| | |
| Paragraph 1 |
Whenever one premiss is necessary, the other problematic,
there will
be a syllogism when the terms are related as before; |
| Paragraph 2 |
If the premisses are affirmative, clearly the conclusion which
follows is not necessary. |
| Paragraph 3 |
But if the premisses are not similar in quality, suppose first
that the negative premiss is necessary, and let necessarily A not be
possible for any B, but let B be possible for all C. |
| Paragraph 4 |
The same relation will obtain in particular syllogisms. |
| Paragraph 5 |
Clearly then from what has been said a syllogism results
or not from
similar relations of the terms whether we are dealing with simple
existence or necessity, with this exception, that if the negative
premiss is assertoric the conclusion is problematic, but if the
negative premiss is necessary the conclusion is both problematic and
negative assertoric. |