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| Paragraph 1 |
Scientific knowledge and its object differ from opinion and the
object of opinion in that scientific knowledge is commensurately
universal and proceeds by necessary connexions, and that which is
necessary cannot be otherwise. |
| Paragraph 2 |
In what sense, then, can the same thing be the object of both
opinion and knowledge? |
| Paragraph 3 |
The truth perhaps is that if a man grasp truths that
cannot be other
than they are, in the way in which he grasps the definitions through
which demonstrations take place, he will have not opinion but
knowledge: |
| Paragraph 4 |
This also shows that one cannot opine and know the same thing
9simultaneously; |
| Paragraph 5 |
Further consideration of modes of thinking and their distribution
under the heads of discursive thought, intuition, science, art,
practical wisdom, and metaphysical thinking, belongs rather partly
to natural science, partly to moral philosophy. |
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created 1996/11/25 modified 2009/04/26