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| Paragraph 1 |
The effect may be still coming to be, or its occurrence may be past
or future, yet the cause will be the same as when it is actually
existent - for it is the middle which is the cause - except that if the
effect actually exists the cause is actually existent, if it
is coming
to be so is the cause, if its occurrence is past the cause
is past, if
future the cause is future. |
| Paragraph 2 |
To take a second example: |
| Paragraph 3 |
This sort of cause, then, and its effect come to be simultaneously
when they are in process of becoming, and exist simultaneously when
they actually exist; |
| Paragraph 4 |
The following must suffice as an account of the manner in which
the middle would be identical with the cause on the supposition that
coming-to-be is a series of consecutive events: |
| Paragraph 5 |
If we get our middle term in this way, will the series terminate
in an immediate premiss, or since, as we said, no two events are
'contiguous', will a fresh middle term always intervene because
there is an infinity of middles? |
| Paragraph 6 |
Now we observe in Nature a certain kind of circular process of
coming-to-be; |
| Paragraph 7 |
Some occurrences are universal (for they are, or come-to-be what
they are, always and in ever case); |
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created 1996/11/25 modified 2009/04/26