Wittgenstein's 'private language' argument

DB1 The following consists of comments upon selected passages from Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' relevant to the 'private language argument'.

For the benefit of those who do not possess a copy of the Investigations I have quoted in full the sections I am commenting upon. The original text is shown in red. I have only been able to deal with a fraction of the relevant material but there should be enough to serve as a basis for discussion.

Wittgenstein numbers his paragraphs, and so have I. The following tables indicate the topics of each of the paragraphs.
Wittgenstein's Paragraphs
243... could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give expression to his inner experiences ... for his private use? ...
244How do words refer to sensations? ...
245For how can I ... try to use language to get between pain and its expression?
246 In what sense are my sensations private? ...
256Now what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand? ...
257"What would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain... ? ...
258 I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. ...
259Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?
260"Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again." ...
261What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation? ...
262... you must inwardly undertake to use the word in such-and-such a way ...
263... A queer question.
264"Once you know what the word stands for, you understand it, you know its whole use."
My Paragraphs
DB3243, a language private in the sense of being capable of referring to private objects (or what have you's), need not also be private in the sense of being understood by only one person
DB4 244, 245, 246
DB5246, making sense.
DB6256, 257
DB7258, 259, 260
DB8261, 262, 263, 264

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