| | |
| Paragraph 1 |
These, then, are the four kinds of question we ask, and it
is in the
answers to these questions that our knowledge consists. |
| Paragraph 2 |
Now when we ask whether a connexion is a fact, or whether a thing
without qualification is, we are really asking whether the connexion
or the thing has a 'middle'; |
| Paragraph 3 |
(By distinguishing the fact of the connexion and the existence of
the thing as respectively the partial and the unqualified
being of the
thing, I mean that if we ask
'does the moon suffer eclipse?' |
| Paragraph 4 |
We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether
there is a 'middle' or what the 'middle' is: |
| Paragraph 5 |
Cases in which the 'middle' is sensible show that the object of
our inquiry is always the 'middle': |
| Paragraph 6 |
Thus, as we maintain, to know a thing's nature is to know
the reason
why it is; |