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| Paragraph 1 |
It is clear that if the conclusion is to show an attribute
inhering as such, nothing can be demonstrated except from its
'appropriate' basic truths. |
| Paragraph 2 |
Our knowledge of any attribute's connexion with a subject is
accidental unless we know that connexion through the middle term in
virtue of which it inheres, and as an inference from basic premisses
essential and 'appropriate' to the subject - unless we know, e.g. the
property of possessing angles equal to two right angles as belonging
to that subject in which it inheres essentially, and as inferred
from basic premisses essential and 'appropriate' to that subject: |
| Paragraph 3 |
It is no less evident that the peculiar basic truths of each
inhering attribute are indemonstrable; |
| Paragraph 4 |
It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not; |