A development of aspects of the philosophies of Leibniz and Carnap in the direction of design automation.

An informal sketch of the development of my ideas about non wellfounded ontologies for the foundations of mathematics.

A discussion of issues in the design of formal logical foundation systems suitable for use in machine supported formal derivations
of analytic models.
The outlines of a proposed system with a roadmap for turning the outline into a specification for implementation.

Positivists have often been antipathetic to metaphysics.
Here, however. a positive role for metaphysics is sought.
Problems about reality which may not be resolved by the methods of the deductive or empirical sciences are considered.
In this domain, the identification of meaningful problems, or of plausible methods is itself an achievement, and is the main
purpose of this essay.

A speculation about what the fundamental differences between the philosophies of Rudolf Carnap and Paul Grice might have been
had they survived into the twenty first century.

A discussion of methods for the formalisation of Physics.

An interview conducted by Tony Dale with Roger Bishop Jones on mechanised proof.

Mainly about his {\it lingua characteristica} and {\it calculus ratiocinator}.

A description of the specification and proof tool ProofPower.

An exercise in classical (possibly even prehistoric) skepticism.
Of necessity this exercise has the character of tentative ideas rendered as sketchy notes.
These notes document a retreat in which ideas on the scope for objective ontological knowledge are progressively narrowed.
The last ditch in this process is the question of how many things it is logically possible that there might be.

Various set theoretic definitions of the concept of analyticity are presented and their characteristics consdered.
It is noted that certain techniques for abstraction prevent defining
the synthetic as complementary to the analytic, and the consequences of this problem are explored, leading to new ways of
defining analyticity.

The scope of deductive reason is considered.
First a connection is discussed between the scope of sound deductive inference and the notion of set theoretic truth via the
concepts {\it demonstrative} and {\it analytic}.
Then the problem of determining the meaning of set theory and the extension of set theoretic truth is addressed.

An assortment of essays I wrote a long time ago.
