Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 14 Part 2

Whether eternal things can consist of elements

Paragraph 1 We must inquire generally, whether eternal things can consist of elements.
Paragraph 2 There are some who describe the element which acts with the One as an indefinite dyad, and object to 'the unequal', reasonably enough, because of the ensuing difficulties;
Paragraph 3 There are many causes which led them off into these explanations, and especially the fact that they framed the difficulty in an obsolete form.
Paragraph 4 "'For never will this he proved, that things that are not are.'
Paragraph 5 They thought it necessary to prove that that which is not is;
Paragraph 6 But, first, if 'being' has many senses (for it means sometimes substance, sometimes that it is of a certain quality, sometimes that it is of a certain quantity, and at other times the other categories), what sort of 'one', then, are all the things that are, if non-being is to be supposed not to be?
Paragraph 7 Secondly, of what sort of non-being and being do the things that are consist?
Paragraph 8 The question evidently is, how being, in the sense of 'the substances', is many;
Paragraph 9 They should have asked this question also, how relative terms are many and not one.
Paragraph 10 It is necessary, then, as we say, to presuppose for each thing that which is it potentially;
Paragraph 11 But further, if the 'this' and the quantitative are not the same, we are not told how and why the things that are are many, but how quantities are many.
Paragraph 12 One might fix one's attention also on the question, regarding the numbers, what justifies the belief that they exist.

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