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| Paragraph 1 |
The right way, then, is either to divide apparent proofs and refutations
as above, or else to refer them all to ignorance of what 'refutation'
is, and make that our starting-point: |
| Paragraph 2 |
Fallacies that depend on Accident are clear cases of ignoratio elenchi
when once 'proof' has been defined. |
| Paragraph 3 |
Those that depend upon whether something is said in a certain respect
only or said absolutely, are clear cases of ignoratio elenchi because
the affirmation and the denial are not concerned with the same point. |
| Paragraph 4 |
The clearest cases of all, however, are those that were previously
described' as depending upon the definition of a 'refutation': |
| Paragraph 5 |
Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon
stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be
cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. |
| Paragraph 6 |
Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon
stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be
cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. |
| Paragraph 7 |
Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident: |
| Paragraph 8 |
Those fallacies that depend upon the making of several questions into
one consist in our failure to dissect the definition of 'proposition'. |