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Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology

by Jonathan Dancy

Preface
Introduction
Part I		KNOWLEDGE
Ch. 1		SCEPTICISM
	1.1	Some Distinctions
	1.2	Three Sceptical Arguments
	1.3	A Short Way with the Sceptic
	1.4	Another Reply
	1.5	A Better Response
Ch. 2		KNOWLEDGE
	2.1	The Traditional Account
	2.2	Gettier Counter-Examples
	2.3	Responses to Gettier
	2.4	Concluding Remarks
Ch. 3		THE CONDITIONAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
	3.1	The Theory
	3.2	Some Comments
	3.3	The Principle of Closure and the First Sceptical Argument
	3.4	Has Nozick Refuted the Sceptic?
	3.5	Internalism and Externalism
Part II		JUSTIFICATION
Ch. 4		FOUNDATIONALISM
	4.1	Classical Foundationalism
	4.2	Problems for the Classical Foundationalist
	4.3	Foundationalism without Infallibility
Ch. 5		FOUNDATIONALISM AND OTHER MINDS
	5.1	Basic Beliefs and One's Own Sensory States
	5.2	The Problem of Other Minds
	5.3	The Argument from Analogy
	5.4	Can You Understand Propositions about Minds Other than your Own?
	5.5	The Private Language Argument: Rule-following
	5.6	Another Interpretation
	5.7	Common Conclusions
	5.8	Prospects for Foundationalism
Ch. 6		EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF MEANING
	6.1	The Relevance of Theories of Meaning to Epistemology
	6.2	Logical Empiricism and the Evidence of One's Senses
	6.3	Three Verificationist Theories
Ch. 7		HOLISM AND INDETERMINACY
	7.1	The Indeterminacy of Translation
	7.2	Quine as a Foundationalist
	7.3	Atomism and Holism
	7.4	The Merits of a More Complete Holism
	7.5	Verificationism, Anti-realism and Foundationalism
Ch. 8		COHERENCE THEORIES
	8.1	What is Coherence?
	8.2	The Coherence Theory of Truth
	8.3	The Coherence Theory of Justification
	8.4	The Role of Empirical Data
	8.5	Coherentism and Empiricism
Ch. 9		COHERENCE, JUSTIFICATION AND KNOWLEDGE
	9.1	The Regress Argument
	9.2	Internalism and Externalism
	9.3	Degrees of Internalism
	9.4	Internalism and Coherentism
	9.5	Coherentism, Realism and Scepticism
Part III		FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE
Ch. 10		THEORIES OF PERCEPTION
	10.1	Is There Room for a Philosophy of Perception?
	10.2	Theories of Perception
	10.3	Direct Realism
	10.4	Indirect Realism
	10.5	Naive and Scientific Forms of Indirect Realism
	10.6	Phenomenalism and Idealism
Ch. 11		PERCEPTION: THE CHOICE OF A THEORY
	11.1	Phenomenalism and the Explanation of Experience
	11.2	Indirect Realism: Double Awareness and a Double Object
	11.3	Direct Realism and the Explanation of Perceptual Error
	11.4	A Causal Element
	11.5	Perception, Causation and Justification
	11.6	Direct Realism and Coherentism
Ch. 12		MEMORY
	12.1	Theories of Memory
	12.2	Indirect Realism
	12.3	Direct Realism
	12.4	Phenomenalism
	12.5	Russell's Hypothesis
	12.6	Perceptual Memory and Justification
Ch. 13		INDUCTION
	13.1	Induction, Perception and Memory
	13.2	Two Conceptions of the Future
	13.3	Hume and his Critics
	13.4	Goodman's New Riddle of Induction
	13.5	Coherentism and Induction
Ch. 14		A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
	14.1	Foundationalism and A Priori Knowledge
	14.2	Empiricism, the A Priori and the Analytic
	14.3	Can Synthetic Truths be Known A Priori?
	14.4	A Priori Knowledge and Universal Truth
	14.5	A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth
	14.6	Quine and the Distinction between A Priori and Empirical
	14.7	A Coherentist Approach
Ch. 15		IS EPISTEMOLOGY POSSIBLE?
	15.1	Hegel
	15.2	Chisholm and the Problem of the Criterion
	15.3	Quine and the Non-existence of First Philosophy
	15.4	Epistemology Naturalized
	15.5	Conclusion
References
Index

Introduction