The scope of deductive reason is considered, in principle and in practice. This is done in three stages. First the relation between deductive reason and analytic truth is discussed. Next a connection is made between analyticity and set theoretic truth, suggesting both that analytic truths can be read as truths of set theory in various syntactic clothes and that the truths of set theory are themselves analytic. The semantics of set theory is then considered, with a view to making as precise as possible the extension of the concept of set theoretic truth, thereby circumscribing the scope of deductive reason. Alongside these theoretical considerations, the pragmatics of application of deduction, particularly in securing confidence in the development of information systems, are born in mind. These considerations provide motivation for foundational studies and a moderating context in which foundational skepticism is evaluated.

Various set theoretic definitions of the concept of analyticity are presented and their characteristics consdered. It is noted that certain techniques for abstraction prevent defining the synthetic as complementary to analytic, and the consequences of this problem are explored, leading to new ways of defining analyticity.

It is argued briefly that the questions of {\it what there is}, and of {\it how many} things there are, admit no definite answer. The question of what there {\it might be} is however susceptible of partial resolution and is found to be closely connected with that of {\it how many} things there {\it might be}. Ways are considered in which these questions might be answered.

An assortment of essays I wrote a long time ago.