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Epistemology

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which studies knowledge and how we come by it. It is therefore a part of philosophy with general methodological significance for philosophy as a whole.

The Fundamental Triple-Dichotomy: rhetoric on the analytic/synthetic distinction and its associates.
The Fundamental Triple-Dichotomy: Materials preparatory to the preparation of a monograph on the triple-dichotomy
Defining Analyticity: a definition of analyticity and a discussion of its merits.
Synthetic Epistemology: Synthetic epistemology is an approach to epistemology in which standards of justification for claims to knowledge are recognised as elective, and in which sound judgement is recognised as primary.
Historical Notes on Analyticity:
Two Epistemological Triads: Factasia explores the relationships between three kinds of knowledge (analytic, synthetic, values) and three sources of knowledge (analysis, intuition and emotion).
Three Kinds of Knowledge: Factasia tries to square the circle, putting intellect, intuition and emotion each in their proper places in divining truth.
: Logical truths, derided as content free and trivial, are the bedrock of mathematics, science, engineering and more. We explore how they fit in, now and in the future.
Fact is stranger than fiction. If you want to understand the future well enough to make good choices today, a touch of fantasy will help you find the "facts".
Factastic Future Engineering: is a method grounded in factastic epistemology for proactive prediction of the future.
Epistemological problems include:
  • The meaning of words such as "know" (which may not be clearly distinguished from theories of knowledge).
  • Scepticism and its refutation (the justification of claims to knowledge).
  • Broad classifications of knowledge, such as the analytic/synthetic distinction (and their refutation).
  • Particular kinds of knowledge (e.g. knowledge from perception, from memory, or from induction).


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