In which is explained the purpose and structure of this work. This consists in taking a philosophical position and some problems which flow from it and then recasting these problems. The aim is to do this as clearly possible while replacing, wherever possible, philosophical presumptions with choice of appropriate language for the formulation of the problems. The role of the position then becomes motivational rather than substantive.

A sketch of a conception of philosophy and of metaphysics closer to those of ancient Greece than to contemporary conceptions.

The re-presentation of metaphyisical positivism, insofar as this can be done, as a choice of idiom rather than as a body of doctrine, preliminary to the use of that language for the statement of various problems.

A discussion of metaphysics from the point of view of metaphysical positivism.

Some temporary notes about particular metaphysical problems of personal interest.

It is my purpose here simply to identify some problems which seem to me to be of philosophical interest That I can now exalt in such a purpose is symptomatic of the advance of my own personal scepticism. Previously I have sought to articulate some elementary philosophical principles as a prelude to the articulation of ideas which belong properly to engineering rather than philosophy. The perceived need for such an articulation lead swifly to an acute and debilitating awareness that these principles which seemed to me elementary, were regarded by many or most contemporary philosophers as false.

A significant element of the position here considered is Popper stance in the poker debate. By this I mean the philosophical issue at stake between Popper and Wittgenstein on the occasion of Popper's speaking at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge. The invitation to Popper invited him to speak upon some "Philosophical Riddle" and Popper chose to attach the presumption apparent in this form of invitation that philosophy is not concerned with substantive problems.

The philosophical position which I occupy, seems to me, rather than a collection of substantive disagreements on matters of (philosophical) fact, is accounted for primarily by a divergent philosophical interests and related idiomatic preferences. My disagreement with other philosophers on the truth of various statements is often the child of conflicting usage.

Because of this a bald statement of position has sometimes seemed to me more appropriate than a confrontation on points of controversy.

As I have become more aware of my own limitations in progressing the kinds of philosophical problem which I find most interesting, the mere formulation of problems has come to seem by itself worthwhile and interesting. The focus simply on the statement of problems reinforces my perception that my position consists in large parts of interests, languages and methods rather than of doctrine. The structure of this work is therefore oriented toward making explicit the extent to which my philosophical world view consists in choice of language and methods appropriate for certain problems of interest.

The first part of the work is simply a position statement, but its role is auxiliary. The next part attempts to recast as much as possible of that position as mere choice of language, appropriate for the formulation of the oroblems which appears in the final part.

Modern conception's of philosophy, particularly those of analytic philosophers in the 20th century are naoorw by comparison with those found at the roots of Western philosophy in Ancient Greece. Our purpose here is to draw on some of these earlier ideas in a sketch of a liberal modern conception of the nature of philosophy.

Plato's views here are made plain in his similes of the line and of the cave, in which knowledge of Platonic forms is the only true knowledge.

Aristotle's views are found in Book I of his metaphysics. First philosophy lies at one exalted extreme of several linear orderings in which the various kinds of knowledge can be placed.

The core concern of pure positive philosophy is to understand the human predicament, both the cosmos in which we find ourselves, the nature of humanity and place in the universe.

The description of language suitable for definite statement of certain metaphysical problems, transforming relevant aspects of metaphysical positivism from a position statement to a choice of language.

Let us define for present purposes an abstract entity as one which is causally isolated from the material or sensory universe, our knowledge of which arises entirely by inference from the definitions of the entities. What can be said in this context about what abstract entities exist? Well, working with Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions, there are very many internal questions which can be settled, and a lot of this is done in set theory. On the "external" questions, e.g. granted that in the context of set theory we can prove the existence of various sets, but are the axioms of set theory correct descriptions of any part of reality, or is set theory entirely hypothetical?