[hist-analytic] Entailment-Cum-Implicature (Was: Re: Shuga-Free

Jlsperanza at aol.com Jlsperanza at aol.com
Fri Feb 12 20:51:31 EST 2010



In a message dated 2/12/2010 5:41:39 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,  
rbj at rbjones.com writes:

I am a  fan of implicature, it is good for answering
a number of controversial  claims by Wittgenstein
and Austin (inter alia).
But so far I'm not  convinced by this application.
 
 
----- I would think then:
 
"entailment" and "implicature" are the two notions
 
or

Moore's notion (entailment) and Grice's notion   
 
                                 vs. Strawson's notion ('presupposition')
 
what we would have is then
 
 
i. the pirot karulises elatically
                    this ENTAILS that the pirot exists.
                          since 'the pirot exists' or there is an x such 
that PIROTx
                         is  the first conjunct in the three-conjuncted 
Russellian expansion.
 
ii. the pirot does not karulise elatically
                    does NOT entail that the pirot exists.
                         and thus is TRUE if the pirot does not exist.
                           
                      So far we are dealing only with entailment.
 
                      Strawson wanted to say that in (ii), (ii) presupposes 
that the pirot  exists.
 
                      Grice comes in: "Too strong (as metaphysically 
dangerous -- for what is a  truth-value gap?)".
                               Better say:  By uttering (ii) on occasion, 
the utterer
                                                        may 
conversationally implicate that the pirot exists.
 
 
--- Grice was the champion of cancellability:
 
His examples of the-x, in negated contexts:

"If I come on a group of  peole arguing about whether (the pirot) 
(karulises elatically), it is not  linguistically improper [I'm using () to adapt my 
example. JLS] for me to say  that (the pirot) (does not karulise 
elatically), since there is (no pirot). Of  course I do not have to put it that way, 
but I perfectly welll can. Second, it  can be even less obvious. If it is a 
matter of dispute whehter the government  has a very undercover person ((they 
call it 'the pirot')) who interrogates those  whose loyalty is suspect 
((they call this to kaulise elatically)) and who, if he  existed, could be 
legitimately be referred to as ('the pirot who karulises  elatically') and if 
further I am known to be very sceptical about the existence  of such a (pirot), 
I could perfectly well say to a plainly loyal person: ("Well,  the pirot who 
karulises elatically will NOT be carulising elatically TO YOU at  any 
rate"), without, I would think, being taken to IMPLY that such a (pirot)  exists. 
Further if I am well known to disbelieve in the existence of such a  
(pirot), though others are inclined to believe in him, when I find a man who is  
apprised of my position, but who is worried in case he is to witness the 
pirot  karulising elatically to  him, I could try to reassure him by saying, 
"The  pirot who karulises elatically will not be karulising elatically TO YOU, 
don' t  worry." Then it would be clear that I said this because I was sure 
there is no  such (pirot)."
 
--- Etc.
 
JLS


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