Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 3 Part 4

8-11: individuals and universals, being and unity

Paragraph 1 (8) There is a difficulty connected with these, the hardest of all and the most necessary to examine, and of this the discussion now awaits us.
Paragraph 2 But if this is necessary, and there must be something apart from the individuals, it will be necessary that the genera exist apart from the individuals, either the lowest or the highest genera;
Paragraph 3 Further, if we admit in the fullest sense that something exists apart from the concrete thing, whenever something is predicated of the matter, must there, if there is something apart, be something apart from each set of individuals, or from some and not from others, or from none?
Paragraph 4 But again (B) if we are to suppose this, it is hard to say in which cases we are to suppose it and in which not.
Paragraph 5 (9) Again, one might ask the following question also about the first principles.
Paragraph 6 But if there is a common element which is numerically one, and each of the principles is one, and the principles are not as in the case of perceptible things different for different things (e.g. since this particular syllable is the same in kind whenever it occurs, the elements it are also the same in kind;
Paragraph 7 (10) One difficulty which is as great as any has been neglected both by modern philosophers and by their predecessors - whether the principles of perishable and those of imperishable things are the same or different.
Paragraph 8 "From which all that was and is and will be hereafter -
Paragraph 9 Trees, and men and women, took their growth,
Paragraph 10 And beasts and birds and water-nourished fish,
Paragraph 11 And long-aged gods."
Paragraph 12 The implication is evident even apart from these words;
Paragraph 13 "we see earth, by water water,
Paragraph 14 By ether godlike ether, by fire wasting fire,
Paragraph 15 Love by love, and strife by gloomy strife."
Paragraph 16 But - and this is the point we started from - this at least is evident, that on his theory it follows that strife is as much the cause of existence as of destruction.
Paragraph 17 "But when strife at last waxed great in the limbs of the Sphere,
Paragraph 18 And sprang to assert its rights as the time was fulfilled
Paragraph 19 Which is fixed for them in turn by a mighty oath."
Paragraph 20 This implies that change was necessary;
Paragraph 21 Let this suffice as proof of the fact that the principles cannot be the same.
Paragraph 22 (11) The inquiry that is both the hardest of all and the most necessary for knowledge of the truth is whether being and unity are the substances of things, and whether each of them, without being anything else, is being or unity respectively, or we must inquire what being and unity are, with the implication that they have some other underlying nature.
Paragraph 23 (A) If we do not suppose unity and being to be substances, it follows that none of the other universals is a substance;
Paragraph 24 But (B) if there is a unity-itself and a being itself, unity and being must be their substance;
Paragraph 25 There are objections to both views.
Paragraph 26 Further, if unity-itself is indivisible, according to Zeno's postulate it will be nothing.
Paragraph 27 But even if ore supposes the case to be such that, as some say, number proceeds from unity-itself and something else which is not one, none the less we must inquire why and how the product will be sometimes a number and sometimes a magnitude, if the not-one was inequality and was the same principle in either case.

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