3. Skepticism and Pluralism

Hume's skepticism was focussed, not on the broader conceptions of knowledge, but on demonstrative knowledge. He drew the distinction (see his Enquiries) between "Relations of Ideas" (which we might today call analytic or logical truths) and "Matters of Fact" (synthetic or contingent truths) and argued that the former could be and the latter could not be intuitively or demonstratively certain. To deny a certainty is to affirm other possibilities. Hume's skepticism is a charter against dogmatism. Adoption of a definite single model of any aspect of reality on the basis of inconclusive evidence is not rational. It is better to seek an understanding of the full range of models which are consistent with the evidence, or to adopt a model on pragmatic grounds without asserting its truth or denying alternative models.

4. Succeeding Against the Odds

Purposive Collaborative Activity leads to Realisation of improbable ends By their action individuals alone or in concert can realise ends which would otherwise be very highly improbable. Knowledge of the future depends therefore upon knowledge of the present intentions of those who seek to influence the future. For each person who seeks to influence our future, the vision which he has of the future cannot be rationally separated from reality. Someone devoted to realising an improbable future must work with models which are consistent with that realisation. He must chose between possibilities which would all be very improbable without intelligent intervention. Knowledge of the future is a choice between factastic visions.