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Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 4 Part 2

One science for being qua being, substance and unity

  
Paragraph 1 There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', but all that 'is' is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to 'be' by a mere ambiguity.
Paragraph 2 Now for each one class of things, as there is one perception, so there is one science, as for instance grammar, being one science, investigates all articulate sounds.
Paragraph 3 If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition (though it makes no difference even if we suppose them to be like that - in fact this would even strengthen our case);
Paragraph 4 And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance, so that there must necessarily be among them a first philosophy and one which follows this.
Paragraph 5 Now since it is the work of one science to investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed to unity - and it belongs to one science to investigate the negation and the privation because in both cases we are really investigating the one thing of which the negation or the privation is a negation or privation (for we either say simply that that thing is not present, or that it is not present in some particular class;
Paragraph 6 It is evident, then, that it belongs to one science to be able to give an account of these concepts as well as of substance (this was one of the questions in our book of problems), and that it is the function of the philosopher to be able to investigate all things.
Paragraph 7 Again, in the list of contraries one of the two columns is privative, and all contraries are reducible to being and non-being, and to unity and plurality, as for instance rest belongs to unity and movement to plurality.


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