| Paragraph 1 |
So much, then, for the first stage of our problem. |
| Paragraph 2 |
We might argue it impossible on the following grounds |
| Paragraph 3 |
If one does not take this relation as thus duplicated-if, that is, A is predicated as being of the essence of B, but B is not of the essence of the subjects of which it is predicated-A will not necessarily be predicated of C as belonging to its essence. |
| Paragraph 4 |
We may generalize by supposing that it is possible to prove the essential nature of man. |
| Paragraph 5 |
Thus they who prove the essential nature of soul or man or anything else through reciprocating terms beg the question. |
| Paragraph 6 |
We conclude, then, that unless one takes both the premisses as predicating essence, one cannot infer that A is the definable form and essence of C: |