[hist-analytic] "The Devil of scientism"
Jlsperanza at aol.com
Jlsperanza at aol.com
Thu Feb 11 18:43:56 EST 2010
--- where "Devil" is case-sensitive!
In a message dated 2/11/2010 5:41:17 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
rbj at rbjones.com writes:
Scientism is the systematic application of scientific method
(at any level) beyond its effective scope, or an excessive,
possibly utopian, conception of the potential of such methods.
This is a pejorative construal of the concept.
I wonder, has it always been a pejorative term or have
people sometimes thought it a positive thing?
---- I'd leave others to drop in, but just to note that the collocation
used by Grice is strangely similar to the betes-noire thing: for it's demons
and perilous places in "Pilgrim Grice" and 'devil of scientism' in 1991.
There was once a query about scientism and scientificism in CHORA-L, and I
then searched for collocations in the OED.
Scientism is the systematic application of scientific method
(at any level) beyond its effective scope, or an excessive,
possibly utopian, conception of the potential of such methods.
--- right. This is just implicatural. I.e. what Carnap would have as an
'unintended' pragmatic effect that an assertion may have on you.
'devil' as used by Grice ("the devil of scientism") should not be
always negatively used. A devil is like a demon (which is how he describes the
betes-noires). But there are daemons and there are daemons. In fact, there
are good daemons, which the Greeks (or Griceans) valued high enough as to
call 'happy': rather the good daemon was the one that made _you_ happy (Grice
quotes his student J. L. Ackrill on this, Proc. Brit. Ac. 1975).
There shouldn't be such an implicature.
After all 'scientia' is just the abstract of 'scio' which is the briefest
statement a Roman could make about 'I know'. So 'scientia' becomes, 'things
to be known'. (cf. sapientia, which is supposed to be what philosophers
love -- philosophia, love of wisdom). The Grecians distinguished between
'episteme' and sophia, but the Romans were never so genial.
--- So if scio is 'to know' one should think that the -ism indeed brings
the 'minimalist' wrong connotation about it. There's a hybris, as Jones
notes, give science where no science is due, sort of thing.
But the _aim_ at _knowing_ ('scio') should not be termed 'devilish' per se.
The dialectic here is between
dogmatic
those who know and know they know
and the
sceptic (another bete noire for Grice)
-- these cannot be defined as 'those who know they don't' because this was
the silly old Socratic paradox).
But Grice is playing on this:
the devil of scientism will want to have us say that
not only we don't know
but that we
don't know we know.
---- I'll see if I can retrieve the original quote. It's not vintage Grice,
though. He allows in a footnote it was George Myro's idea! ("the tenor of
the remark", Grice adds).
Etc.
The Grice reprint (1991) reads:
"We must be ever watchful against the Devil of scientism,
who would lead us into
myopic overconcentration
on the nature and importance of
knowledge,
and of scientific knowledge"
--- slightly oxymoronic in Roman, scientia _is_ knowledge.
"in particular; the Devil who is even so
audacious as to tempt us to call in
question the very system of ideas
required to make intelligible
the idea of calling in question
anything at all."
He may be thinking that, say, if a scientist says that all value-judgements
are _unscientific_ then the very proposition,
_science is a valuable thing_
becomes meaningless. The appeal to external/internal, as per Carnap, may
not do, nor his pragmatist bent as to, what works works. Etc, but of course
we'd need to elaborate on this.
"and who would even prompt us, in
effect, to suggest that
since we do not really think but
only think that we think,
we had better change our minds without undue delay."
--- this is like a RAA i.e. reductio ad absurdum, which is indeed Grice's
intro for "not", or elimination, rather.
For there is of course the blatant contradiction of a Neutral Monist who
has us "changing our _minds_" when we are supposed to have none!
But also there's this doxastic version (alla Hintikka) of Socrates'
originally epistemic paradox
I know that I do not know
This cannot, alla Grandy, be understood self-reflectively (His review of
Schiffer, JP)
(i) I know that I do not know that (i)
----
But Grice here -- while capitalising either devil or scientism, we can
dismiss that -- has 'think', i.e believe:
"we do not really think"
where the devil is engaging in, to use Austin's artless sexism, as Grice
has it in Gr01:3, a trouser-word, the 'real' (Austin's objections to the
'real' duck in Sense and Sensibilia -- the word that wears the trousers)
"but only think that we think"
and what's wrong with that?
It's wrong in the epistemic context
I don't know. I only know that I know.
With 'think' Grice CANNOT be thinking of privileged access and
incorrigibility which he has JUST introduced as pirotic advantages for survival:
if pirot thinks that p, ceteris paribus, pirot thinks that he thinks
that p.
----
"who would even prompt us, in
effect, to suggest that
since we do not really think but
only think that we think"
and this is supposed to be the protasis or premise to the conclusion of
this argument that we are suggested to make, as prompted by the devil of
scientism -- where
here it is
scientism qua devil alla Descartes's malignant daemon of the Meditationes
Metaphysicae.
--- i.e.
the modal conclusion:
that "we had better change our minds without undue delay."
Again, the argument being:
(A)
We (the common man, etc)
don't really think
but only
think that we think.
-----------------------------------------------
We had better change our minds without undue delay.
Since (A) is RAA absurd, a forteriori, the devil wins because he is having
as proving something we cannot be prove -- or something!
Ever watchful against him, indeed!
JL Speranza
---
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