[hist-analytic] M. A. E. Dummett

Jlsperanza at aol.com Jlsperanza at aol.com
Mon Jan 9 06:58:41 EST 2012


_http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/sir-michael-dummett?fb=optOut_ 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/sir-michael-dummett?fb=optOut) 
_http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/obituaries/article3270646.ece_ 
(http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/obituaries/article3270646.ece) 
_http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/culture-obituaries/8981654/Profe
ssor-Sir-Michael-Dummett.html_ 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/culture-obituaries/8981654/Professor-Sir-Michael-Dummett.html) 

---
 
A few quotes, below.
JLS
 
---
 
I. Dummett on Grice:
 
"Naturally, so grotesquely false a methodology could not be consistently  
adhered to by intelligent people. In consequence, in place of the  general 
*semantic* concepts that had been expelled in the original  determination to 
pay attention to nothing but the actual _"use"_ of particular  sentences, 
*new* _ones_, such as the celebrated notion of presupposition  [Strawson], or 
that of conversational implicature [Grice], or Austin's  distinction between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary force, and so on, were  invented by the 
"ordinary-language" philosophers themselves; and, in the  process, 
"ordinary-language" philosophy ceased to exist,
almost without anyone noticing that it had. An era had ended. Not with  a 
bang but a whimper. And the moment was propitious for the American  
counterattack." ('[Systematic Philosophy'], repr. "Truth and other enigmas"). 
 
II. Grice on Dummett:
 
(i) In "Logic and Conversation" -- The 4th William James Lecture, for 1967  
-- 'Indicative Conditionals', WoW, p. 79, Grice introduces his paradox, and 
 adds: "Dummett and Kripke suggest that we distinguish between (1) the 
notion of  the probability of a conditional relative to certain evidence h, a 
notion  which is not altered if, for that conditional, we substitute its 
standard  counterpositive, or (for that matter) its standard disjunctive 
counterpart;  for (if p, q)/h is equivalent to (if not q,not p)/h, and also  to 
(either not p or q)/h; and (2) the notion of conditional  probability as it is 
exemplified in the probability of p, relative to both  q and h, a notion 
which CANNOT be treated as identical with the  probability of the negation of q, 
relative to the conjunction of the  negation of p and h. They [Dummett and 
Kripke] further suggest that the puzzle  about Yog and Zog should be taken 
to relate to conditional probabilities and not  to the probability of 
conditionals. ... I do not propose to quallel with this  solution to the 
paradoxical aspect of my example.
 
(ii). More informally [and this relates to Bayne's work on Anscombe, since  
we shared this quote elsewhere], in 
 
Grice's "Notes for Ox Phil 1948-1970",  American Philosophical  
Association. ----- The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,  Grice 
refers to the "Play Group" and Oxford philosophers in general. He divides  them 
indeed into:
 
I. 'yes' [The Play Group] -----  Austin
-----------------------------------------  Grice
-----------------------------------------  Hampshire
-----------------------------------------  Strawson
----------------------------------------- Warnock  
----------------------------------------- ...
II. 'no' -------------------------------  Anscombe
----------------------------------------  Dummett
----------------------------------------  Murdoch
---------------------------------------- ...
III. 'overage' -----------------------  Ryle
----------------------------------------  Hardie
---------------------------------------- ...
 
Refs: "Dummett", in Stanford Encyclopedia, etc. 
 
 




More information about the hist-analytic mailing list