[hist-analytic] Reciprocity: Rousseau vs. Rawls: Re: Hobbesian

jlsperanza at aol.com jlsperanza at aol.com
Tue Jan 12 08:04:52 EST 2010



-----Original Message-----
From: Baynesr at comcast.net
To: hist-analytic <hist-analytic at simplelists.co.uk>
Sent: Mon, Jan 11, 2010 9:13 pm
Subject: Reciprocity: Rousseau vs. Rawls: Re: Hobbesian

 From self love no concept of reciprocity is derivable. Nor does 
reciprocity,
alone, imply obligation. I would like to clarify a point in view of JL 
(Speranza)'s
mention of my introducing the "amorous" relation entailed by being "in 
love."
While being in love certainly carries this implication, this is not my 
reason for
introducing it. Let me clarify this somewhat.

>John may love Mary
>
>and
>
>Mary may love John,
>even though they are not "in love."

Good point. Relying on Grice´s informativeness, basically his "Maxims 
of Quantity", or pertaining to the Category of Quantity, as he 
humourously calls it "echoing Kant", I would think

(1) Mary and John are in love.

_implicates_

(2) Mary and John are in love with each other.

But as you say, I may be wrong -- this would seem to depend on idiolect 
meaning, or as I prefer, idiosyncratic, as Grice says, meaning. I don´t 
use the nominal, "in love" much, since I´m a verb person.

In particular, I´m having in mind this, "odd, but possible" context, as 
Grice would have it, that Mary is in love with Peter, and John is in 
love with Judith. So they are, literally, both Mary and John in love.

I would prefer to use Jack and Jill for this, as it´s the example used 
by Grice.

Otherwise, it starts to sound like a cheap film, "Mary and Carol, and 
Ed and Pete" or something.

----

Bayne continues:

"They are in this circumstance of reciprocity under no obligation to 
one another."

i.e. in the scenario

(3) Jack loves Jill and Jill loves Jack.

Bayne:

"But it appears to me to be the case that once they are "in love""

i.e.

(4) Jack and Jill are in love WITH EACH OTHER.


"they at once
are subject to a mutual or reciprocal obligation;"

I see you do use "mutual" and it would be good to revise the etymology 
for this. I do suspect that binary is entailed or logically implied.

"there is something they "owe"
each other which they did not under those circumstances where the only 
thing
that could be said was that John loves Mary and Mary loves John. So 
what is
it that transforms this sort of reciprocity into a state of being in 
love."

Good point.

"It is this,
that the lover know that he is loved by the beloved."

And I was wondering if "believes" may do. I´m having in mind Ovid, Ars 
Amatoria. First, there are cases of self-deception, magisterially 
analysed by D. F. Pears in his Questions in the philosophy of mind and 
beyond (Motivated irrationality). Jack may not KNOW that he loves Jill. 
In fact, it happens with otherwise rational agents, a lot. Why, Jack 
may not even know he loves hisself, as I prefer. Some self-love!

For, is ´love´a psychological predicate we are talking about? I hope 
so. If so, there´s issues of incorrigibility and privileged access, 
both discussed by Grice in his "Method in philosophical psychology". 
Etc.

Bayne:

"Once this is a fact, then there
exists the reciprocity that characterizes being in love over and above 
the bare
conjunctive reciprocity mentioned. My contention at this point is that 
obligation
arises from reciprocity; and the sort of reciprocity is epistemic, viz. 
that one
KNOW that the beloved indeed love me; so the beloved is known to love me
and because I know I love the beloved, there is this reciprocity:"

Very good. And to qualm those who object to long Gricean clauses in 
their analysis, Bayne properly goes symbolic:

"x knows y loves
x and x knows x loves y, so 'knows x loves y' and 'knows y loves x'  
entails that
x knows they love *each other*."

Or

1. Jack loves Jill.

2. Jill loves Jack

3. Jack assumes that Jill loves Jack. I.e. Jack assumes (2)

4. Jill assumes (1)

"(Jack) knows (Jill) loves
(him) and (Jill) knows (Jack) loves (Jill), so (she) 'knows (Jack) 
loves (Jill)' and (he) 'knows (she) loves (him)'  entails that (he) 
knows they love *each other*."

Isn´t what is entailed merely that he knows, or assumes, that he loves 
her, and he further assumes that his love is requited by Jill?

They both seem to mutually know or assume this -- but the "each other", 
as you say, is merely about their assumptions, not about the content of 
their love. To have a mutual love, they would need, say, a pet.

So, Jack and Jill mutually love their sheepdog, Jake.

-- recall the odd ending, with Jack breaking his crown and all that. I 
always found this rhyme so macabre.


"Thus the reciprocity is epistemic! But there is
more to this epistemic relation than one might think.
The obligation of the beloved to the beloved is reciprocal; that 
obligation arises
from such a state as being in love."

It _is_ odd, isn´t it. For there is no (x) such that both Jill and Jack 
love. Perhaps it´s their mutual welfare. In the case of sexual 
survival, it may well be an antecedent for Jack wanting Jill to 
perpetuate his genes and viceversa. But then, one pale of water ...

"This reciprocity in turn is epistemic; and so
I claim that the obligation arises ultimately from an epistemic 
relation, not a
moral fact."

Good. Assumptions. But recall they seem to be assumptions about moral 
facts, or feelings. And as Grice says, sometimes are assumptions ARE 
true. (What´s the good, Grice wonders, in Meaning Revisited, WoW, of 
having all our assumptions wrong? It doesn´t even follow; it´s 
intranscendentally unkantian, as he´d say).

Bayne:

"I might go so far as to say that the "ought" is not to be derived from 
the
"is" but from the "known to be.""

It is in contexts like this I fear my "assume" won´t do, for you seem 
to require the factivity of "know" -- alla Gettier, A knows that p, if 
p is true" -- to get to a, however derived, moral "fact", alla 
Blackburn´s quasi-moral quasi-realism of attitudes.

Bayne then considers St. Matthew: I´ll start the numbering from 1 again


(1) Do onto others as you would have them do onto you.
(2) Do what is good for you with the least possible harm to others.

Bayne comments:

>only (1) involves
>a reciprocal.

as per

(1´) EACH do onto the other as EACH would have the other do onto
     himself.
(2´) EACH must do for himself with the least harm to the other

Bayne adds a good point about the "singularity" constraint on the 
other. Warnock was appealed to this in his rendering of (Ex) as "some", 
too. "Logic and Metaphysics").

>Momentarily ignore the difference between (2´) and
(2´´') EACH must do for himself with the least harm to the OTHERS.

Bayne:

Both in (1) and (2)

"'each' from a remote position joins with 'other'
to form 'each other' at another position.

Allowing (1) to become

(1´) Do onto EACH OTHER as EACH would have the other do onto himself

Eureka:

>Here we have a ... reciprocal.

On the other hand (2) yields

(2¨¨) EACH must do for himself with the least harm to OTHER.

Non-Eureka:

"no genuine reciprocal can be found at (the) logical form of (2")

-- How about

(2' ' ' ') Each must do for himself with the least harm to each other

?

You are right there seems to be a difference. I take the other here as 
the 10 comm. thing, love thy neighbour. Where it is not specified who 
the neighbour is. And this allows some humble Samaritans to say that 
one has to love one´s neighbour not like you love yourself, but MORE 
than you love yourself, and paradoxes like that.

In fact, there is a church I never visit in Buenos Aires: Santisimo 
Sacramento. It was built by a ladida lady who wanted to show how much 
she loved her neighbour by building such an overornamented church it 
hurts. "If I live in a palace, shouldn´t God live in one, too?", her 
odious motto.

But I can imagine God rephrasing the above using the "each other"

Perhaps in the vocative:

"Each of ye, do for thyself, with the least harm for each other"

?

-- Just exploring. Not offering as counterexamples or anything.


"in the
case of (B''') but there is one in (A''). Why is this? Syntactically, 
the reason
is in the placement of 'himself'. Observe that 'himself' occurs in 
*between*
'each' and 'other' in (B'''). It suggests a "barrier"; that barrier is 
related to what
"we" used to call a "governing category." 'Himself' is a reflexive;

---

And wouldn´t it be possible to avoid the reflexive nature of the 
FORMULATION of the practice by having, clumsily, things like

Jack loves Jack.

Etc.

It seems reflexiveness is an accident, of coreference, etc.

"'each other' a reciprocal.
On earlier theories of
syntax the binding principles governing the relation of reflexives and
reciprocals were treated as much alike (Both must be bound in their
"governing category"). In (B''') 'himself' needs binding in its 
category and
it gets it from 'Each'. So 'Each' cannot "move" to 'other' without 
violating
transivity of identity (forget the distinction for now between 
coreference
and coindexation etc). Because there is this "barrier" namely 'himself' 
the
reciprocal is impossible."

Thanks. I´ll reconsider and get back to you. I see what you mean 
splendidly and would try to be looking perhaps more closely at the 
logical form, and how the surface form of both reflexives and 
reciprocals can be thought of as derivable defined operators, ... or 
something.

Cheers,

J. L. Speranza




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