Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 13 Part 3

Mathematics, harmonics, optics, good and beauty

Paragraph 1 For just as the universal propositions of mathematics deal not with objects which exist separately, apart from extended magnitudes and from numbers, but with magnitudes and numbers, not however qua such as to have magnitude or to be divisible, clearly it is possible that there should also be both propositions and demonstrations about sensible magnitudes, not however qua sensible but qua possessed of certain definite qualities.
Paragraph 2 The same account may be given of harmonics and optics;
Paragraph 3 Each question will be best investigated in this way - by setting up by an act of separation what is not separate, as the arithmetician and the geometer do.
Paragraph 4 Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error.

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