[hist-analytic] Not Cricket

jlsperanza at aol.com jlsperanza at aol.com
Thu Jan 14 13:55:11 EST 2010

Yes, toleration and tolerant are great concepts. I cannot but think of  
Locke when I hear those words. 
The Grice ref. in fact is to Plato, Republic. It should be online  
googlebooks for Studies in the Way of Words, and the rather pretentious title  goes:
"Metaphysics, Eschatology, and Plato's Republic"
and it's possibly Grice's last, since he wrote it in 1987 especially for  
the book.
The "Republic" section concerns the dialogue between Socrates and  
Thrasymachus on
  'fair'    -- say
as being 
   'legal' or 'political' as Rawls would have it.
Grice feels Socratic but finds it hard to 'go the rounds' with  
Thrasymachus, hence the need to apply what he calls philosophically  eschatological 
Grice writes:

"Thrasymachus nowhere makes it clear whether
he regards the POPULAR APPLICATION of the
term 'just', which Thrasymachus may not himself
endorse, as a positive or negative commendation."
(p. 310). 
"Among [Socrates'] flaws in this argument one
might point particulArly to the dubious analogy
between the province of justice and the province
of the arts, and also to a blatant equivocation
with the word 'compete', which might mean
either 'try to perform better than' or 'try to get
the better of'" (p. 313)
which look like anti-reciprocals, if you axes (sic) me.
Grice goes on to discuss,
  "honor among thieves"
as important.
Grice's classicist prose sometimes take the best of him.
"If the possession of Gyges's ring would enable
our inroads upon others to remain undiscovered, 
no reasonable person would deny himself this
   Adeimantus reinfornces the demands expressed
by Glaucon by drawing attention to the support lent
by the prevailing education and culture to the 
    RECEIVED opinion
as distinct from the view of it taken by Socrates"
    (p. 314)
"In the case of Plato's Thrasymachus it seems that he,
perhaps like Plato himself, is njot disposed to engage
in the kind of 
     conceptual sophistication
practiced by Aristotle and by some philosophers since
Aristotle; for Thrasymachus, the friends of MORAL JUSTICE
(on the assumption that the representation of Thrasymachus
as a kind of moral sceptic is legitmate) will be philosophers
who treat the term
    'moral justice'
as one which refers to morality, or to moral virtue
in general, a usage which Aristotle also recognises as
legitimate , alongside the usage in which 'justice' 
is the name of one or more specific virtues"
   (p. 316)
"The possibly more Kantian conception of the
relation between moral and political justice will
perhaps carry the consequence that the view
of Socrates and his friends that moral 
justice is desirable independently of the consequences
of acting justly is no accident."
   (p. 319)
"My account also resembles the original account
by Socrates in that it deploys the notion of
which was a prominent ingredient in Socrates's story."
(p. 320).
On analogy:
"Consider 'in in good shape', which seemingly
applies to objects belonging to different stages, 
namely to animal bodies and to states. In addition
to such 'holistic' epithets, which apply to subject
which inhabit different stages, there will also be
'meristic' epithets, like 'part' itself, which apply to
parts of such aforementioned subjects"
(p. 323)
"Gaps which appear in the ranks of
first-mode specifications might be expected
to favor neo-Socrates rather than
neo-Thrasymachus, unless neo-Thrasymachus"
--- Grice must be thinking Nozick.
"can make out a good case in favour of the
view that where first-mode specifications
are lacking, second-mode specifications
will also be lacking." (p. 323)
"It might be possibly, by a move which would
be akin to that of "Ramsification", to redescribe
the things which inhabit a certain stage"
(p. 324).
Re: analogy.
"It further suggests that neo-Socrates need 
both of these conceptions [of analogous terms],
but, of course, cannot have both of them"
(p. 332). 
"If we go beyond Plato, we might to add
such forms of motivational appeal as that which
arises from subscriptions to some 
principle governing the realization of the
initial property"
(p. 335).
"Nothing has so far been said to rule out
the possibility that while Socrates and other
such persons may each be concerned that 
people IN GENERAL should value the
realization of justice in themselves because
of its intrinsic appeal, that is to say, for
moral reasons, neverhteless, their concern
that people in general should value 
for moral reasons the realization in themselves
of justice is based at least in part on
or political grounds rather than on any
intrinsic or moral appeal"
  (p. 335).
"At this point it seems to me we
move away from the territory of Socrates
and Plato and nearer to the territory
of Kant"
  (p. 336).
J. L. Speranza

In a message dated 1/14/2010 7:07:10 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,  
Baynesr at comcast.net writes:
Good point, and not just because I can respond  briefly. 
Rawls doesn't take up ANY of the Greek philosophers, 
but DOES  take up everyone else, it seems. This is 
interesting in itself. I'll take a  look at Grice on this. 
Aristotle is a core figure in Anscombe, but here  interest 
is morality not justice. 

I've been "indoctrinated" so  heavily in the Kantian creed 
that Rawls's Kantianism is, at first,  appealing. I was 
considering how I might define 'tolerance', given the  
counterfeit role it plays in Rawls. What I came up with is 

"Tolerance is the recognition of a duty to respect the 
freedom of  others." 

Surely,there must be a better one. But what?

Very tricky  notion; not like, say, 'bias' which is conceptually 
somewhat void of  conceptual content. This illustrates another
interesting asymmetry: coming up  with a definition of 'tolerance'
is tough; so is providing a criterion of  'toleration'; perhaps
there is not; whereas 'bias' is easy enough to define,  although
many will make a valiant effort to prove otherwise, *applying*  
any criterion seems to suggest the need for further critera.
Tolerance is  not a legal idea, bias is.

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