|1||Warren S. McCulloch|
|A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity|
|2||Alan M. Turing||Computing Machinery and Intelligence|
|3||John R. Searle||Minds, Brains and Programs|
|4||Margaret A. Boden||Escaping from the Chinese Room|
Herbert A Simon
|Computer Science as Empirical Enquiry|
|6||David C. Marr||Artificial Intelligence: A Personal View|
|7||Daniel C. Dennett||Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI|
|8||Patrick J. Hayes||The Naive Physics Manifesto|
|9||Drew McDermott||A Critique of Pure Reason|
|10||Aaron Sloman||Motives, Mechanisms and Emotions|
|11||Geoffrey E. Hinton|
David E. Rumelhart
|12||Andy Clark||Connectionism, Competence and Explanation|
|13||Hubert L. Dreyfus|
Stuart E. Dreyfus
|Making a Mind Versus Modellng the Brain: Artificial Intelligence at a Branch Point|
|14||Paul M.Churchland||Some Reductive strategies in Cognitive Neurobiology|
|15||Adrian Cussins||The Connectionist Construction of Concepts|
She considers the main division in AI to be between "GOFAI" (Good Old Fashioned AI) and Connectionism, claiming that both have a common ancestry in the paper by McCulloch and Pitts in Chapter 1. This reflects Boden's perception of AI as a part of cognitive science concerned with the modelling of mental phenomena, rather than (say) as an engineering enterprise attaching no special significance to the structure of the brain.
Having discussed the significance of the McCulloch and Pitt paper Margaret moves on (or rather back) to Turing's paper (chapter 2), briefly describing the "Turing Test".
Three kinds of objection to Turings position are mentioned:
Moving on from the criticisms of Turing, we come to the paper by Newell and Simon, in Chapter 4, where the concept of a Physical-Symbol System is introduced. In this paper computer science is characterised as empirical enquiry.