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These, then, are the four kinds of question we ask, and it is in the answers to these questions that our knowledge consists. |
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Now when we ask whether a connexion is a fact, or whether a thing without qualification is, we are really asking whether the connexion or the thing has a 'middle'; |
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(By distinguishing the fact of the connexion and the existence of the thing as respectively the partial and the unqualified being of the thing, I mean that if we ask 'does the moon suffer eclipse |
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We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether there is a 'middle' or what the 'middle' is: |
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Cases in which the 'middle' is sensible show that the object of our inquiry is always the 'middle': |
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Thus, as we maintain, to know a thing's nature is to know the reason why it is; |