[hist-analytic] Carnap and Grice on "logical"

[Jlsperanza at aol.com]

In a message dated 3/10/2010 8:49:34  rbj at rbjones.com writes as per  below. 
Sorry for typo. Indeed I did mean the Grice/Tarski interaction, not  
Tarski's interaction with himself. R. B. Jones writes: "The most revealing  
reference for Tarski is his paper, "On the concept of logical consequence" ...  
conspicuously inconsistent". since he muddles mathematical 'induction', 
algebra,  non-logical with logical consequence ... shows Tarski to be in a 
complete muddle  on this matter". Sad, my logic tutor, G. Palau, wrote her PhD on 
"logical  consequence" so I should ask her! -- 
 
But isn't 'consequene' really the
 .
.  . 
 
symbol used by logicians. As in Grice's example
 
"He is an Englishman;" Jill said of Jack, "He is, therefore, brave"
 
Jack is an Englishman
----------------------------------
Jack is brave.
 
Surely that is NOT a logical consequence, but it is a consequence. I never  
understood the difference between a conclusion and a consequence. But I  
suppose with a tweak here and there, we can combine both notions.
 
If Tarski is considering algebra, which does rely on 'mathematical  
intuition', then, not all of the algebraic consequences are logical ones,  right?
 
---- The problem with Grice at this stage is that he found "implicit"  
premises leading to strict consequence to be of more interest than actual  
'proofs'. So that he spends like 2 pages considering the different premises that  
would make 
 
Jack is an Englishman
---------------------------------
Jack is brave
 
a sort of 'consequence' --. It could WELL be 'inductive' -- almost in the  
mathematical sense. I.e. Jill believes Englishmen TEND to be brave.  Etc.
 
At this point Carnap would allude (or refer explicitly) to the 'meaning'  
"postulate"
 
(x)Ex --> Bx
 
If x is an Englishman, x is brave.
 
In which case we do need that as a premise to turn the 'consequence' into a 
 logical one, no?
 
"I think I probably will have to do that before 
long!" (read Quine in  Schilpp).
 
I wouldn't bother. I'd just read what Carnap understood about it -- Now if  
a QUINEAN would be welcomed above board by us, that IS a different issue! 
:).  Oddly when I read Grice's contribution to the Quine festchrift I almost 
missed  Quine's reply -- so short -- have a page -- that I almost found it 
insulting --  "Grice's doctrine", or words to that effect, is "forbiddingly 
complex" -- he  fails to mention the law that makes this illegal -- and "in 
any case, otiose".  Ah well. He says that the way he (Quine) uses symbols, he 
doesn't need any  scope indication device for things. They are by default 
understood as having  maximal scope in the order in which they occur. 
 
On Quine's 'Two dogmas' as meant to undermine Carnap's and Grice's  
campaigns:

"there is no case to answer 
(this is what Grice and  Strawson did)."
 
Right. Critics and defenders of the analytic-synthetic distinction have  
only superficially read the Grice/Strawson defence as concerned with NL rather 
 than FL, while it seems pretty easy to provide analogues of Grice's and  
Strawson's examples of the type that would relate to Carnap's enterprise.
 
MP meaning postulate
 
(x) Bx --> -Mx
 
No bachelor is married.
 
---- vis a vis Grice/Strawson example:
 
My neighbour's three-year old son 1. is an adult (analytically false)
------------------------------------ followed by "What are you TALKING  
about?"
------------------------------------------------- 2. understands Russell's  
theory of types
------------------------------------ followed by "What's hard to  believe"
 
My neihbour is a married bachelor. ("What are you talking about?")
(ix)Bx & Mx   followed by ((x)Bx --> Mx) -> - ((Ex)Bx  & Mx)
 
My neighbour, who is a bachelor, runs a marriage counselling agency ("That  
is ironic").
 
J. L. Speranza