[hist-analytic] Mele and the history of analytic philosophy of action

Jlsperanza at aol.com Jlsperanza at aol.com
Fri Feb 4 14:07:25 EST 2011

It is excellent that Bayne is considering this  latest book by Mele. Mele's 
site contains a full list of his publications,  ordered, typically, 
unchronologically. I have selected a few that deal with  historical issues in his 
interesting philosopher. Cheers.  Speranza

""Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and  Awareness," in 
L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, eds. Libet, Free Will, and  
Responsibility. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)."

---- I take this  as 'historical' in that it is an exegesis of Libet.

""Approaching  Self-Deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company." 
Consciousness and Cognition  19 (2010): 745-750."

Again, I take that as exegetical or historical in  that it mentions Audi.

“Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility,”  Journal of Ethics 10 
(2006): 283-294. 

Again, exegeses and criticism of  other authors.

“A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘Four-Case Argument’ for  Incompatibilism,” 
Analysis (2005) 65: 75-80.


“Dennett on  Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2005): 36: 414-426. 

Again. Here we are getting  closer to the period that interests me, since 
Dennett's background is Oxonian,  under Gilbert Ryle, at All Souls, Oxford.

J. Gert and A. Mele,  “Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An 
Interplanetary Exploration.”  Philosophia, 32 (2005): 275-283.

A study of  Lenman.

“Motivated Irrationality,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling,  eds. The Oxford 
Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004),  240-256. 

This is the title of a book by D. F. Pears, who died last  year.

“Chisholm on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2003) 34: 630-648.

An  exegesis.

“Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video  Arcade,” in M. 
Sintonen, P. Ylikoski, and K. Miller, eds., Realism in Action,  (Kluwer, 
2003), 129-135.

Again, a double exegesis.

H. Beebee and  A. Mele, “Humean Compatibilism.” Mind, 111 (2002): 201-223. 

Good: a big  one here: Hume.

“Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will,”  Philosophical 
Explorations 2 (1999): 96-104. 


“Strength  of Motivation and Being in Control: Learning from Libet,” 
American Philosophical  Quarterly 34 (1997): 319-332. 

More on Libet.

“Underestimating  Self-Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad,” An
alysis 57 (1997): 119-123.  


F. Adams and A. Mele, “The Intention/Volition Debate.”  Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 22 (1992): 323-338. 

This above may deal  with the issue brought by D. Frederick.

“Dretske’s Intricate  Behavior,” Philosophical Papers 20 (1991): 1-10. 

An exegesis on a good  author. I think this was possibly a personal 
influence. Michigan?  Wisconsin?

“Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action,” American  Philosophical 
Quarterly 26 (1989): 19-30. 

There is a paper by Pears,  Belief and intention, and Grice, "Intention and 
uncertainty" dwells deeply on  these issues. 

“Akratic Feelings,” Philosophy and Phenomenological  Research 50 (1989): 

The locus classicus for Grice on akrasia is  his reply to Davidson, 
"Davidson on weakness of the will", in  Vermazen/Hintikka.

(Review article) “Self-Deception and Akrasia: A  Review of David Pears’s 
Motivated Irrationality,” Behaviorism 14 (1986):  183-191. 

Good he dedicated a review article to this master of Christ  Church, Oxford.

“Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the  Psychology of Action,” History 
of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1985): 375-393.  Reprinted in N. Sherman, ed. 
Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays (Rowman and  Littlefield, 1999). 

We get to REAL EXEGESIS. I like that, and see his  specialty is Greek 
philosophy, too.

“How to Represent Aristotelian  Deliberation Syllogistically,” TheNew 
Scholasticism 59 (1985): 484-492.  

Excellent exegetical, it sounds like.

“Aristotle on the Roles of  Reason in Motivation and Justification,” 
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie  66 (1984): 124-147. 


“Aristotle’s Wish,” Journal of the  History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 


“Aristotle  on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action,” Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy,  Supplementary Vol. X (1984): 133-155. 


“Pears on  Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions,” Philosophia 14 (1984): 

Pears  co-worked with Grice in the philosophy of action, of course, and 
Grice quotes  Pears on predictability in the British Academy Lecture. Pears 
also has ANOTHER  less quoted collection, Problems in the philosophy of mind. 
Pears is closer to  Grice in these areas than Hampshire (Thought and Action), 
or other Oxonians, who  covered the same ground.

“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,”  Proceedings ofthe American 
Catholic Philosophical Association 56 (1982): 79-86.  


“Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,”  Journalof the History of 
Philosophy 19 (1981): 405-423. 

We are getting  closer to which was Grice's favourite philosophical book -- 

“The  Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s Causal Theory of 
Action,”  The New Scholasticism 55 (1981): 281-316. 


“Aristotle on  Akrasia and Knowledge,” The Modern Schoolman 58 (1981): 


“On ‘Happiness and the Good Life’,” Southwestern Journalof  Philosophy 10 
(1979): 181-187. 

So, his first essay is on something Grice  will write in a later stage of 
his life, vide Warner, "Grice on happiness".  Grice's paper on happiness in 
terms of the good life -- relying of course on  Ackrill's Aristotle -- and 
thus explicitly cited, in Grice, "Aspects of Reason",  appendix: "Happiness".

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