Index of Essays
This is a collection of essays in progress, mostly not very far progressed. They are written in LaTeX, made available in pdf.
An introduction to and an overview of various work in progress.
Notes for a philosophical discussion on the future of humanity.
This is a place for drafting materials to be posted to my Roger Bishop Jones blog, or elsewhere.
Notes for a philosophical discussion on why and how we should choose foundations for mathematics.
More than one attempt at an abstract for submission to SOTFOM II, an upcoming symposium on the foundations of mathematics.
The ancient Chinese philosophy of Dao provides ideas which may be seen as fundamental to contemporary ideas in ethics, politics and economics and therefore which together provide a basis for new approaches to practical philosophy.
Some thoughts about the nature of philosophy and the kinds of philosophy.
This note offers an alternative to a proposal by Rob Arthan for a simpler and more powerful replacement for the mechanisms currently provided in the various HOL implementation for defining new constants. [THe document is derived from Rob's paper and is mostly exactly the same since I didn't get very far in making the intended changes. My guess is that it is only in the description at the beginning that there may be some differences. The material which it modifies was I think presented by Rob at one of the HOL conferences (probably 2013) without mention of the ideas here, but at the time I write this codicil to the abstract Rob is in preparing final amendments to a version of his paper for publication in a special edition of the Journal of Automated Reasoning and his intention is, as I understand it, to include mention of this possibility in the paper, the details of which we have recently discussed.]
Issues properly belonging to the semantics of set theory are now being addressed using results about forcing. This essay considers the relevance of forcing to semantics.
A description of my efforts in the foundations of mathematics over the past 25+ years.
A discussion of the philosophical programme of Rudolf Carnap, its place in the philosophy of the twentieth century and of its sigificance for the applications of interactive theorem proving software.
A discussion of the relationship between these two different systems of ideas.
An informal discussion of abstract ontology.
A development of aspects of the philosophies of Leibniz and Carnap in the direction of design automation.
An informal sketch of the development of my ideas about non well-founded ontologies for the foundations of mathematics.
A discussion of issues in the design of formal logical foundation systems suitable for use in machine supported formal derivations of analytic models. The outlines of a proposed system with a roadmap for turning the outline into a specification for implementation.
Positivists have often been antipathetic to metaphysics. Here, however. a positive role for metaphysics is sought. Problems about reality which may not be resolved by the methods of the deductive or empirical sciences are considered. In this domain, the identification of meaningful problems, or of plausible methods is itself an achievement, and is the main purpose of this essay.
A speculation about what the fundamental differences between the philosophies of Rudolf Carnap and Paul Grice might have been had they survived into the twenty first century.
A discussion of methods for the formalisation of Physics.
An interview conducted by Tony Dale with Roger Bishop Jones on mechanised proof.
Mainly about his {\it lingua characteristica} and {\it calculus ratiocinator}.
A description of the specification and proof tool ProofPower.
An exercise in classical (possibly even pre-historic) skepticism. Of necessity this exercise has the character of tentative ideas rendered as sketchy notes. These notes document a retreat in which ideas on the scope for objective ontological knowledge are progressively narrowed. The last ditch in this process is the question of how many things it is logically possible that there might be.
Various set theoretic definitions of the concept of analyticity are presented and their characteristics consdered. It is noted that certain techniques for abstraction prevent defining the synthetic as complementary to the analytic, and the consequences of this problem are explored, leading to new ways of defining analyticity.
The scope of deductive reason is considered. First a connection is discussed between the scope of sound deductive inference and the notion of set theoretic truth via the concepts {\it demonstrative} and {\it analytic}. Then the problem of determining the meaning of set theory and the extension of set theoretic truth is addressed.
An assortment of essays I wrote a long time ago.

up quick index © RBJ

privacy policy


$Id: indexhead.xml,v 1.1 2006/10/21 17:18:21 rbj01 Exp $