Aristotle - The Organon - index for ANALYTICA POSTERIORA Book 1 Part 33

Scientific knowledge differs from opinion

Paragraph 1 Scientific knowledge and its object differ from opinion and the object of opinion in that scientific knowledge is commensurately universal and proceeds by necessary connexions, and that which is necessary cannot be otherwise.
Paragraph 2 In what sense, then, can the same thing be the object of both opinion and knowledge?
Paragraph 3 The truth perhaps is that if a man grasp truths that cannot be other than they are, in the way in which he grasps the definitions through which demonstrations take place, he will have not opinion but knowledge:
Paragraph 4 This also shows that one cannot opine and know the same thing 9simultaneously;
Paragraph 5 Further consideration of modes of thinking and their distribution under the heads of discursive thought, intuition, science, art, practical wisdom, and metaphysical thinking, belongs rather partly to natural science, partly to moral philosophy.

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