[hist-analytic] Carnap, Grice: "philosophical logician" versus "philosopher of logic"

Jlsperanza at aol.com Jlsperanza at aol.com
Sun Mar 7 19:37:21 EST 2010

In a message dated 3/7/2010 4:50:54 P.M.  Eastern Standard Time, 
rbj at rbjones.com writes:
Not convinced that that is the  correct delineation.
"Philosophy of logic" surely must be philosophy, whereas  
"philosophical logic" must be a kind of logic; doesn't that 
jump out  from the grammar??

Right -- but recall: grammar is only a "pretty good guide" to logical form! 
But I am wondering. When I did teach logic, I felt so _guilty_. All those  
faces, looking at me for me to provide inference rules! Before the 
springbreak  they are already convinced that horseshoe does some things!
---- So I am thinking:
Lit.Hum. programme, Oxford.
They should take a course as provided by
The Wykeham professor of logic.
-- _He_ is not a logician, or a philosopher.
He is the Wykeham professor of logic.
So the student, let's call him Tom (or Tommy)
takes notes:
"The professor said that the horseshoe, together
with the squiggly makes for a turnstile".
(the squiggly is the sign for "-", and the turnstile is the Frege assertion 
What the Wykeham professor of logic is saying is not logic. Why, he is no  
logician. It's not philosophy of logic either. Why he is a professor, not a  
----- I would think that one may compare this with
"prof. of mathematical logic", Oxford. St. Giles, Department of  
What he says is no logic. Why, he is only a "professor of" mathematical  
logic. Etc.
So I would think, --- there's LOGIC.
That's a system. System G. Say. It's even rude to call it 'logic' because  
System G may incorporate 'temporal variables' which are not really part of 
the  "logic" of it. 
That is something that exists: it's a PRODUCT. The process is what  anyone 
who submitted is has done: a person or a machine. That would be a  LOGICIAN.
Plus, there are people called philosophers (machines, less likely) -- but  
if Noel Coward is right that 'probably we'll live to see machines do it, 
let's  do it, let's fall in love' you never know. And if a philosopher 
philosophises on  logic, he is doing, as you say, "philosophy of X", philosophy of 
I claim that is what Grice is doing. But he is (I love him) pretentious  
enough. Similarly, when he has the sections of PGRICE separated, it's  
"Philosophical Psychology" -- but the work of the editors is relevant here --.  
Rather than, say, "philosophy of mind". So, in the same vein, or by the same  
token, one would say that
"a philosophical psychologist"
is a psychologist.
But NONE of the psychologists I met will endure, bare, afford, tolerate,  
that! They are so narrow minded and myopically concentrated on Wundt, that  
whatever Aristotle said in "De Anima" (Peri Psycheos) goes over their  
narrow-minded heads.
I would expect, on a bad day, the same from logicians! 
--- Think keywords:
And now let's be reminded of Grice's 'casual' wording in the second William 
 James lecture. Grice _is_ 'causal' by nature: all he said, and rightly so, 
is  within this context of convivial philosophy: the talk, the 
conversation, the  open class, the seminar, etc.:

The first sentence from this thing that  linguists have learned almost by 
heart -- some of them without understanding the  gist of it! :( --
"It is a commonplace of philosophical logic that..."
 1  2  3  4  5  6 7 8
--- the 6th and 8th word: "philosophical logic"
"... there are, or appear to be, divergences
in meaning between, one the one hand,
at least some of what I shall call
the formal devices" (never logical constants)
"-, \/, /\, (Ax), (Ex), (ix) (when these are 
given a standard two-valued interpretation) --
and, on the other, what are taken to be
their analogues or counterparts in 
natural language"
-- he'll never say English!
"such expressions as 'not', 'and', 'or',
'if', 'all', 'some'

" "(or "at least some") he adds in a  bracket
indicating that he is NOT onto the 
counterparts but the original
devices, rather.
So, if one presses the use of "philosophical logic" there, Grice  is 
implicating that
--- there are practitioners of such a thing, 'philosophical  logic'.
--- that those practitioners should perhaps not inappropriately be  called 
'philosophical logicians".

I once was wedded to linguistics, but did not want, of course, to say,  
that Grice was one. (Imagine the 'treason' one may feel if one starts a  
programme in philosophy and comes out as a linguist!). So I found some  
expressions, in I think Allwood, or other, to the effect that there  possibly is such 
a thing as
"philosophical linguistics".
in which case, this woud be practiced, no doubt, by the
"philosophical linguist" -- but I never met one!
--- With "pragmatics" it's even more aggravating. "Pragmatics", as promoted 
 by the IPrA (quite a few euros per month they desire!) is _the_ truly  
interdisciplinary discipline. But there's
"philosophical pragmatics"
-- Grice no doubt, and the rest.
And then there's -- I recall my local mentor on this, Thomas Moro  Simpson,
"philosophical semantics" -- "semantica filosofica" in the THICK book of  
his compilation that included a vernacular tr. of Strawon, "On referring" by  
my PhD thesis director, the late E. A. Rabossi.
And a practitioner of which would be a
"philosophical semanticist".
We were discussing those things with Horn, and to his horror, if I may say  
so, we found that the OED recognises perhaps the first use of 
'pragmaticist' as  coming from his colleague at Yale, Harold Bloom. But I forget if we 
found, or  they found, an earlier use of 'pragmaticist' to mean otherwise. I 
have  found "pragmaticist" a bit of a mouthful. I find "philosopher" a bit of 
a  mouthful, but my use of 'foolosopher' (c) by Hobbes, (OED) did fall flat 
in some  quarters ("Surely we deserve some respect!", someone said, I 
recall  him alright -- but I wasn't meaning all philosophers were such, of 
course).  What bothers me about 'pragmaticist' is that it looks quite like the 
more  venerable, 'pragmatist' -- after all it was a Peirceian, Morrisian 
invention,  Carnap was pretty familiar with.
And we don't want to say that a metaphilosopher _is_ a philosopher. Having  
seen who contributes to A. Marsoobian, "Metaphilosophy" (I love him) I  
HOPE he will accept contributions by, say, sociologists on serendipity  and 
such. In fact, it may be claimed that to do true metaphilosophy it's best to  
leave the Emperor's clothes behind, or something.
J. L. Speranza

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