[hist-analytic] Some Clarification of My Posting on Putnam

Baynesr at comcast.net Baynesr at comcast.net
Mon May 30 10:35:59 EDT 2011


A bit of clarification of my last posting on Putnam. My position is very close to Putnam's with respect to scientific realism. My defense of the more traditional substance ontology framing a, typical, sense data theory of perception ought not to be understood as a defense of this notion. Putnam's position (or so it would appear) is closer to Cassirer's view. More on this later, after I've digested more of Cassirer. Putnam falls within a continuum of "relativism" but there is a decided lack of discussion on the nature of human action. It is here where I hope to introduce something different. Moreover, when I mentioned a reworking of Kant's "Analytic" I meant to say "Aesthetic." The point here is the relation of intuition and a volition. Kant treats the theory of action as a branch of ethics. I do not. Part of Austin's and Putnam's "problem" from my point of view is that there is a "metaphysics" to their concept of the "ordinary man." He is in fact a philosophical construct depending on a particular ontology. I reject this. I am closer in this to Sellarsian raw feels, as Putnam describes, but openly advocate a phenomenological beginning of philosophy more closely linked to Husserl's "suppositionless philosophy.". In addition, on my view ontological relativity, so called by Quine, ties in with the notion of privacy as Wittgenstein understood it. Anyway, I can see how some will regard my initial critique as oblivious to where Putnam would take us. However, I do reject sense data as "objects" in the sense of individuatable "entities," although my take on criteria of ontological commitment will not be Quinian. More later. 

Regards 

Steve Bayne 
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