[hist-analytic] Mele and the history of analytic philosophy of action
Jlsperanza at aol.com
Jlsperanza at aol.com
Fri Feb 4 14:07:25 EST 2011
It is excellent that Bayne is considering this latest book by Mele. Mele's
site contains a full list of his publications, ordered, typically,
unchronologically. I have selected a few that deal with historical issues in his
interesting philosopher. Cheers. Speranza
""Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness," in
L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, eds. Libet, Free Will, and
Responsibility. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)."
---- I take this as 'historical' in that it is an exegesis of Libet.
""Approaching Self-Deception: How Robert Audi and I Part Company."
Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010): 745-750."
Again, I take that as exegetical or historical in that it mentions Audi.
“Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Ethics 10
Again, exegeses and criticism of other authors.
“A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘Four-Case Argument’ for Incompatibilism,”
Analysis (2005) 65: 75-80.
“Dennett on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2005): 36: 414-426.
Again. Here we are getting closer to the period that interests me, since
Dennett's background is Oxonian, under Gilbert Ryle, at All Souls, Oxford.
J. Gert and A. Mele, “Lenman on Externalism and Amoralism: An
Interplanetary Exploration.” Philosophia, 32 (2005): 275-283.
A study of Lenman.
“Motivated Irrationality,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds. The Oxford
Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004), 240-256.
This is the title of a book by D. F. Pears, who died last year.
“Chisholm on Freedom,” Metaphilosophy (2003) 34: 630-648.
“Intending and Trying: Tuomela vs. Bratman at the Video Arcade,” in M.
Sintonen, P. Ylikoski, and K. Miller, eds., Realism in Action, (Kluwer,
Again, a double exegesis.
H. Beebee and A. Mele, “Humean Compatibilism.” Mind, 111 (2002): 201-223.
Good: a big one here: Hume.
“Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will,” Philosophical
Explorations 2 (1999): 96-104.
“Strength of Motivation and Being in Control: Learning from Libet,”
American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 319-332.
More on Libet.
“Underestimating Self-Control: Kennett and Smith on Frog and Toad,” An
alysis 57 (1997): 119-123.
F. Adams and A. Mele, “The Intention/Volition Debate.” Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 22 (1992): 323-338.
This above may deal with the issue brought by D. Frederick.
“Dretske’s Intricate Behavior,” Philosophical Papers 20 (1991): 1-10.
An exegesis on a good author. I think this was possibly a personal
influence. Michigan? Wisconsin?
“Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action,” American Philosophical
Quarterly 26 (1989): 19-30.
There is a paper by Pears, Belief and intention, and Grice, "Intention and
uncertainty" dwells deeply on these issues.
“Akratic Feelings,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989):
The locus classicus for Grice on akrasia is his reply to Davidson,
"Davidson on weakness of the will", in Vermazen/Hintikka.
(Review article) “Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Review of David Pears’s
Motivated Irrationality,” Behaviorism 14 (1986): 183-191.
Good he dedicated a review article to this master of Christ Church, Oxford.
“Aristotle on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the Psychology of Action,” History
of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1985): 375-393. Reprinted in N. Sherman, ed.
Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
We get to REAL EXEGESIS. I like that, and see his specialty is Greek
“How to Represent Aristotelian Deliberation Syllogistically,” TheNew
Scholasticism 59 (1985): 484-492.
Excellent exegetical, it sounds like.
“Aristotle on the Roles of Reason in Motivation and Justification,”
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (1984): 124-147.
“Aristotle’s Wish,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984):
“Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action,” Canadian Journal
of Philosophy, Supplementary Vol. X (1984): 133-155.
“Pears on Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions,” Philosophia 14 (1984):
Pears co-worked with Grice in the philosophy of action, of course, and
Grice quotes Pears on predictability in the British Academy Lecture. Pears
also has ANOTHER less quoted collection, Problems in the philosophy of mind.
Pears is closer to Grice in these areas than Hampshire (Thought and Action),
or other Oxonians, who covered the same ground.
“Aristotle on the Justification of Ends,” Proceedings ofthe American
Catholic Philosophical Association 56 (1982): 79-86.
“Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Journalof the History of
Philosophy 19 (1981): 405-423.
We are getting closer to which was Grice's favourite philosophical book --
“The Practical Syllogism and Deliberation in Aristotle’s Causal Theory of
Action,” The New Scholasticism 55 (1981): 281-316.
“Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge,” The Modern Schoolman 58 (1981):
“On ‘Happiness and the Good Life’,” Southwestern Journalof Philosophy 10
So, his first essay is on something Grice will write in a later stage of
his life, vide Warner, "Grice on happiness". Grice's paper on happiness in
terms of the good life -- relying of course on Ackrill's Aristotle -- and
thus explicitly cited, in Grice, "Aspects of Reason", appendix: "Happiness".
More information about the hist-analytic