[hist-analytic] Carnap and Grice on "logical"
Jlsperanza at aol.com
Jlsperanza at aol.com
Fri Mar 5 12:26:05 EST 2010
In a message dated 3/5/2010 9:29:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
rbj at rbjones.com writes:
If we insist that only the
"logical" features of the language can be taken into account
then we get a narrower conception of logical truth than of
analyticity, but we also get one which must surely be
language relative, and therefore does not really warrant (in
my opinion) the very nice label "logical truth", which
should go to something really important, like Hume's "Truths
of Reason" or Aristotle's "Demonstrative (or intuitively
certain)" (which is one of the ways Hume explicates "truth
Thanks v. much for the explanation. I guess I won't be using 'logical
constant' for a while. Grice does speak of 'device' in various contexts:
They seem to be "logical devices" but he just says
"formal devices" in WoW:ii, first page.
and he has both the turth-functors (monadic, -; dyadic: &,v, ->) and the
three quantifiers ((x), (Ex) and (ix)). This gives the list as comprising,
let's see _seven_ formal devices. He does not mean to be complete, because
his point is about "some of the formal devices". And he is not into the
mathematic, as you say, first-order predicate-calculus (we agree there that's
the stuff of mathematics) BUT of what he calls, vaguely, 'philosophical
logic' (as opposed to 'philosophy of logic'). I think Grice and Strawson were in
this informal campaign of highering the status of what they were doing,
from "philosophy of logic" -- where they would be philosophers doing logic --
to "philosophical logic" where they would be logicians philosophising.
Matter of style -- Similarly, he saw himself as a philosophical psychologist,
rather than as a philosopher of mind.
So it's the 'devices'. Other people indeed have used 'operators', and
indeed the abstract idea of an 'operation' may be the best or more faithful to
what we are wanting the 'devices' for. While in "Retrospective Epilogue" he
sticks to the 'connectives', I take his point to be generalised to
'devices' -- so that it can comprise what he says about the Square of Opposition,
e.g. as involving the quantifiers, say -- and not just the monadic
truth-functor ('not' -- that we need to define the "E" and the "O" forms) and the
dyadic truth-functors (that we need, qua "&" and "->", to define "A" and
I agree with you that 'logical' should be given a higher status and that it
cannot be dependent on the choice of a linguistic framework like that. And
so I see very well Carnap's point in changing from "L" to "A".
It seems authors who have spoken of the 'logical constants' have confused
the things. I take your point very well that these devices can indeed be
referred to in the meta-language, but since by Grice's Bootstrap (Principle
-- don't have a richer metalanguage than you'll ever regret) and since the
meta-language CAN be English, one need not have to go there -- yet.
I'll revise for other uses of 'logical', with Grice.
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