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| Paragraph 1 |
Can we nevertheless actually demonstrate what a thing essentially
and substantially is, but hypothetically, i.e. by premising (1) that
its definable form is constituted by the 'peculiar' attributes of
its essential nature; |
| Paragraph 2 |
Further, just as in syllogizing we do not premise what syllogistic
inference is (since the premisses from which we conclude must be
related as whole and part), so the definable form must not
fall within
the syllogism but remain outside the premisses posited. |
| Paragraph 3 |
The following type of hypothetical proof also begs the question. |
| Paragraph 4 |
Again, both proof by division and the syllogism just described are
open to the question why man should be animal-biped-terrestrial and
not merely animal and terrestrial, since what they premise does not
ensure that the predicates shall constitute a genuine unity and not
merely belong to a single subject as do musical and grammatical when
predicated of the same man. |