It is a major part of the enterprise of metaphysical ontology to find a way to separate out the abosolute from the relative
or the conventional.
This is so difficult that complete scepticism about the possibility is by no means unreasonable.

Even if we are convinced that there really is "out there" some objective substance to our world, it is not clear that there
is any way of talking about it which is not riddled with artifice and loaded with elements which depend more on choice of
language than on the nature of objective reality.

Consider the ontological status of continuously extended material objects (if such there be).
In out mathematical mndels, space itself, though continuous, is modelled as a continuum of points.
One extended body may be mathematically not a single entitiy but a function consisting of a graph corresponding to the distribution
of matter over a region of space.
This would typically involve a collection of entities with the cardinality of the continuum.

Are we to suppose that there really are so many parts to an extended material object?
Or should we take this ontological plenitude as an artifice of our mathematical methods, and the reality as something which
may conveniently be modelled and predicted by such means but in its essence consists of some smaller collection of entities?