[hist-analytic] Carnap and Grice on "logical"

[Jlsperanza at aol.com]

In a message dated 3/3/2010 12:12:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,  
rbj at rbjones.com writes:
he is the 
odd man out on what "Logical Truth"  should mean and deciding 
to stop using the term.  Quine and Tarski want  it to be a 
narrower term than analyticity (a difficult position for Quine  
to coherently adopt) but can't actually make their minds up 
what it  should mean.  They want logical truths to be true 
taking account only  of the meanings of the "logical" 
constructs but not of "non-logical"  constructs, but they can 
offer no definite account of which constructs are  and are not 
logical.

-----
 
I see, in  a way, I was going to say it relates to Grice (That's what  I 
_always_ say, right?). But on second thoughts, I realise Grice speaks,  
somewhat irritatingly, but I love him, of
 
-, &, v, ->, (x), (Ex), ix
 
as "formal devices" -- not "logical devices".
 
I always thought the correct is "constant", but you may teach me out of  
that!
 
----
 
When retrieving some stuff on Toulmin, who died last year, I was re-reading 
 bits of his "Uses of Argument" -- not our type of Carnapian or Gricean 
there --  but he does say something witty regarding what he calls the 
"non-logical goats".  This phrase is so clumsy (I love Toulmin!) that it gets few 
hits in Google,  which is good. He wants to say that there are goats which are 
logical -- all the  constants above -- and some which are not (he lists, 
"but" and "most"). Odd,  no?

J. L. Speranza