Aristotle - index for METAPHYSICA Book 7 Part 6

Each thing and its essence are one and the same

Paragraph 1 We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different.
Paragraph 2 Now in the case of accidental unities the two would be generally thought to be different, e.g. white man would be thought to be different from the essence of white man.
Paragraph 3 But in the case of so-called self-subsistent things, is a thing necessarily the same as its essence?
Paragraph 4 Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence, so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one.
Paragraph 5 (But of an accidental term, e.g.'the musical' or 'the white', since it has two meanings, it is not true to say that it itself is identical with its essence;
Paragraph 6 The absurdity of the separation would appear also if one were to assign a name to each of the essences;
Paragraph 7 Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence.

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