be
REASONABLE to correlate" 

'the author of Sein  und Zeit wears a moustache"

"with the formal structure that treats  the
iota operator LIKE A QUANTIFIER"

('as a quantifier' seems better  English -- cfr. P A Stone on 'Girls won't  
be girls')

GRICE'S  AVOWAL:

"But this does NOT seem to be the case; I see
no such clear  SEMANTIC distinction"

nor do I. Geary sees, but a pragmatic distinction,  and then, not _that_  
clear -- "On a clear day you can see forever" --  "on a VERY clear day you 
can  
see as far as Aylesbury" Noel  Coward).

Grice continues:

"So it seems BETTER to  associate"

the author of Sein und Zeit wears a  moustache

"with the formal structure that treats the iota operator
as  a term-forming device"

(and not as a term simpliciter as I clumsily wrote  in my previous).

"We are then committed to the STRUCTURAL  ambiguity
of"

the author of Sein und Zeit does not wear a  moustache

[eg. since he died some years  ago]

Having credited Shuga with that Grice finishes the   consideration:

"The proposed task may NOW be defined as follows: on  one  reading, [the 
author of Sein und Zeit does not wear a moustache]  entails the  existence 
of a 
unique [author of Sein und Zeit], on the  other it does not; but  in fact, 
without waiting for disambiguation,  people understand the utterance  of

[the author  of Sein und Zeit does not wear a  moustache]

as IMPLYING (in some  fashion) the unique existence of [an author of Sein  
und Zeit]. This is  intelligible if on one reading -- the strong one -- the 
 
unique  existence of [an author of Sein und Zeit] is ENTAILED, on the other 
-- 
the  weak one -- though NOT ENTAILED, it is *conversationally implicated*   
[emphasis mine. JLS]"

"What needs to be shown [he does], then, is a  route by which the weaker  
reading coult come to implicate what it does  not entail"

(I believe Shuga is credited as author in the UC/Berkeley  obit of Grice,  
online -- since it was a joint collaboration of Stroud  and Shuga, as they 
both  were present for the Grice-bench warming  ceremony; and apparently 
Shuga's 
recollections of how bizarre he found  Grice's explanations on how to play  
cricket -- on the Balliol 'campus'  -- amused a few).

Besides a book on Heidi (gger) to, Shuga authored, I  believe,  
Frege, for the Honderich Arguments from the Philosophers  series.

ETc.
 
JL
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